Victory in the East

October 6th, 2025

It’s been said Ukraine could win the war, and that’s correct, they could win. In fact, every war is winnable. It is, as Clausewitz so accurately observed, all a function of will - war is a struggle of will. The side with the stronger will, will win the war (providing that the other side’s will to continue the war fails before they manage to kill everyone on the weaker side). 

This is what gives people hope that Ukraine could win the war; Ukrainian national will is strong. The problem, of course, is that the Russian will to fight - and win - the war appears to be just as strong. Which leads to the question, what would Ukraine need to do to win the war?

The answer comes immediately to mind: break the Russian will. This, of course, is like the vaudeville line on how to make a marble statue of an elephant: Easy, get a big block of marble and chip away everything that doesn’t look like an elephant.

It has been suggested that the answer to breaking Russia’s will is to so embarrass Russia, and Putin, on the battlefield that he sues for peace or is thrown out of power. I suppose that’s a possibility, though I would submit that it’s equally likely that, if embarrassed enough he would escalate, maybe even use battlefield nuclear weapons. Hard to know what someone like Putin would do if embarrassed on the world stage.

As to how do you embarrass Russia and Putin? The accepted answer is a combination of “break the Russian economy” and produce a large scale battlefield victory causing huge losses. In short,  kill a lot of Russians.

The problem here is two-fold. First, breaking the Russian economy - the thesis of strategic bombing first elucidated by General Douhet (and his contemporaries Wever, Trenchard and Mitchell) - may be a great deal more difficult than the projections of Western analysts. Russia’s economy has problems. But, arguably, Germany, France, England et al have worse economic problems. And they also suffer from social stresses that are not present in Russia. And, most nations adapt as they are bombed, they get more resilient. History has shown that most countries last much longer than forecast.

Further, there is the issue of China. It isn’t possible to know what is going on inside Emperor Xi’s mind, but it’s readily conceivable that Xi will not let Russia lose, but would rather see the war drag on, letting Europe and the US commit more assets to the war, assets that can’t be committed elsewhere.

As for losses on the battlefield, and generating enough losses to convince Russia to give up the goal of conquering eastern Ukraine, that would entail producing a massive defeat, that is, killing a lot of Russians.

How many? Well, if you believe the casualty figures produced by Kyiv (and several European intelligence agencies and armies) the Russians have already suffered more than 500,000 KIAs and well more than 1 million wounded. And that hasn’t dimmed Russian support for the war. (Note: as for the argument that no one tells the truth to Russian pollsters, they may not, but they still pay their taxes and do as they are told.)

I don't think Russia has suffered that many casualties - the best estimate I’ve seen (my only information is all material found in free, online material, but these numbers make sense and they are documented) is between 135,000 and 225,000 KIA - and I would tend to lean into the range of perhaps 175,000 KIA. The number of severely wounded (those who will never return to the army) is probably around 200,000, and other wounded about 450,000 - 500,000.

But, of note, Ukrainian casualties are probably about the same - and may be more. And while Russia’s population is 147 million, Ukraine’s is now listed at 38 million by the UN (the IMF says 33.4 million); using that number, Russia has 3.8 times as many people as Ukraine, yet roughly the same number of casualties.

Assuming that Russian will is roughly equivalent to Ukrainian will, the numbers suggest - for those who want to quantify this, that Russians would endure at least 3.8 times as many KIAs and also not give up; that would work out to some 650,000 KIAs. Said differently, if you killed another 500,000 Russian soldiers they would keep fighting. Of course, the Red Army - just the army (which included troops from all of the Soviet Union, not simply Russia) suffered some 8.7 million dead during WWII; Russia has a tradition of massive casualties - and massive suffering.

These numbers of KIAs seem nearly inconceivable to Europe and the US, in as much as everyone compares them to the wars fought by the US - and Russia - post World War II. In fact, total US killed in action since the end of World War II runs to about 105,000 (including Korea and Vietnam). We have had 7,320 combat related deaths since 1990; we have become very capable of fighting while suffering few casualties. 

But, as one really smart Marine RCT commander put it, ‘we’ve been fighting two divisions below our weight class for the last 40 years.’ 

The simple truth is that when great powers fight, you should expect a lot of people will get killed, yours and the enemy. And the war in Ukraine is a great power fight. Russia - with a little help from China and North Korea and Iran, is fighting Ukraine - with a lot of help from the US and Europe. 

Per the Council of Foreign Relations, as of January 2025 the US had provide $195 billion in military assistance and grants to Ukraine, and Europe had provided some $121 billion in aid plus another $131 billion in support to Ukrainian refugees. And additional $43 billion has been provided by non-European nations - a total of something on the order of $490 billion (there are some rounding errors in the total). Ukraine had a GDP of about $160 billion in 2021, so, 3 times its GDP has been spent on the war in one way or another. And more has been spent in the last few months - money not included here - so, close to half a trillion dollars.

Ukraine also receives assistance that comes free of charge, in particular intelligence support from Europe and the US that would cost tens of billion to replicate. 

As for Russia, Russia will spend 8% of GDP on national security this year, which means about $160 billion. Given that a fair percentage of this spending doesn’t go to the war effort but to other forces and other activities, and that this year’s total is larger than the first two years of the war, Russia has spent less on the war than Ukraine - Europe - the US. 

So, where does that leave Ukraine?

Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure will continue and gasoline prices in Russia will probably continue to rise. But, will Russia have enough gasoline to continue to perform basic economic functions and continue the war in Ukraine? Yes.

Who will the Russian people blame for high gasoline prices and gasoline shortages: Putin, or Ukraine and the West? Some will blame Putin, but most will blame Ukraine and the West.

Could Ukraine kill enough Russians to convince Russia to stop fighting and withdraw? No one knows. But the numbers would suggest that this would at least require hundreds of thousands - perhaps millions - more deaths to break Russian will.

And we need to face facts about Putin: he is 1) capable - since the gross error in 2022 of believing the massively wrong assessment that led him to invade with 200,000 men in the hopes of a quick several weeks of fighting, he changed strategies (a tremendous challenge in any war) and has since the start of 2023 turned the war around. These are not the actions of an idiot. 2) He’s ruthless. Russia has taken something on the order of 175,000 - 220,000 killed, and 500,000 - 650,000 wounded. They are not slowing down. He is quite willing, it seems, to keep this up.

So, yes, Ukraine could win the war. But to do so it must significantly escalate the level of violence on the battlefield - let’s say 4 or 5 times as violent as it has been so far, AND significantly damage the Russian economy, perhaps also 4 or 5 times as much damage as it is now suffering. And so, for Ukraine to win, Russia must be convinced, in the face of this increased violence, that the answer to stopping the violence and damage to the economy, to Russia, is not to escalate, or even consider the use of battlefield nuclear weapons, but to surrender.