Too Many Chefs

It is said that too many chefs spoil the broth. The point is obvious: if you are making something (pretty much anything) someone - some ONE - has to be in charge. If two people are in charge of making the soup, it is likely to come out a bit off.

This idea of concentrating leadership, or at least avoiding any unnecessary diffusing of leadership, is nowhere as important as in an army or navy. The reason is obvious: fast, crisp decisions are necessary to survive and win in combat, and fast, crisp decisions are difficult or impossible if there are too many people trying to be in charge.  On a ship, where there is limited space and no escape, the necessity for good order is obvious and the more difficult the situation the greater the need.

Not only is a clear, uncluttered chain of command a central element of successful military units, the reverse is also true, top-heavy commands (too many chefs) run higher risks of poor decisions, and even when they make good decisions the decision-making process will normally be slower, and hence they run the risk of unsuccessful operations; said differently, top heavy armies and navies run higher risks of losing.

Between 1941 and 1945, 17 officers served as 4 star admirals; this number includes Adm. Kimmel, in command of the fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, Adm. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations on December 7th, and 5 officers promoted to 4 stars during the spring and summer of 1945. Of those 4 stars, 3 of them were actually wearing 5 stars by the end of the war. The last officer to be promoted to admiral during WWII was Samuel Robinson, promoted to 4 stars on 27 August  1945. Technically, that’s after Japan surrendered, but before the formal end of the war, September 2nd, 1945. Robinson was the 66th 4-star admiral in the Navy since its birth (Farragut was the first, in 1866).

Since 1945 the Navy has promoted 172 officers to 4 stars, and currently has 8 - four star admirals; there are a few other differences.

One of those differences is in the process of what is called in the military  “command and control” (known as “C2”). The DOD defines command and control as the exercise of authority over assigned forces by a properly designated officer in the accomplishment of an assigned mission (it varies a bit from service to service but the gist of it is the same). To do so, the commander needs to know what his own forces are doing and what the enemy is doing. Keeping the commander informed, and being able receive tasking from the commander is, therefore, central to C2.

Since WWII a great deal of money has been spent on improving C2. This has centered on the technology and process of passing and displaying data both up and down echelon; keeping the boss informed, and then receiving his orders; speed and accuracy and completeness of data - in both directions - is essential. 

How fast could we pass data 80 years ago? By the early 1950s the Navy was operating communications systems that could pass text between 100 and 200 words per minute (PER MINUTE). The best rates during WWII were 74.2 baud, which, if using binary coding, would equate to 74.2 bits per second. In practice, it was less than 74 bits per second. But, if running well, this translated into something on the order of 50 to 100 words per minute - atmospherics being an important factor in the final rate on any given day.

Note, this was all text. There was no true data link. Locating data was spelled out and then someone on the other end had to take “12 degrees 1 minute N 134 degree 47 minutes E” and go plot that on a map.

This means that passing precise data was very difficult even on your own ship and aircraft, never mind what you thought the enemy was doing. Accordingly, there was need for decision-makers to be present at each critical spot, and the answer was to have more senior officers present with forces.

It’s worth noting that one of the common justifications through the years for funding more advanced communications equipment is that increased data rates and increased security will allow centralization and streamlining of command and control and allow for more rapid AND better command decisions, with the need for fewer command centers and a simpler, leaner command structure. 

By the 1980s we had developed an array of data links as well as satellite communications. Link 16, an example of just one of several data link systems, and now the common data link for NATO, passes data (per WIKIPEDIA) at one of 3 rates: 31,600, 57,600, or 115,200 bits per second. And this is just one of multiple data links. This works out to data rates between 500 and 1500 times that which was available in 1945.

And about that Navy ( https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html#1938  ): in 1945 the Navy had 51 battleships or fleet carriers, 71 escort carriers, 72 cruisers, 738 destroyers and frigates, 232 submarines, and nearly 6,000 other ships, plus a merchant marine of 11,000 ships, manned by more than 3.3 million officers and sailors.

Today the US Navy has 328,000 officers and sailors, 10 aircraft carriers and 297 total ships, which happens to also be the number of admirals listed in the US Naval Institute’s Naval Review issues of May 2024.

So, to restate: in World War II the US Navy (and the US Army and the US Army Air Force) had no data links, no automated displays of where ships and aircraft were, no means to automatically identify whether a whip or aircraft or truck was friendly or enemy, no “Blue Force Tracker” that allowed the automated following of own forces, no digital communications, and a data transmission rate of less than 100 words per minute.

The Navy was commanded by fewer than 300 x 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 star admirals. Of note, by summer of 1945, the US Army (with 90 divisions and more than 8 million soldiers, and the same data rates as the Navy, had 188 generals of all ranks. 

So, if we have a total force that is less than 1/10th the size of the force in WWII, and a command and control system that is in excess of 1,000 times more effective, why do we need more admirals now then we did then? 

The US Navy is not top heavy, it is not “fat” with senior officers; when we consider both the much smaller size and the much more capable command and control, the US command structure is morbidly obese. The other services are as well. 

Some in Congress seem upset that the President just relieved 1 admiral (US Coast Guard - they have the same problems). But the truth is that if there is any desire to make the command structures of the Navy and the other services more effective and more efficient, the number of senior officers - and the number of senior civilians - requires drastic reduction. Congress needs to understand that most of the admirals, and most of the senior civilians, have become impediments to efficiency and most importantly, to effectiveness. They need to be prepared for many admirals and SES being asked to retire and not being replaced. And it needs to begin immediately.