OCTOBER 20th, 2025 NEXT SUMMARY 28 October 

Politics 

As you all know, President Trump and President Zelenskyy met last Friday in Washington DC, and Trump talked to President Putin by phone. The most significant immediate issue was the announcement by Trump that there would be no transfer of Tomahawk missiles at this point, though, in an interview later, Trump insisted the idea could resurface if there were no movement in peace talks by Putin.

Zelenskyy was apparently in general agreement with what was discussed though few details were released, and despite rumors that there was a brief shouting match in the private portion of the Trump- Zelenskyy meeting.

Trump also mentioned that he is trying to arrange a meeting with Putin in Hungary in the near term.

Zelenskyy said he’ll be prepared to meet with Trump and Putin if he is invited:

"If I am invited to Budapest - if it is an invitation in the format when the three of us meet, or as it is called 'shuttle diplomacy', President Trump will meet with Putin, and President Trump will meet with me - then in one format or another we will agree.”

Today, only 44 months into the war, the EU Council voted to end all purchases of Russian oil and gas by January 1st 2028. Monitoring mechanisms are being developed to prevent cheating.

EU member states must now submit national energy diversification plans, and the EU Council will begin discussions with the European Parliament to finalize the decision - in other words, this is not technically the final decision…

The IAEA announced that Russian and Ukrainian officials agreed on the 18th to a local ceasefire around the ZNPP as Russian workers prepare to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.

Combat Operations

On the ground there were minor changes in most sections of the front line.

There were two noted developments: Russian forces continue a slow grind south in Kupyansk and Ukrainian sources note that Russian forces now control that portion of the city of Kupyansk west of Oskil, and north the intersection of the P07 and P79 roadways, controlling the main GLOC across the Oskil River in this area.

Russian forces south of the Vovcha River pressed west from Verbove and probes appear to have reached at least 3 miles west of that town - and may have reached the small town of Yehorivka on the banks of the Yanchur River. This would mean that they had penetrated the last Ukrainian defensive line in that area, westward to the Dnepr River.

This needs to be watched closely.

Elsewhere, there were minor changes in the line west and south-west of Chasiv Yar, and west of Toretsk, and minor changes along the perimeter of the August salient. Overall Russian positions appear to be holding in the salient, with some minor Russian gains near the base, but here and elsewhere there is the now common “see-saw” manner of fighting for small pieces of terrain, each side gaining control for several days at a time and then losing control.

Recon probes continue into Pokrovsk, and one recon element reportedly reached the railroad station in the north center of the city (and was reportedly eliminated)  but there were no substantive changes around the edges of that city, and, further west, there also were some small gains along the banks of the Dnepr, with Russian forces pushing into southern Stepnohirsk.

In the air, drone and missile strikes continued over the weekend, with 70 to 100 drones and a small number of missiles each day, again striking power grid related infrastructure. Multiple towns experienced power outages and water outages (which usually end in less than a day); as I write this parts of Sumy have no power or water.

Thoughts

The war seems to have settled into the somewhat ugly autumn fight, with cloudy weather, some rain, some fog, and cold all slowing things down on the battlefield. I would expect that, tactically, we will see few changes on the battlefield over the next 4 - 6 weeks, though the situation in Kupyansk may make me regret saying that. There is also the obvious possibility that the manpower issues, particularly on the Ukrainian side, are worse than they appear, and there could be a dramatic brake in a line, but my sense is that the Russian logistics and command and control are not set up to support such an event so that is less likely to occur.

As for the EU, and European consumption of Russian oil and gas, that is took 44 months for them to reach this point is a remarkable indictment against the leadership of most of Europe, and makes it seem incredible that the promises for 5% of GDP spending on national security will be sustained. With a population 3 times that of Russia, and a combined GDP 8 times that of Russia, Europe should be able to defend itself from Russia without breaking a sweat. Yet almost 4 years into the war the EU Council has only gotten this far in separating themselves from Russian energy supplies.

One might argue that the threat to Europe isn’t Russia so much as it is Europe’s lack of commitment to their own security.

v/r pete          

 

Cromwell Was Right

October 19th, 2024

Oliver Cromwell, not one of the most pleasant fellows in the last 6,000 years, nor the most friendly to those with whom he disagreed, was, however, a smart and very competent leader. Cromwell is apocryphally credited with having advised to “Trust in God, but keep your powder dry.”

Looking around the world right now, this may be even better advice than when first given (Cromwell reportedly made the comment to some of his officers as they prepared to invade Ireland.)

