October 16th, 2024

Overall  

Politics  - Victory Plan

- Korean Troops

Ground Operations - Russian gains in Kursk Salient

- Russian gains south-east of Pokrovsk

Weather

Mud season - bezdorizhzhia or rasputitsa - has arrived.

Kharkiv

47 and light rain. Cloudy into the weekend. Daily lows in the low 40s, daily highs in the upper 40s. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

51 and mostly cloudy. Mostly to partly cloudy for the next 5 days. Daily lows in the low 40s, daily highs in the low 50s. Winds northerly, 5-15kts.

Kyiv

46 and mostly cloudy. Rain showers ending this night, sunny to partly cloudy for the rest of the week and though the weekend. Daily lows in the 30s, mornings may occasionally dip below freezing, daily highs in the upper 40s. Winds northerly, 5-10kts.

Politics and Diplomacy: Victory Plan

President Zelenskyy briefed the Verkhovna Rada on his plan to win the war. He said that if the plan is implemented “the war will end next year.” The plan contains 5 main elements and 3 secret appendices.

1. Formal NATO membership

"The fact of inviting Ukraine to NATO can become really fundamental for peace. We understand that membership in NATO is a question of the future, not the present. But Putin must see that his geopolitical calculations are losing.”

2) Persuading Western allies to lift a ban on use of long-range weapons

"This is an irreversible strengthening of Ukrainian defense against the aggressor. It is realistic to defend our positions on the battlefield in Ukraine and at the same time necessarily return the war to the territory of Russia. So that the Russians feel what war is.”

3) Deterring Russian aggression

"Ukraine proposes to deploy on its land a comprehensive, non-nuclear strategic deterrence package that will be sufficient to protect Ukraine from any military threat from Russia and that will maximally narrow the range of Russian actions to such prospects - or join an honest diplomatic process for a just end to the war, or guaranteed to lose the opportunity to continue an aggressive war as a result of the use by Ukraine of the provided deterrence package in accordance with Russia's defined military targets.”

4) Strengthening the economy

"Ukraine offers the United States together with certain partners, in particular the European Union, of which Ukraine will be a part, and with other partners in the world who are our partners, to conclude a special agreement on the joint protection of critical resources available in Ukraine, joint investment and the use of the corresponding economic potential.”

5) Improving future security

"This Ukrainian experience should be used to strengthen the defense of the entire Alliance and guarantee security in Europe. This is a worthy mission for our heroes. We envisage, if the partners agree, to replace certain military contingents of the US Armed Forces, which are stationed in Europe, with Ukrainian units.”

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the plan “mythical” and said that the only path to peace was for Ukraine to: “...recognize the futility of its current policies, coming to terms with the need for a more realistic approach, and understanding the underlying causes that led to the ongoing conflict.”

He also commented that the plan really was a disguised version of the "U.S.-backed policy of fighting to the last Ukrainian.”

North Korea

An “addendum”  to the report yesterday that North Korea was going to man a 3,000 man”battalion” in Ukraine:  John Foreman, former UK ambassador to Moscow, commented yesterday that North Korea has already sent 10,000 troops to support Russian efforts in Ukraine.

Ground Operations 

Kursk Salient

Fighting continued along the entire perimeter of the Kursk Salient and Russian forces had confirmed gains south-east of Subzha in the vicinity of Ullanok. Russian forces also may have made gains on the west side of the salient as well, pushing through Leonidovo (10 miles south-east of Korenevo), and also advancing near Olgovka (just 2 miles east of Korenevo). Ukrainian forces near Olgovka - which looks to be roughly a brigade in size), are now at the end of a 7 mile long corridor back to the heart of the Ukrainian incursion, and they do not control the prime roads out of the area.

Further west, fighting continued around Novyi Put (on the border), but there were no confirmed gains or losses.

North of Kharkiv

Russian forces were again active north of Kharkiv, but there were no confirmed gains or losses by either side.

North of the Donets River

Russian forces remained on the attack along virtually the entire line of contact and made gains into Kolisnykivka (south-east of Kupyansk, and made gains in the vicinity of Makiivka, north-west of Kreminna, as well as near Terny, west of Kreminna.  Additional reporting suggests, but not yet confirmed, the Russian forces west of Pishchane have pushed closer to the Oskil river and at one point are less than a quarter mile from the Oskil river.

Bakhmut

North-east of Bakhmut, in the terrain east of Siversk, Russian forces continue to push westward and north-west in the vicinity of  Verkhnokamyanske but there were no confirmed gains by the Russians.

North, east, and south-east of Chasiv Yar there were multiple reports of hard fighting but there were no confirmed changes in the front line. Nevertheless, it is of note that reports suggest that the Russians north of Chasiv Yar are now a kilometer west of the Donets Canal. Ukrainian staff assessment is that the Russians are trying to take advantage of the current  - slightly unusual - dry weather in that area and are pushing as hard as they can, particularly before rain restricts some activity, to include artillery spotting.

