Thursday, October 16, 2025

 OCTOBER 16th, 2025 Next Summary Monday, October 20th

Politics - Trump and Zelenskyy to meet on Friday the 17th

- Trump and Modi - India to cut oil purchases from Russia


Combat Ops - Damage to Power Plants

- More small Russian gains 


Weather


Of note, cloud cover and rain showers are interfering with commercial satellite imagery of most areas, resulting in fewer confirmed changes on the ground, while also limiting effectiveness of reconnaissance drones and allowing more aggressive Russian operations.


Kharkiv

48 and cloudy. Cloudy all week and into next week, rain showers Sunday and Monday. Daily lows in the low 40s, daily highs in the low 50s. Winds south-westerly, 5-10kts.


Melitopol

52 and partly cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy through the weekend, except Friday, which will be partly sunny; rain on Sunday. Daily lows upper in the 30s to low 40s, daily highs in the upper 50s.  Winds variable, 5-10kts.


Kyiv

48 and cloudy, wind gusting to 20. Cloudy through next Monday, rain on Saturday and Sunday. Daily lows in the upper 30s to low 40s, gradual warming, daily highs in the upper 40s rising to the mid 50s by the weekend, temperatures lower next week. Winds south-westerly, 10-15kts.


Politics 


President Trump will meet with President Zelenskyy tomorrow in Washington. Trump commented that they will discuss a possible Ukrainian offensive.

"We will talk to him about the war. And we will talk about the fact that, as I understand it, they want to go on the offensive. I will make a decision on this. But they would like to go on the offensive - you know that. And we will have to make a decision.”


On Wednesday President Trump told reporters that PM Modi of India had assured him that India will halt buying of Russian oil “within a short period of time.”

 "He's assured me there will be no oil purchases from Russia. He can't do it immediately. It's a little bit of a process, but the process is going to be over soon.” 

India’s Ministry of External Affairs released a statement that included:

"India is a significant importer of oil and gas. It has been our consistent priority to safeguard the interests of the Indian consumer in a volatile energy scenario. Our import policies are guided entirely by this objective. Ensuring stable energy prices and secured supplies have been the twin goals of our energy policy. This includes broad-basing our energy sourcing and diversifying as appropriate to meet market conditions."

"Where the US is concerned, we have for many years sought to expand our energy procurement. This has steadily progressed in the last decade. The current Administration has shown interest in deepening energy cooperation with India. Discussions are ongoing."


India consumes between 5.2 and 5.6 million barrels of oil per day (MBPD), with imports of just over 4.5 mbpd (average for September). Of that, Russian sourced oil has been as high as 36% (in 2024).

In 2024 India imported 646 million barrels of oil for Russia, seconds only to China, which imported 801 million barrels for the year. Of note, before the war started in Ukraine (and before Russia was offering oil at a several dollar per barrel discount) India imported on average just 68,000 BPD from Russia.


Ground Operations


SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS


Fighting continues north of Sumy city and Russian reports claim gains at the west end of the would-be buffer zone (near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka) but neither claim can be confirmed.

Russian sources claimed Russian gains in the Vovchansk area but these were not confirmed.

Along the border, north of the Oskil River, imagery from Saturday showed Ukrainian forces had taken terrain north of the village of Bolohivka, and have closed to within a mile of the Russian border in that area.


NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

There were no confirmed changes in the line of contact north of the Donets River.

However, fighting was reported at the intersection of the P07 and P79 roadways in the center of Kupyansk and suggests that the Russian line is, in fact, slowly grinding southward in that city.


BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK


There are claims of Russian gains north of Siversk but these have not been confirmed.

Hard fighting is reported in the general area west and south-west of Chasiv Yar, and north-west of Toretsk; forces in contact were reported in 6 different towns in that area, but there were no confirmed changes to the front line. Reporting does suggest that a Ukrainian element (size unknown) continues to hold a position just south of the Kleban Byk Reservoir.

Russian drone strikes continue on Ukrainian GLOCs in the rear areas around Kostiantinivka and Pokrovsk, with strikes again being reported 12 miles (20 KM) behind the Ukrainian lines.

Fighting continues around the perimeter of the August salient, north-east of Pokrovsk, but there were no confirmed changes to the line of contact.

In the Pokorvsk area there were confirmed Russian gains on the south side of that city, imagery showing Russian forces in an apartment complex just north of Kyivska street. 

There were no changes in the front lines further south, to the Vovcha River.


SOUTHERN UKRAINE


South of the Vovcha River imagery confirmed Russian forces had taken control of Oleksiivka. This town has appeared to trade hands several times in the past month or so, but it appears that the Russians do now indeed control the town.

Imagery also confirmed that Russian forces also gained ground west of Malynivka (10 miles due west of Hulyaipole) and around Novomykolaivka (about 9 miles north-east of Hulyaipole).