There is just a lot of “stuff” going on. If you’ve been hiding in the north woods for the last 9 months you might have missed it, but there’s all sorts of economic turmoil: here in the US tariffs are up, and so is the GDP, and deficits are down, and we are in the process of building nuclear reactors and starting our own rare earths production lines. But elsewhere, things are strained: Russia’s economy looks shaky, Europe’s arguably looks worse, and strange stories are coming out of Beijing, with all sorts of rumors, and the Chinese Communist Party seems a little worried about the resurgent USA.

China has the second largest economy in the world, built on two things: lots of exports AND lots of increased internal demand as their population - 1.4 billion people - has grown increasingly well off. But there has been some concern that China’s population is beginning to decline (India has already passed China as the most populous nation), and the United Nations has forecast that China’s population could fall to 1.3 billion by 2050.

Except there are now reports that the normal bureaucratic fudging of data has taken a new turn. Data now suggests that China’s real population is currently 1.2 billion - or less, and falling. Research by a demographer at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Yi Fuxian, cites low fertility rates, and an aging population as the root cause. This, coupled with a tightly controlled bureaucracy both at the national level and in the provinces, and federal funding based on number, has both provided incentives for over reporting and prevented any sort of auditing or accurate count. 

Interestingly, studies on China’s population by Russian and Japanese think tanks over the last 7 years suggest similar or even greater differences between the official population and the actual population; the Japanese study suggests the real population might already be as low as 800 million, and is at least below 1 billion (estimated at 986 million). Yi insists that the data justifies that assessment: less than 1 billion.

Xi presumably knows the real population. But up until now he has been successful in hiding it, in keeping various programs moving so that consumer spending seemed a reflection of a much larger population.

But problems are starting to show, with more reports of empty malls, empty apartment buildings, etc. After all, if your domestic economy is based on the needs of 1.4 billion consumers, and only 1 billion are actually present, there’s a problem. 

This would mean that Xi’s need to reopen the US market to Chinese goods is much more serious a problem than it first appears; good for us, and good for deterrence.

Meanwhile, President Xi fired 9 generals, to include the #2 general on the Central Military Commission, accusing them of corruption.

The folks who study China a great deal have come down hard on one side or another concerning these firings: either Xi is losing control of his army and is struggling to regain control, OR Xi is purging his army and thereby establishing greater control.

Not lost in all this is the war in Ukraine, which seems headed for its 4th winter and rumors of each side preparing for a winter offensive. China is a major supplier of technology to Russia, and is the major purchaser of Russian oil; China imported 800 million barrels of Russian oil in 2024 (almost $50 billion), but that number has been inching up; in August China imported $6.7 billion in oil from Russia and estimates for September suggest that imports are higher still; that money funds Putin’s war machine.

So?

Each of these issues: What is China’s real population and is it shrinking? How healthy is China’s economy? Is China’s army (the PLA) “at war” with Xi? Etc., each has surfaced before. But not at the same time, and before there was a compliant Europe and an America that was happy to keep buying Chinese. 

Suddenly, all that has changed. In particular, there’s an American president who wants to reshuffle the entire deck.

But Xi wants a lot of things, and this strange world situation could easily make Xi desperate. And desperate leaders do desperate things. Like most major political figures, Xi has a large ego, he wants to be the guy who makes Taiwan part of China; he wants to be recognized around the worlds as the great leader, he wants to enjoy some years as  Number 1. 

But with all the above, Xi is, arguably, in uncharted territory. Some might argue he will be more cautious. But might he not think that his time is running out and he needs to act? I think one could argue it either way.

And I would suspect it annoys the heck out of him that Trump has dragged all the spotlights onto him - away from Xi.

Which means?

Which means the US - and that includes Congress - needs to be focused on those national security issues that might deter Xi before he does something rash: consider moving theater nuclear weapons to the Pacific, keep pushing improvements to readiness, find the bottlenecks in our weapons manufacturing and restock our armories, sit down with the shipyards and the aircraft manufactures and focus on streamlining the building of ships and aircraft; no more changes right now, get these aircraft and ships built. We don’t need perfect plans in 12 months, we need good plans aggressively executed now.

 OCTOBER 16th, 2025 Next Summary Monday, October 20th

Politics - Trump and Zelenskyy to meet on Friday the 17th

- Trump and Modi - India to cut oil purchases from Russia

Combat Ops - Damage to Power Plants

- More small Russian gains 

Weather

Of note, cloud cover and rain showers are interfering with commercial satellite imagery of most areas, resulting in fewer confirmed changes on the ground, while also limiting effectiveness of reconnaissance drones and allowing more aggressive Russian operations.

