OCTOBER 3rd, 2025

Politics - Elections in Czech Republic

- POW exchange

Combat Ops - Some small gains by both sides 

- Missile and drone strikes

Economics  - EU Imports from Russia

Weather

Kharkiv

62 and mostly cloudy, gusting over 25. Partly cloudy tomorrow, then cloudy for the next week. Daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds easterly, 10-15kts.

Melitopol

66 and mostly cloudy, gusting over 30. Sunny on Saturday, then clouds return, rain showers on Sunday. Daily lows upper 40s to low 50s, daily highs in the 60s.  Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

45 and cloudy. Mostly cloudy through the weekend, rain showers now forecast for Monday and Tuesday. Daily lows mid 40s, daily highs in the 50s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Politics 

Voting has begin in the general election in the Czech Republic, and continues through Saturday. Former Prime Minister Andrej Babis is the current favorite to win. Babis is the founder and lead of “ANO” (“YES”), a populist, sometimes labeled right of center party, but has also been labeled as center-left as well as libertarian, etc. (Babis describes it as “right wing with social empathy.” 

Babis has been described as a “Euro-sceptic” and he opposes the “Brussels Bureaucracy” and liberal immigration policies. Babis has called for an end to Czech aid to Ukraine. 

Ukraine and Russia conducted another POW exchange, each side receiving 205 POWs, 185 military, 20 civilians.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Fighting continues north of Sumy city but there were no confirmed changes in the front lines. Multiple reports from various bloggers suggest that this operation is being reduced in significance and that some Russian forces are being withdrawn and shifted to other areas, though the Russian forces present continue to probe and engage in drone and artillery strikes.

North of Kharkiv, imagery confirmed that Russian forces made gains on the west side of the town of Vovchansk.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continued along most of the front line but there were no confirmed changes in the front lines except in the south, with imagery confirming Russian gains both in Shandryholove (on the Nitrius River), where Russian forces appear to control most of the town, and in the town of Yampil (east of Lyman), with Russian forces now control the north-east quarter of the town.

Of note, a Ukrainian element commander commented on poor weather degrading drone usage, the first comment on the rains that has surfaced.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

North of Bakhmut, imagery confirmed earlier reports of Russian forces occupying the Donetsk Metallurgic Plant, about 1.5 miles north of Siversk. The site is about 2 miles from the T0513 roadway west of the city and provides direct fire over that GLOC. Russian forces also appear to have gained some ground to the north-west of Siversk, near Dronivka, but this has not been confirmed.

Russian sources made claims of gains west of Chasiv Yar, and in the terrain north-west of Toretsk, but these have not been confirmed.

In the ongoing fight for control of the August salient, imagery confirmed that Ukrainian forces had control of the town of Dorozhnie, just north-east of Bilytske (on the west side of the salient), even as imagery confirmed Russian forces had control of Pankivka, on the opposite side of the salient. At the same time, unconfirmed Ukrainian reports suggest that at the north end of the salient, in the vicinity of Kucheriv Yar, Ukrainian forces have isolated a Russian element, while Ukrainian reports note continued Russian recon probes north of Kucheriv Yar into Zolotyi Kolodyaz.

East of Pokrovsk, imagery confirmed Russian forces Russian forces had pushed into and now control the industrial facility east of Myrnohrad, near Balahan. Claims of Russian gains west of Pokrovsk, in the Udachne and Kotlyne areas, have not been confirmed.

There were no other changes to the front line north of the Vovcha River.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Just south of the Vovcha River, imagery showed Russian forces solidifying control over Zelenyi Hai, and further south, imagery showed Russian forces pushing westward from positions just west of Novoivanivka, about 10 miles north-east of Hulyaipole.

West of Orikhiv, imagery confirmed that Russian forces made small gains in Stepnohirsk.

Fighting was again reported around the Antonovskiy bridge, up river from Kherson, but no details are provided. The bridge was struck and one span dropped in August 2022 (to inhibit Russian force movement across the river) and has not been repaired. However, small unit raids have continued in the area since then.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of October 2nd-October 3rd, Russian forces launched 7 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 21 x Iskander cruise missiles, 7 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles  and 381 x  Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 12 Iskander cruise missiles, 5 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 303 Shahed drones. Note, per initial reports, all 7 ballistic missiles reached their targets.

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in  Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Poltava and Sumy oblasts. 

