January 21st, 2025 

Ground Ops - Velyka Novosilke may fall soon

- More Russian gains near Pokrovsk

Politics  - Brigade Commander Charged fro Desertions

Weather

Kharkiv

32 and mostly cloudy. Cloudy for the next week, snow showers Friday. Temperatures will be in the upper 20s all day Wednesday and Thursday, and then in the low 30s Friday, Saturday and Sunday. Winds from eh south-east or east, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

33 and mostly cloudy. Cloudy all week, temperatures in the 30s (highs and lows) all week.  Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

34 and cloudy, gusting over 20, windchill low 20s. Cloudy for the week; temperatures hovering between 30 and 35 all week. Winds southerly, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations 

Kursk Salient

Fighting continues along much of the perimeter of the Kursk salient, but there were no confirmed changes in the front lines.

North of Kharkiv

Fighting was reported in the vicinity of Vovchansk, north-east of Kharkiv, but there were no confirmed changes in the front lines.

North of the Donets River

Russian forces continued operation north of Kupyansk and it appears that they made some small gains west of the Oskil River, in the terrain due west and due north from Dvorichna. Further south, there does not appear to be any change in the front lines just east of Zapadne.

In the general area west of Svatove, Russian forces continue to attack both south and north along the east bank of the Oskil River, into Zahryzove and Kolysnikivka, but there were no confirmed changes in the line. A bit to the south-east, however, Russian forces in the general area of Zelenyi Hai continue to attack to the south-west and appear to have pressed another mile to the south-west and are now perhaps 7 miles from the town of Borova.

Fighting also continues near Terny with Russian forces attacking westward from their positions just west of the Zherebets River, and also southward, from the Terny area - on the east bank of the river. But, there were no confirmed changes in the front line.

Bakhmut 

North and north-east of Bakhmut fighting was reported throughout the weekend but there were no noted changes to the front lines.

Fighting continues in central Chasiv Yar but reporting continues to be contradictory and there is no clear indication that the Russians have forced the Ukrainians completely out of the ceramics plant, and hence out of central Chasiv Yar. The same uncertainty pertains just south of Chasiv Yar in Stupochky and Predtechyne. Russian forces were noted just east of Bila Hora, however, as the Russians continue to press into the empty spaces between the towns.

On the north edge of Toretsk Russian forces continue to fight for control of the several mine refuse piles just outside the north-west edge of the town, and fighting is described as “fierce.” But the town of Toretsk is, with the exception of a few small pockets of trapped Ukrainian troops, in Russian hands. The village of Krymske, essentially northern Toretsk, is still held by Ukrainian troops. Russian attacks also continued in Shcherbynivka over the weekend.

Donetsk City Area

Russian forces continue to advance, pushing through Kotlyne and Udachne on the T-0406 roadway, west of Pokrovsk, and between those two towns Russian forces are more than a mile north of the roadway.  Further east some Russian elements may have reached to just south off Kyyivsska Street - the southern edge of Pokrovsk; these are probably just reconnaissance probes. Multiple RuAF air strikes have been reported on Pokrovsk itself. East and north-east of Pokrovsk Russian forces are reported active in 7 different towns and the general sense is that the Russians are pressing north to cut the road and shorten lines, and pressing north-west to further the encirclement of Pokrovsk.

Russian forces in the general area south of Kurakhove maintained pressure on most of the permitter of the small "cauldron” between Kurakhove and the Sukhi Yaly River; the pocket is now 2.5 to 3 miles across, east to west, and 3 - 3.5 miles north to south. Of perhaps great import, the opening in the north-west corner is now less than 1.5 miles across, and part of that is river and swampy terrain. North of the pocket Russian forces continue to press westward and are now roughly on a north-south line, 2 miles west of Slovyanka.

Russian forces continued operations around Velyka Novosilka (VN) and there is reporting claiming that the town has fallen to the Russians. This report is probably a bit hasty and it appears that the Russian forces pushing in from the east and those in from the west still are perhaps 3 streets apart (perhaps 1500 feet), across the center of town. Overall, as of yesterday, there was a strip of terrain about that wide running roughly north south, most of the length of the town, but it was under significant pressure form Russian forces, and is probably narrower and shorter as of this afternoon.

