September 2nd, 2025

Politics  - Pope Leo calls for ceasefire

- Merz: “prepare for a long war”

- GPS jamming incident 

Combat Ops - Russian and Ukrainian gains

- Russia forces push into Pokrovsk?

 

Weather

Kharkiv

81 and sunny, gusting to 20. Mostly sunny all week. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the 70s. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

83 and mostly cloudy. Sunny all week, daily lows in the 60s, daily highs in the 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

70 and sunny, gusting to 20. Mostly sunny weather all week. Daily lows in the low 50s, daily highs in the upper 70s. Winds north-easterly, 5-10kts.

Politics 

Pope Leo called for a ceasefire in Ukraine:

“It is time for those responsible to renounce the logic of arms and to take the path of negotiation and peace with the support of the international community.”

Germany’s Chancellor Merz said that he is “bracing himself for the war to last a long time,” and note that the war cannot end “at the price of Ukraine’s capitulation”.

Germany’s MinDef Pistorius commented on EU President von der Leyen’s remarks on plans for a European security force in Ukraine: 

“Those are things that you don’t discuss before you sit down at the negotiating table with many parties that have a say in the matter.”

On Sunday the plane carrying EU Commission President von der Leyen from Warsaw to Plovdiv was subject to “GPS jamming” as it approached Plovdiv airfield in south-central Bulgaria (about 70 miles southeast of Sofia). The aircraft landed safely, the aircrew using paper flip charts for the approach and landing. Russian jamming and denial of GPS has been reported over much of Eastern Europe.

Reuters reports that a Belize flagged bulk carrier struck an “explosive device” near Chornomorsk (just south of Odessa), sustaining minor damage. I believe this is the first report of a mine strike since late 2023.

Ground Operations 

There are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces continue to shift forces toward the Donetsk region from both Sumy oblast and from Kherson oblast, suggesting that Russia is planning a push in the Pokrovsk - Kostiantinivka area, a “Fall Offensive” if you will. The reports suggest that several relatively elite airborne and marine regiments / brigades have been pulled from the Sumy and Kherson area since mid August and redeployed, with reports including movement of at least elements of 5 different units; the specific area to which they have been moved has not been reported.

At the same time, North Korean units should begin moving into the Kursk region in the near term.

SUMY AND KURSK OBLASTS

Fighting continues along the line of contact north of Sumy City, and there are claims of Russian gains in Yunakivka, but there are no confirmed changes.

Fighting continues north of Kharkiv, with Russian forces attacking at multiple points, but there were no confirmed changes to the front line.

Further east, north of the Oskil river, along the border, unconfirmed reports suggest Russian forces may have pushed into, or through, the small village of Ambarne, and may be pressing on the town of Khatnje on three sides.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting around Kupyansk is increasing in intensity and there have been several exchanges of terrain with Russian forces just west of Kupyansk, pushing south and apparently crossing the H-26 roadway (also known as the P07 roadway), then withdrawing northward as Ukrainian forces attacked from the west - and Russian forces pushed further into Kupyansk itself. Right now it appears that Russian forces control from Holubivka (just north-east of Kupyansk, down into northern central Kupyansk, and then northwest, roughly along the P79 roadway, past Radkivka, but Ukrainian forces have pushed into western Moskovka (Myrne) and there is fighting taking place on top of Moskovka and Sobolivka, and Ukrainian forces appear to be gaining ground in Moskovka.

South of Kupyansk, fighting continues along the line of contact, south to the Donets River, but there were no confirmed changes in the line of contact. To the south, Ukrainian forces appear to be pressing into Ridkodub and are threatening to cut off a Russian element to the north of that town. And there is reporting that suggests the Russian forces now control the entire Serebrianske forest north of the Donets River, east of the Zherebets River, but this has not been confirmed. It would be surprising if true;  the Ukrainian positions in the deep forest have resisted very heavy Russian attacks since the beginning of the war. If the Russians took the forest I would expect a good deal of propaganda to that effect. Russian forces see taking the forest as a prelude to attacking further west at Yampil, as well as attacking south across the river and enveloping Siversk.

CHASIV YAR - TORETSK - POKROVSK

The Russian operations in the Serebrianske forest (see above) will support operations both to the west and also on the south side of the Donets. However, there were no confirmed changes to the front line in this area over the last several days.

There were no confirmed gains to the west and south-west of Chasiv Yar, though fighting continues along the entire front line and Russian forces continue to run recon elements in the direction of - and in some cases into - Kostiantinivka.

Immediately west of Toretsk Russian forces continue to strike at Ukrainian forces in the small pocket east of the Kleban Byk Reservoir and again it seems that the Russian effort is to allow regular Ukrainian reinforcement of units so that they can become targets for drones and artillery.

Further west there were multiple Russian claims of gains but none of them were confirmed.

North of Maiak much of the Russian “August salient” remains and Ukrainian forces have not materially affected it since the first few days of the counter attack. Russian forces in the salient now appear to be a reinforced brigade - which still seems thin given the area they are covering. 

