May 27th, 2025 Next Summary May 29th

Politics - Trump Rebukes Putin after air strikes 

- New Sanctions?

- PATRIOT Missile Gap?

Combat Ops - Russian gains in center 

Economy - EU energy purchases exceed Ukraine aid

Weather

Winds nominally remain manageable, but the gusts will present some problems for the smaller drones.

Kharkiv

80 and mostly cloudy, gusting to 40. Cloudy all week increasing chances of thunderstorms through the week. Daily lows around 60, daily highs mid 70s. Winds easterly, 10-15kts.

Melitopol

77 and rain showers, gusting to 25. Rain showers end tomorrow morning, then partly to mostly cloudy through Friday, weekend more rain. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the upper 70s. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

77 and rain showers, gusting to 30. Rain and thunderstorms continue tonight and all week, through Friday afternoon. Daily lows in the mid to upper 50s, daily highs in the 70s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics and Diplomacy

President Trump had sharp words for President Putin following the air strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure over the weekend:

"I have always had a very good relationship with Vladimir Putin of Russia, but something has happened to him. He has simply gone crazy! He is killing a lot of people for no reason, and I am not just talking about soldiers. Missiles and drones are being launched at cities in Ukraine for no reason. I have always said that he wants ALL of Ukraine, not just part of it, and maybe that will turn out to be true, but if he does it, it will lead to the collapse of Russia.”

The Wall Street Journal is reporting that President Trump is considering new sanctions against Russia in the wake of those strikes, but didn’t offer any clarity as to what this new sanctions might include.

Ambassador Kellogg, President Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine, reports that the US has received Kyiv’s list of conditions for ending the war but is still waiting for Russia’s list. During the most recent Trump - Putin phone call, Putin promised a memorandum stating conditions.

The Economist is reporting that the US is unable to provide more Patriot missiles to Ukraine as a result of the current limits on production. Current production is 500 PAC-3 missiles per year, though Lockheed is in the process of increasing production to 650 missiles per year, with a goal of achieving the rate by some time this year.

Lockheed produces approximately 20 “PAC-2” missiles per month, and are trying to increase that to 35 per month by the beginning of 2027. PAC-2 has a longer range, while the PAC 3 is more capable against a ballistic missile in its terminal phase.

Ground Operations

THE RUSSIAN CENTER - Between Toretsk and Pokrovsk

Russian forces have pushed into Popiv Yar and the terrain just south-east of Poltavka (about 6 miles due north of the big bend in the T0504 roadway). This positions Russian forces to next move on Rusyn Yar (on the west side of the roadway) and push further into Yablunivka (on the east side), and reports suggest that Russian forces were, in fact, repositioning to strike into Yablunivka today. Further south in the pocket, Russia’s MOD claimed that Stara Mykolaivka has been taken by Russian forces, and fighting was reported just north of that town in the town of Zoria.

THE BORDERS

Russian forces continue to attack south-west from their positions inside Sumy Oblast, and imagery confirms that Russian forces now control Bilovody, a small farming village located about 15 miles north-east of Sumy, about 3 miles inside Ukraine. It is a village of two parallel streets on opposite sides of a river, with 488 inhabitants before the war started.

Ukrainian forces remain active near Tetkino, but there were no other reports of Ukrainian forces active in Kursk Oblast or on the border with Kursk or Belgorod oblasts.

North of Kharkiv Russian forces were active inside Vovchansk and may have retaken the aggregate plant. The plant, as you may recall, has changed hands several times in the last 6 or 7 months.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues along most of the line of contact, but the only change in the lines took place north-west of Terny, with Russian forces gain ground in the vicinity of Ridkodub. 

BAKHMUT

Russian forces appear to have made some minor gains in the Chasiv Yar area and just south of Chasiv Yar, with varying claims of how far they have pushed into Stupochky (just south of Chasiv Yar).

Russian forces were also active immediately north and west of Toretsk, but it isn't clear whether there were any gains in the last few days. 

DONETSK CITY

In the Pokrovsk sector fighting was noted in more than 15 towns over the weekend and Russian forces have again pushed across the T0406 roadway west of Pokrovsk. Small gains were also confirmed just south of Pokrovsk.

Fighting south of the Pokrovsk sector continues along a line from the Troitske area to a position between Oleksiivka and Andriivka to north of Rozlyv, through Bahatyr and Odradne and from  there south-west to the Vesele area, with Russian forces appearing to make some gains in and around Bahatyr and just west of that town. Fighting in the area is said to be “intense,” and along the front line small patches of terrain keep changing hands.