Kharkiv

48 and cloudy. Cloudy all week and into next week, rain showers Sunday and Monday. Daily lows in the low 40s, daily highs in the low 50s. Winds south-westerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

52 and partly cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy through the weekend, except Friday, which will be partly sunny; rain on Sunday. Daily lows upper in the 30s to low 40s, daily highs in the upper 50s.  Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

48 and cloudy, wind gusting to 20. Cloudy through next Monday, rain on Saturday and Sunday. Daily lows in the upper 30s to low 40s, gradual warming, daily highs in the upper 40s rising to the mid 50s by the weekend, temperatures lower next week. Winds south-westerly, 10-15kts.

Politics 

President Trump will meet with President Zelenskyy tomorrow in Washington. Trump commented that they will discuss a possible Ukrainian offensive.

"We will talk to him about the war. And we will talk about the fact that, as I understand it, they want to go on the offensive. I will make a decision on this. But they would like to go on the offensive - you know that. And we will have to make a decision.”

On Wednesday President Trump told reporters that PM Modi of India had assured him that India will halt buying of Russian oil “within a short period of time.”

 "He's assured me there will be no oil purchases from Russia. He can't do it immediately. It's a little bit of a process, but the process is going to be over soon.” 

India’s Ministry of External Affairs released a statement that included:

"India is a significant importer of oil and gas. It has been our consistent priority to safeguard the interests of the Indian consumer in a volatile energy scenario. Our import policies are guided entirely by this objective. Ensuring stable energy prices and secured supplies have been the twin goals of our energy policy. This includes broad-basing our energy sourcing and diversifying as appropriate to meet market conditions."

"Where the US is concerned, we have for many years sought to expand our energy procurement. This has steadily progressed in the last decade. The current Administration has shown interest in deepening energy cooperation with India. Discussions are ongoing."

India consumes between 5.2 and 5.6 million barrels of oil per day (MBPD), with imports of just over 4.5 mbpd (average for September). Of that, Russian sourced oil has been as high as 36% (in 2024).

In 2024 India imported 646 million barrels of oil for Russia, seconds only to China, which imported 801 million barrels for the year. Of note, before the war started in Ukraine (and before Russia was offering oil at a several dollar per barrel discount) India imported on average just 68,000 BPD from Russia.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Fighting continues north of Sumy city and Russian reports claim gains at the west end of the would-be buffer zone (near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka) but neither claim can be confirmed.

Russian sources claimed Russian gains in the Vovchansk area but these were not confirmed.

Along the border, north of the Oskil River, imagery from Saturday showed Ukrainian forces had taken terrain north of the village of Bolohivka, and have closed to within a mile of the Russian border in that area.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

There were no confirmed changes in the line of contact north of the Donets River.

However, fighting was reported at the intersection of the P07 and P79 roadways in the center of Kupyansk and suggests that the Russian line is, in fact, slowly grinding southward in that city.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

There are claims of Russian gains north of Siversk but these have not been confirmed.

Hard fighting is reported in the general area west and south-west of Chasiv Yar, and north-west of Toretsk; forces in contact were reported in 6 different towns in that area, but there were no confirmed changes to the front line. Reporting does suggest that a Ukrainian element (size unknown) continues to hold a position just south of the Kleban Byk Reservoir.

Russian drone strikes continue on Ukrainian GLOCs in the rear areas around Kostiantinivka and Pokrovsk, with strikes again being reported 12 miles (20 KM) behind the Ukrainian lines.

Fighting continues around the perimeter of the August salient, north-east of Pokrovsk, but there were no confirmed changes to the line of contact.

In the Pokorvsk area there were confirmed Russian gains on the south side of that city, imagery showing Russian forces in an apartment complex just north of Kyivska street. 

There were no changes in the front lines further south, to the Vovcha River.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

South of the Vovcha River imagery confirmed Russian forces had taken control of Oleksiivka. This town has appeared to trade hands several times in the past month or so, but it appears that the Russians do now indeed control the town.

Imagery also confirmed that Russian forces also gained ground west of Malynivka (10 miles due west of Hulyaipole) and around Novomykolaivka (about 9 miles north-east of Hulyaipole).

Fighting continued further to the west but there were no confirmed changes in the line. Of note, Russian sources claim that Russian forces took control of Karantynnyy Island, just downriver from Kherson city. The island is about 5 miles long and about 2 miles wide, on the west side of the river.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of October 15th - October 16th, Russian forces launched 2 x Khinzhal ballistic missiles, 26 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 2 x Iskander cruise missiles, 7 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 320 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 5 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 283 Shahed drones. 