Fighting continued further to the west but there were no confirmed changes in the line. Of note, Russian sources claim that Russian forces took control of Karantynnyy Island, just downriver from Kherson city. The island is about 5 miles long and about 2 miles wide, on the west side of the river.


Air and Maritime Operations


During the night of October 15th - October 16th, Russian forces launched 2 x Khinzhal ballistic missiles, 26 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 2 x Iskander cruise missiles, 7 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 320 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 5 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 283 Shahed drones. 

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk (missile strike), Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts.

At least 2 civilians were wounded.

No RuAF tacair strikes reported.


During the night of October 14th - October 15th, Russian forces launched an unknown number of ballistic missiles and 113 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 86 Shahed drones. 

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk (to include a missile strike), Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.

Power outages were noted in parts of Dnipropetrovsk, with more than 100,000 households losing owner. This was followed by an announcement by the government of electricity rationing in all oblasts except Donetsk and parts of Chernihiv.

At least 2 civilians killed and 4 wounded.

RuAF tacair conducted strikes in 4 towns.


Emergency power outages have begun for most of Ukraine as repair work continues on the results of the attacks of the last several days.


Damage Assessment: Oleksii Kucherenko, Deputy Chair of the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on Energy commented on two “Combined Heat and Power Plants” (CHPP) that were damaged in the October 10 drone and missile strikes and taken off line:

"That is, conditionally, if on Friday after the impact two Kyiv CHPs "fell off" to zero, that is, they produce zero electricity - one 800 MW, the other 540 MW, a total of 1,300 MW "fell off" from the system - it is clear that there is a deficit, and Kyiv is already deficient in generation, it cannot live without external support, it does not have enough of its own.”

"There, the price affects, and the technical capabilities of emergency support, now we will directly ask for emergency support. Well, and what I said, the generation deficit. In one powerful city, where the CHPP belongs to Naftogaz, it was also a hit today, and it is also at zero.”

During the night of October 9th - October 10th, Russian forces launched 2 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 14 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 12 x Iskander cruise missiles, 4 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 465 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 1 Kinzhal ballistic missile, 4 Iskander ballistic missiles, 9 Iskander cruise missiles, 1 Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 405 Shahed drones.


Economic Reporting


Feb22   July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct8 Oct15 Oct16

Brent      94.71    70.44 66.90 67.03 66.18 62.66 62.25

WTI     92.10    68.65 64.29 63.26 62.48 59.07 58.62

NG       3.97         3.35 3.06 3.12 3.44 2.98 3.04

Wheat     8.52          5.49 5.18 5.22 5.06 4.96 4.96

Ruble     85          78.47 79.74 84.03 81.28 78.46 80.47

Hryvnia 28.6 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.48 41.61 41.74

Urals 91.66 64.07 63.17 60.12 61.15 56.58 56.48

ESPO 94.52 71.58 68.63 68.32 66.74 63.42 63.71

Sokol 99.31 64.38 62.57 62.97 61.91 58.81 58.89


Thoughts


The most important thing happening in the war is Trump and Modi reaching some sort of understanding to reduce, and possibly end, India purchases of Russian oil. This represents a very large “stick” but also represents - if Russia will agree to a ceasefire and peace agreement - a very large carrot: resumption of selling oil on the open market.

My suspicion is that this will have more of an impact on Kremlin decisions than any number of Tomahawk missiles.

That said, there has been some interesting commentary about the idea of the US providing TLAM to Ukraine, suggesting that it would not be a meaningful escalation as the Russians are already using advanced cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukraine. That the Russians are using these weapons is unquestionably true. But technically, it is escalation when more advanced weapons are inserted into the equation. The question is whether the escalation would fall into the “escalate to de-escalate” theory of deterrence or not. One might argue that placing TLAMs in Ukraine could be viewed by the Russians as similar to the placement of ballistic missiles in Cuba.

As you will recall, the ground launched TLAMs (The GLCM - Ground Launched Cruise Missile) was a nuclear tipped weapon that was removed from Europe and then they were all destroyed under the Theater Nuclear Forces agreement with Russia. And there is an easy (if not accurate) analogy of GLCM to Ukraine = missiles to Cuba). I’m not saying Russia is right, I’m just suggesting how they might perceive it.

But I think there are other issues that occur to me; I assume someone is working these before giving TLAM to Ukraine (hopefully they were worked before suggesting the idea to the President). For example:

The issue of numbers: per the American Enterprise Institute, the US has an inventory concern with TLAM. As has been demonstrated in the last three years, the US can empty weapons magazines much faster than they can be restocked. 

Or, outcomes, call it the “Curse of the WunderWaffe” (wonder weapons): if we give Ukraine a significant number of TLAM - perhaps 300 or 400 - and these are all shot off - and the war doesn’t end, what next? What’s the next step?

But, as I say, I am sure someone somewhere is thinking several steps ahead on this, and asking the right “what ifs.”


v/r pete  


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