Fighting continues on the line from Novopil to Vesele and there are claims that Russian forces have advanced in the area of Zelene Pole (just north of  Novopil), with Russian bloggers claiming that Zelene Pole has been circled by Russian troops. The Ukrainian General Staff has reported fighting in Zelene Pole which would be consistent with Russian forces encircling the town but, while credible, it has not been confirmed. If it is confirmed that is moving the front line forward several miles in just a couple of days.

There is additional reporting, also unconfirmed, of Russian forces just south of Komar, to include reserve forces being used into the area; Komar is the town north of Fedorivka on the Mokri Yaly River. Again, this is unconfirmed but if accurate would also represent moving several miles north (downriver) on the Mokri Yaly river and would be a significant gain.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Fighting continues on the front lines west of Orikhiv to the Dnepr River, particularly between Novoandriivka and Stepove, but there does appear to be any change in the front lines in the last several days.

Air Operations

During the night of  May 26th and day of the 27th Russian forces launched at least 1 x ballistic missile and 60 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down  35 drones, and 8 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Chernyhiv (ballistic missile strike), Dnipropetrovsk and Kherson oblasts.

RuAF assets conducted air strikes on 16 towns across the front.

During the night of  May 25th-26th Russian forces launched 9 x Kh-101 cruise missiles and 355 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down all 9 cruise missiles and 233 drones, and 55 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, and  Odesa oblasts.

Russian air defenses claimed to have shot down 99 Ukrainian driers last night and this morning. There was no report on total number of drones or any sites hit or damage.

During the night of  May 24th-25th Russian forces launched 9 x Iskander class ballistic missiles, 55 x Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles, 1 x Kh-22 cruise missile, 4 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles (60 total cruise missiles), and 298 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 55 cruise missiles and 139 drones, and 2 cruise missiles and 127 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Poltava, Sumy, Ternopil, and  Zhytomyr  oblasts.

Reports indicate 12 civilians were killed and 60 wounded.

During the night of  May 23rd-24th Russian forces launched 14 x Iskander class ballistic missiles and 250 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 6 ballistic missiles and 128 drones, and 117 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odessa and Zaporizhia oblast.

During the night of  May 22nd-23rd Russian forces launched at least 2 unidentified ballistic missiles and 176 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 91 drones, and that 59 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Chernivtsi,  Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Poltava  oblasts; the ballistic missile struck Odessa oblast.

RuAF tacair conducted strikes in at least 16 towns along the front lines.

UAF personnel report that Russian forces are using fewer cruise missiles and more drones as their drones improve in capability, allowing them to substitute cheaper drones for the more expensive cruise missiles. At the same time the UAF reports that Russian Iskander ballistic missiles have been provided a terminal maneuvering capability that has made the missiles more difficult to hit, reducing the probability of intercept. 

The strikes reported above constitute 3 of the largest air strikes of the war, with 903 strike drones launched in 3 days, plus 25 ballistic missiles and 60 cruise missiles, and as with most of the other large strikes, targeted civilian infrastructure. What is not known is the amount of damage to civilian infrastructure. The total number of people killed or wounded has also not been reported but presumably is on the order of 100 casualties, with perhaps 20 killed and 80 wounded.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jan8 Feb7 Mar4 Apr8 May8 May23 May27

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      76.69 74.89 70.00 64.80 61.93 63.63 64.34

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      73.94 71.17 66.97 61.37 59.00 60.38 61.12

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15      3.66 3.37 4.44 3.69 3.64 3.23 3.32

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17      5.37 5.86 5.37 5.38 5.34 5.44 5.31

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    105.18 96.88 89.50 86.24 82.45 79.63 80.33

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 42.33 41.46 41.40 41.18 41.55 41.52 41.64

Urals 56.56    71.76 68.32 65.49 52.76 54.13 58.42 58.71

ESPO 78.19 N/A 71.50 70 48.90 64.40 64.19

Sokol 72.79 70.92 67.20 61.42 57.39 59.14 59.57

The German magazine BILD reports the EU will pay Russia more than 20 billion Euros ($22.5 billion) in 2025 for gas, oil and uranium, which is more than the total military aid that Ukraine will received from the EU.