Further south, west of Horlivka, Russian forces continue to push into Toretsk, and made confirmed gains west of Niu York. Gains within Toretsk were not confirmed, but multiple sources are showing similar Russian activity.

Donetsk City

Russian forces made additional confirmed gains to the south-east of Pokrovks, pushing westward from Krasnyi Yar (about 5 miles south-east of Pokrovsk). Additional Russian forces are pushing through Lysivka (just south-east of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces appeared to gain ground south, east and north of Selydove. Elsewhere along the edge of the salient Russian forces claimed small gains in perhaps 15 different towns as they seek to expand the salient and also close up any gaps between Russian controlled terrain. This effort continued around the terrain south of the Pokrovsk salient, near the towns of Heorhivka and Hostre and Ostrivke.

Further south Russian forces are attacking north-west from Vodyane and north from positions just west of Vuhledar, but there were no confirmed gains. 

Southern Ukraine 

Russian forces continue to press northward, and there are multiple reports that forces south-west of Velyka Novosilke are continuing to press north from the area of Levadne, and one report suggests the Russians are preparing to drive north and bypass Velyka Novosilke,

Other reporting suggests that Russian forces have taken control of several islands in the mouth of Dnepr river.

Air Operations

On the night of the 14th-15th Russian force launched 7 x S-300 ballistic missiles, 5 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 2 x Kh-59 cruise missiles, and 17 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space.. The UAF claimed it show tow 12 drones and 4 other drones were “lost,” (EW).

A video released from a surveillance drone shows 5 Iskander ballistic missiles striking within several hundred feet of each other in less than a minute, about 1,000 feet behind the major port complex in Mykolaiv. The Russians claim it was a warehouse holding missiles, but there is nothing to confirm that. 

Aid

President Biden announced a $425 million aid package for Ukraine. The announcement did not give specifics but noted that it would include: “air defence equipment, air-to-ground munitions, armored vehicles and ‘critical munitions.’”

Australia announced that it would transfer 49 x M1A1 tanks to Ukraine; the Australian tanks are being replaced with M1A2 tanks.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Sep9 Oct8 Oct15 Oct16

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 71.74 77.30 74.47 74.25

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 68.37 73.59 70.79 70.58

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.20 2.74 2.52 2.49

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.67 5.93 5.85 5.80

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 90.75 96.83 97.25 97.46

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.22 41.24 41.23

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 78.83 73.30 71.60 66.81

ESPO       65 77 77 77

Sokol 66.23 72.10 67.86 67.86

Thoughts 

Three thoughts:

First: File under: Blind Squirrels find the occasional acorn. In spring of 2022, as the Russians began their transition to an attrition war, I commented (with the help of reading BH Liddell Hart’s history of World War II) that if the Russians could solve their manpower problem they would be able to correct their monstrous strategic mistake with which they started the war, and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. In the 2-and-a-half-years since Putin has not called for a full mobilization and yet has managed to slowly build up his army. Now it appears that he may be bringing North Korean troops in to augment the army in Ukraine. A story out this morning suggests the initial North Korean element will be 10,000 strong, vice the 3,000 reported just a few days ago.

If in fact Putin has convinced the North Koreans to “loan” him some soldiers, it would seem Putin has finally solved his manpower problem. 

The story of North Korean soldiers being “loaned” to Russia to fight in Ukraine was labeled by one diplomat as “an indicator of how far the Russian army has fallen, that it must beg, borrow and steal to get men to fight the war.” Perhaps. Or perhaps it means that Putin has found a way to sustain the force on the ground in Ukraine, the force that is grinding down the Ukrainian army, without having to conduct a full mobilization. North Korea has a lot of soldiers, they can readily afford to move several divisions worth of soldiers (10,000 soldiers would roughly equate to a division) to Ukraine, particularly if it means that someone else will feed them, and that the NK government will receive oil and grain, things that makes a dictator happy. This might well be a real “win” for Putin.

Second: President Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan has only one element that speaks directly to victory: the use of long range weapons to strike deeper into Russia. At the same time, it has an element - NATO membership offer - that is directly in opposition to Russian war aims. Hard to see how this will work.

Third: A report in Al Jazeera meanwhile stresses that press gangs are now needed keep a steady stream of Ukrainian men flowing into the army’s training programs so that they can provide a stream of new soldiers to front-line units.

Official numbers are that 1.3 million Ukrainians are now serving in the army. Estimates - that Al Jazeera reports - are that at last 80,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since the 2022 invasion.

Of perhaps greater significance is that more than 100,000 Ukrainian men have deserted from the army in the last 2 years, a 7.7% desertion rate. To put that in significance, the US desertion rate in Vietnam was 0.84% spiking to 3.3% during 1971. US desertions during the GWOT from 2001 to 2015 totaled 40,000 men, of about 6 million who served during that period, a 0.67% desertion rate.

An official desert rate of 7+% suggests a serious morale problem.

v/r pete