Southern Ukraine

Russian forces continued operations west of Orikhiv and as well as along the Dnepr River, particularly in the vicinity of Kozatskyi Island (about a mile down river from the Nakhhodka dam). Russian forces continue to probe and raid onto the two islands (Kozatskyi and Kruhlyk) but there were no confirmed changes over the weekend. The goal is to establish enough control to move an artillery battery onto the island and strike deeper into the west bank of Kherson Oblast.

Air Operations

Air Strikes by both sides continued throughout the weekend, with both sides continuing to claim that they shot everything down and the only damage was done by falling debris.

Of note, pictures were posted of a fire at the fuel tanks at the Gorbunov Aircraft Plant in Kazan, a division of Tupolev, and a facility that is the assembly and site for the TU-160 bomber and the TU-214 civilian aircraft.

Politics 

Following the reporting of the extreme desertion rate in the 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade (1700 desertions between March and December 2024, in a unit with 3,000 personnel) the commanding officer - Colonel Dmytro Ryumshyn - has now been charged with incompetence and negligence. It has been alleged that he hid or falsified the desertion rate in the brigade in reports to HHQ (see thoughts).

As a reminder, the brigade was put together by the French at a cost estimated at $955 million. Ryumshyn turned over command on December 12th.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Sep9 Dec9 Jan8 Jan17 Jan21

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 71.74 72.63 76.69 81.35 78.79

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 68.37 68.85 73.94 78.87 75.90

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.20 3.17 3.66 4.12 3.80

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.67 5.59 5.37 5.36 5.48

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 90.75 100.84 105.18 102.37 99.56

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.55 42.33 42.11 42.11

Urals 56.56    67.61 78.83 66.19 71.76 76.29 74.21

ESPO 65 77 78.19 82.85 80.29

Sokol 66.23 65.32 72.79 76.40 75.26

Note: Ruble trading below 100 first time since December 26th.

The Russian Central Bank reports that by the end of 2024 Russia’s dollar reserves had dropped to an estimated $70 billion. Russia has been trying to find trading partners who will accept rubles but has not been entirely successful. Currently, 43% of Russian exports are traded in rubles, 38/6% in “other currencies” (mainly yuan), and 18.4% in dollars.

Total exports revenue for 2024 is expected to equal $420 billion.

Thoughts

Two thoughts:

First, by loosening restrictions on oil and gas exploration and development in the US, President Trump hopes to drive down the cost of both oil and natural gas. As you will recall, the RAND study on Extending Russia (2019) commented that: 

"Because of Russia’s budget dependence on oil exports, low oil prices have the potential to further degrade the economy and limit the Russian government’s actions. Low oil prices in the second half of the 1980s were one of the main factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given the Russian state’s dependence on oil revenues for its budget, continued low oil prices are likely to extend Russia economically.”

Said differently, opening up the US energy industry in an effort to drive down US oil and natural gas prices will do as much as anything else we can do to over-extend Russia. 

I would assume that Vlad Putin was immediately aware of the consequences. Further, the commodity market will immediately begin to adjust prices in expectation of increased US supplies of oil and gas. The oil and gas prices will start moving down, and Russian oil and gas prices with them. From today forward Russian economic strain will grow. 

Putin can be expected to continue to push his army forward and will, personally and through his minions, continue to assert maximal negotiation goals, staking out an extreme position from which to bargain. But the US energy market will quickly start discounting oil and gas futures and that will start prices down, threatening not only Russian oil sales, but Iranian oil sales as well.

Second, a very interesting report in Ukraine Pravda in which the authors had access to statistics from the Ukrainian General Staff. They went through each of the 6 “theaters” (Pokrovsk, Velyka Novosilke, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Lyman), Pokrovsk they identify as “critical,” Velyka Novosilke is “approaching critical,” the other four as “difficult.”

Then in each theater they list the challenges. The challenges in each spring from the same issues: lack of infantry (in part due to high desertion rates); also mentioned are inadequate training, unit commanders passing false information up echelon (telling the boss what he wants to hear, not the truth (note the item above: charges brought against Col. Ryumshyn)), and low quantities and quality of ammunition.

Reading between the lines, the fall of each: Pokrovsk, Velyka Novosilke, Toretsk, is possible in the relatively near term.

It would seem that both sides need a ceasefire as soon as possible, no matter how many times they state extreme positions from which to begin negotiations.

v/r pete