RuAF tacair struck at least 5 Ukrainian towns.

At least 6 civilians were injured.

During the night of October 1st-October 2nd, Russian forces launched 86 x  Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space. The UAF claimed it shot down or defeated by EW, 53 Shahed drones. 

Initial damage from missile and drone strikes was reported in Chernohiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Sumy oblasts. There were partial blackout in Chernihiv, Dnipro, Kyiv, Odessa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

RuAF tacair struck at least 3 Ukrainian towns.

At least 1 civilian was killed and 13 injured.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun9 July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct2 Oct3

Brent      94.71       66.80 70.44 66.90 67.03 64.81 64.35

WTI     92.10    64.89 68.65 64.29 63.26 61.30 60.68

NG       3.97         3.69 3.35 3.06 3.12 3.49 3.38

Wheat     8.52          5.49 5.49 5.18 5.22 5.14 5.16

Ruble     85          79.27 78.47 79.74 84.03 81.46 82.05

Hryvnia 28.6 41.55 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.28 41.28

Urals 91.66 60.84 64.07 63.17 60.12 61.24 59.99

ESPO 94.52 63.97 71.58 68.63 68.32 66.51 NA

Sokol 99.31 61.51 64.38 62.57 62.97 61.71 60.76

Per the the Helsinki based Centre for Research and Clean Air (CREA),

- The EU spent 1.15 billion euros ($1.35 billon) on Russian fuels in August

85% of the purchases were among the top 5 (Hungary, Slovakia, France, the Netherlands and Belgium). The remain 15% was purchased by Spain, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Greece, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Poland.

• The top 5 are:
• Hungary: 416 million euros ($488 million)
• Slovakia: 275 million euros ($323 million)
• France: 157 million euros ($184 million)
• Netherlands: 65 million euros ($76 million)
• Belgium: 64 million euros ($75 million)

Russian oil and natural gas currently accounts for 3% of Europe’s oil, and 19% of it’s natural gas, down from 27% of its oil and 45% of its natural gas at the start of 2022.

Elsewhere, China remains the largest buyer of Russian energy, importing 5.7 billion euros ($6.7 billion) of oil and gas from Russia in August; India was second with 3.6 billion euros ($4.2 billion), Turkey was third (3 billion euros ($3.5 billion), and 5th, behind the EU, was South Korea, with 564 million euros ($660 million). 

The EU also imports nickel, iron and steel from Russia, though these totals are well down from pre-war levels.

The EU continues to buy Russian fertilizers, and Russia’s share of the EU fertilizer market has increased from 17% in 2022 to 30% this year. The EU now accounts for 13% of Russia’s fertilizer sales.

Russia is the largest exporter of fertilizers in the world.

As President Trump opined:  

“They’re funding the war against themselves. Who the hell ever heard of that one?”

Thoughts

The EU energy and fertilizer situation… 3+ years into this war and the EU agricultural industry is more dependent on Russia than it was before the war started.

Noted above in the “Air and Maritime Operations” notes, Russian forces fired 7 x Iskander ballistic missiles and none of them were intercepted. Multiple papers and online news sites are reporting that Russian forces began modifying their Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic missies during spring to perform a pitch down maneuver in the terminal phase of flight and that this has proven to be difficult to the Patriot system. Whether there are other facets to this, to include some types of jamming, etc., is not mentioned and would, hopefully, remain unmentioned as the manufacturer and the US Army work to counter that activity.

Per the “Independent,” (UK newspaper) a report recently released by DIA covering April through June, noted that the Ukrainian Air Force (which operates the Patriots) has: “struggled to consistently use Patriot air defence systems to protect against Russian ballistic missiles due to recent Russian tactical improvements, including enhancements that enable their missiles to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a traditional ballistic trajectory.”

Patriot interception success rates (as reported on line) were very high until these changes started to appear. Comparisons with other systems (such as the SAMP/T) showed Patriot with as good or better engagement rates (85% or better), and Patriot was reported to have a 10 for 10 success rate with the first Kinzhals fired at Kyiv. However, interception rates began dropping this past spring, reaching 37% in August and 6% in September, according to the “Financial Times,” quoting a Ukrainian Air Force report.

Besides the obvious “the enemy gets a vote,” there is the obvious problem that long wars “train” your enemy. Even as you get smarter, so does he. And in this case, “he” includes China.

v/r pete