OCTOBER 9th, 2025

Abbreviated notes today.

There were few changes on the ground in the last 24 hours, with some minor changes in the front lines. The one change of note was some clear Russian gains into the middle of Kupyansk. Overall, the ground war has slowed, which I suspect is, as noted yesterday, a combination of weather and change of seasons (which impacts small unit tactics), troop rotations, and some shifting of forces. I would expect this will continue until the weather gets very cold - late November or early December.

The nightly drone strike consulted of 112 drones, 25 of which get through unscathed, causing more damage to the power grid, with reports noting serious damage to the power grid in Chernihiv Oblast (north-east of Kyiv), though no specifics were given. As to power, it was also noted that, as of yesterday, Russia has completed the isolation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, as they prepare to connect it to the Russian power grid.

Thoughts

The Ukrainian General Staff is reporting more Russian forces moving into the terrain south of Pokrovsk, between that city and the Vovcha River, which would seem to suggest preparations to attack into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian forces also continue to move slowly forward in the general area north of Hulyaipole (the south-east corner of the front) and Ukrainian forces continue to have trouble stopping these advances. Except for one small piece of terrain just east of Hulyaipole, the Russian have now retaken all the terrain across southern Ukraine recovered in the 2023 Ukrainian Counter-offensive. Further, in every case, the Russians appear to have been diligent in brining in their engineering units and building defensive positions. These defensive positions have proven very difficult to breach and have reportedly been improved based on lessons learned during the 2023 counter-offensive.

Meanwhile, Russian sources are claiming that Ukrainian forces are being shifted to the Sumy region in preparation for another thrust into Kursk oblast. Whether that is true is not clear at all.

All that said, the situation in Kupyansk is of concern. The Russians have two thrusts into the city, one from due north, one from the north-west. In between is a Ukrainian force (at least one brigade) which is holding ground but some reporting suggests that hold is at risk and the Russians have a possibility of a full encirclement. If that were to happen Kupyansk would quickly fall, and with it the logistics support to Ukrainian forces east of the Oskil River, north of Senkove. That could result in the loss of several brigades as well as having a “can-opener” effect further south, leading to a good deal of stress on the Ukrainian hold east of the Oskil River.

The rest of the front line has seen a good deal of small back and forth the “see-saw” tactical gains and losses, and the Russians continue to hold the bulk of the August salient, and are making some progress in taking Ukrainian terrain just east of the salient.

And in Pokrovsk, Russian recon elements continue to probe, but the fighting remains concentrated onto south and south-west edges of the city. 

If there is one area of concern, the growing Russian fiber-optic drone capability is degrading Ukrainian logistics support to front line elements. Tactical (back-pack sized) electronic warfare systems to counter drones have become commonplace; the fiber optic drones are, of course, immune. And Russia has a very clear edge in the manufacturing of these drones. This appears to have evolved into the key tactical problem for the rest of the year.

v/r pete