Meanwhile, there is unconfirmed reporting that Russian forces - of strength enough to hold terrain - have pushed into the south-west side of Pokrovsk, are holding their potions even as additional elements push to the north-east - but this has not been confirmed with imagery.

And, east-north-east of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces advanced several blocks inside the town of Novoekinomichne.

West of Pokrovsk Russian forces claim to have taken all of Muravka, on the south side of the Solone river, on the Doentsk - Dnipropetrovsk oblast border, but this has yet to be confirmed. Further south, Russian forces are pressing on the south edge of Filiia, but do not appear to have taken that town.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

South of the Vovcha River Russian forces appear to be making multiple gains but the exact extent have yet to be confirmed. However, it does appear that Russian foces now control Zelenyi Hai, Olesandrohrad, and Komyshuvakha. This is consistent with the Russian practice of taking small towns and then cutting off would-be pockets and straightening lines. I would expect them to continue to use the Vocha river to guard one flank as they continue to press westward.

Further west, Russian forces continue the slow grind tactics. South of Orikhiv imagery appears to indicate that Russian forces have pressed northward to just south of Novodanylivka and have now recaptured all terrain south of Orikhiv that was taken during the Ukrainian summer offensive in 2023.

Air Operations

During the night of September 1st-September 2nd, and during the day on the 2nd, Russian forces launched 203 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 168 Shahed drones. Energy infrastructure was again targeted, but several apartment buildings and housing complexes were struck and suffered damage.

Damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv oblasts; 

RuAF tacair struck 3 Ukrainian towns.

Civilian casualties not reported.

During the night of August 31st-September 1st Russian forces launched 86 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 76 Shahed drones. 

Damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Kyiv oblasts, but the damage reports are incomplete. 

At least 5 civilian were killed.

During the night of August 30th-August 31st Russian forces launched 142 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 126 Shahed drones. Energy infrastructure was again targeted, but several apartment buildings and housing complexes were struck and suffered damage.

Damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv and Odessa oblasts; 

Civilian casualties not reported, but 30,000 households were without electricity in Chernihiv oblast and another 29,000 in Odessa oblast.

During the night of August 29th-August 30th Russian forces launched 8 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 37 x Kh-101/Kh-59/69, and Kalibr cruise missiles and 537 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 6 Iskander ballistic missiles, 32 cruise missiles, and 510 drones. 

Energy infrastructure was again targeted, but several apartment buildings and housing complexes were struck and suffered damage.

Damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Volyn, Zaporizhzhia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.

Civilian casualties included at least 1 dead and  several dozen wounded.

During the night of August 28th-August 29th Russian forces launched 68 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 46 Shahed drones. Energy infrastructure was again targeted, but several apartment buildings and housing complexes were struck and suffered damage.

Damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; 

RuAF tacair struck 6 Ukrainian towns.

Civilian casualties not reported.

The UAF reported that, during August, it destroyed 6,346 Shahed drones, 5  x Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, 20 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 55 x Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, 20 x Kalibr cruise missiles, 4 x Kh-59/69 guided aircraft missiles, 9 x Iskander-K cruise missiles, 2,129 x other strike drones, 930 x reconnaissance drones, and 3,174 other drones.

A Ukrainian strike, using the Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile struck a Russian post in Crimea on August 30th, the first successful use of this missile.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   May8 Jun9 July8 Aug8 Aug29 Sep2

Brent      94.71       61.93 66.80 70.44 66.90 68.15 68.34

WTI     92.10    59.00 64.89 68.65 64.29 64.15 64.85

NG       3.97          3.64 3.69 3.35 3.06 2.94 2.92

Wheat     8.52           5.34 5.49 5.49 5.18 5.30 5.23

Ruble     85          82.45 79.27 78.47 79.74 81.20 80.64

Hryvnia 28.6 41.55 41.55 41.80 41.39 41.34 41.42

Urals 91.66 54.13 60.84 64.07 63.17 62.22 62.30

ESPO 94.52 48.90 63.97 71.58 68.63 70.82 70.35

Sokol 99.31 57.39 61.51 64.38 62.57 65.01 64.94

Thoughts

Chancellor Merz’s comment “to prepare for a long war” makes sense to a certain degree: you have to be prepared for whatever comes. But it begs the obvious question: how does the war end? As any review of history will show, once a war starts you also start to lose control; and the longer it lasts, the further it can go off track.

Merz’s other point - no capitulation - is fine, but is there a defined end state? Long war or short war, is there an executable plan that promises to reach that desired end state?

Not to be a stick in the mud, but he is the Chancellor of Germany, he is supposed to be one of the “leaders” of the “coalition of the willing.” Shouldn’t he have a plan by now?

As a reminder, Merz just a few weeks ago noted that his government can no longer afford the welfare state model that has guided Germany for decades. And the German army, air force and navy all need tremendous amounts of money to “get better.”

So, can Germany afford to support a long war?

v/r pete