In 2024 the EU spent 22 billion Euros on energy from Russia, and provided Ukraine with 20 billion Euros in military aid.

Thoughts 

There are two conflicting analytic streams and the differences are becoming increasingly important. The first is that the Russian casualty rate is so excessive that the Russians cannot sustain these loss rates and, in essence, something has to give. One open source analytic estimate recently commented that at its current rate of advance Russia would require 3.9 years to finish seizing the four claimed oblasts, and to seize the desired buffer zones would require 91 years and cost 50 million casualties.

This assessment is predicated on three assumptions: that the casualty figures published daily in western capitals is accurate, that Ukrainian casualties, which are never discussed, are manageable, and that the Russian operational aim is primarily to seize land.

Are these assumptions true?

The few efforts to accurately count up Russian casualties (outside of certain capitals with an interest publishing very large numbers) yields 110,000 to 165,000 Russian KIAs, a significant variance from the remarkable daily figures produced in Western capitals.

As to the seconds point, last October the Ukrainian Minister of the Interior spoke out of school and stated that there were 55,000 missing in action, and later admitted that “most of them are dead.” Since then, the Ukrainian government has admitted that there are 50,000 Ukrainian KIA and 56,000 MIA. And everyone admits these numbers are low, and most privately admit they are likely very low. Sources inside the Ukrainian government have reported to the Wall Street Journal that there are 70 - 80,000 KIA as of last fall and 35,000 MIA (presumed dead). In short, added together you have more than 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed, though they may not be calling it “killed in action."

That puts the two casualty figures in the same general range. When you also remember that Russian KIAs include 10,000 or more penal colony troops, the losses of Russian soldiers comes down and these two figures start looking similar. Yet Russia has more than 4 times as many people as Ukraine.

This is of significance as the Russian casualty statistics are being used to justify a strategy to prolong the war. Yet it isn't clear at all that Ukraine is in a better position for long term demographic survival as is Russia. And getting this wrong would accelerate Ukraine’s demographic troubles.

Finally, there I the assumption that the Russian primary aim on the battlefield on a daily basis is to capture land. While the Russians do want to capture land, the stated goal tactically has been, since at least late 2022, and possible as early as summer of 2022, to inflict casualties. This makes measuring ground gained or lost a relatively meaningless statistic.

All of which leaves a good deal of doubt surrounding the assumptions. Which leads to this one key point:

Before anyone makes any hard decisions on what Europe or NATO are doing with Ukraine, there needs to be hard data, confirmed data, on the actual casualty rates on each side.

Then the US needs to answer this question:

Is defense of the Ukraine a vital national interest to the US and does it warrant committing limited resources? The case of the PATRIOT missiles is one case of many.

And then there needs to be a hard study as to what is in the realm of the possible. 

Can the US and NATO defend Ukraine and defeat Russia without precipitating the use of nuclear weapons by Russia? At what cost?

Can the US and NATO defend Ukraine and at the same time execute a strategy to contain China? 

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to work to expand their holdings along the rest of the Ukrainian border, clearly an effort to answer calls from last year and the year before for a “buffer zone.” What I have found is no clear reference to what they are doing with the areas they have taken; let me explain.

 Russian forces in early 2022 were mainly focused on expanding their holdings; as a result they over-extended and were pushed back, with Ukrainian forces retaking terrain west of the Dnepr River, land around Sumy and in northern Ukraine, and land east of Kharkiv, and north of the Donets River pushing Russian forces east of the Oskil River, and in fact east of the Zherebets River, to a line that nearly matched the P66 roadway.

At that point the Russians brought in their engineers and began to build defensive positions along the entire Russian line: lines of trenches, tank barriers (so called “dragon’s teeth,” concrete blocks that a vehicle can’t roll over) fighting positions and very dense mine fields. These defensive positions were well conceived and the Ukrainian offensive in the summer of 2023 failed to fully penetrate the defensive line south of Orikhiv (the site of deepest penetration). Two things have happened since then, the Russians have improved their lines, based on the lessons they learned in defending the liens in 2023, and, as they have moved forward, the Russians have been moving defensive lines forward.

But, what is not clear is whether they have built the same sort of heavy lines in the small salients north of Kharkiv, or whether they have started building such defensive lines on the terrain the control north-east of Sumy. THe Russians will continue to pursue a buffer zone, but how they go about developing that buffer zone will have a great impact on what Ukraine would need to do to reclaim land.

v/r pete