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk (missile strike), Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts.

At least 2 civilians were wounded.

No RuAF tacair strikes reported.

During the night of October 14th - October 15th, Russian forces launched an unknown number of ballistic missiles and 113 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 86 Shahed drones. 

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk (to include a missile strike), Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.

Power outages were noted in parts of Dnipropetrovsk, with more than 100,000 households losing owner. This was followed by an announcement by the government of electricity rationing in all oblasts except Donetsk and parts of Chernihiv.

At least 2 civilians killed and 4 wounded.

RuAF tacair conducted strikes in 4 towns.

Emergency power outages have begun for most of Ukraine as repair work continues on the results of the attacks of the last several days.

Damage Assessment: Oleksii Kucherenko, Deputy Chair of the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on Energy commented on two “Combined Heat and Power Plants” (CHPP) that were damaged in the October 10 drone and missile strikes and taken off line:

"That is, conditionally, if on Friday after the impact two Kyiv CHPs "fell off" to zero, that is, they produce zero electricity - one 800 MW, the other 540 MW, a total of 1,300 MW "fell off" from the system - it is clear that there is a deficit, and Kyiv is already deficient in generation, it cannot live without external support, it does not have enough of its own.”

"There, the price affects, and the technical capabilities of emergency support, now we will directly ask for emergency support. Well, and what I said, the generation deficit. In one powerful city, where the CHPP belongs to Naftogaz, it was also a hit today, and it is also at zero.”

During the night of October 9th - October 10th, Russian forces launched 2 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 14 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 12 x Iskander cruise missiles, 4 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 465 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 1 Kinzhal ballistic missile, 4 Iskander ballistic missiles, 9 Iskander cruise missiles, 1 Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 405 Shahed drones.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct8 Oct15 Oct16

Brent      94.71    70.44 66.90 67.03 66.18 62.66 62.25

WTI     92.10    68.65 64.29 63.26 62.48 59.07 58.62

NG       3.97         3.35 3.06 3.12 3.44 2.98 3.04

Wheat     8.52          5.49 5.18 5.22 5.06 4.96 4.96

Ruble     85          78.47 79.74 84.03 81.28 78.46 80.47

Hryvnia 28.6 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.48 41.61 41.74

Urals 91.66 64.07 63.17 60.12 61.15 56.58 56.48

ESPO 94.52 71.58 68.63 68.32 66.74 63.42 63.71

Sokol 99.31 64.38 62.57 62.97 61.91 58.81 58.89

Thoughts

The most important thing happening in the war is Trump and Modi reaching some sort of understanding to reduce, and possibly end, India purchases of Russian oil. This represents a very large “stick” but also represents - if Russia will agree to a ceasefire and peace agreement - a very large carrot: resumption of selling oil on the open market.

My suspicion is that this will have more of an impact on Kremlin decisions than any number of Tomahawk missiles.

That said, there has been some interesting commentary about the idea of the US providing TLAM to Ukraine, suggesting that it would not be a meaningful escalation as the Russians are already using advanced cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukraine. That the Russians are using these weapons is unquestionably true. But technically, it is escalation when more advanced weapons are inserted into the equation. The question is whether the escalation would fall into the “escalate to de-escalate” theory of deterrence or not. One might argue that placing TLAMs in Ukraine could be viewed by the Russians as similar to the placement of ballistic missiles in Cuba.

As you will recall, the ground launched TLAMs (The GLCM - Ground Launched Cruise Missile) was a nuclear tipped weapon that was removed from Europe and then they were all destroyed under the Theater Nuclear Forces agreement with Russia. And there is an easy (if not accurate) analogy of GLCM to Ukraine = missiles to Cuba). I’m not saying Russia is right, I’m just suggesting how they might perceive it.

But I think there are other issues that occur to me; I assume someone is working these before giving TLAM to Ukraine (hopefully they were worked before suggesting the idea to the President). For example:

The issue of numbers: per the American Enterprise Institute, the US has an inventory concern with TLAM. As has been demonstrated in the last three years, the US can empty weapons magazines much faster than they can be restocked. 

Or, outcomes, call it the “Curse of the WunderWaffe” (wonder weapons): if we give Ukraine a significant number of TLAM - perhaps 300 or 400 - and these are all shot off - and the war doesn’t end, what next? What’s the next step?

But, as I say, I am sure someone somewhere is thinking several steps ahead on this, and asking the right “what ifs.”

v/r pete