February 7th, 2025 

Ground Ops - Another “offensive” in the Kursk area, not clear how far

- Small gains elsewhere

Politics  - Kellogg meets with Ukraine Ambassador to US

- Kellogg comments

Weather

Cold and gusty weather, but clearer, should improve reconnaissance.

Kharkiv

24 and cloudy, gusting to 20, windchill 14. Partly cloudy next week, daily highs in the low to mid 20s, daily lows in the upper teens, windchills single digits to low teens. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

26 and mostly cloudy, gusting over 20, windchill 15. Mostly sunny for the next five day. Daily highs for the next week will be at or just below freezing, daily lows in the low 20s to teens. Windchills single digits to teens. Winds north-easterly, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

30 and cloudy, gusting to 30, windchill 19. Partly cloudy tomorrow and next week, daily lows will be at or below 20, daily highs will be mid 20s, windchills will be in single digits to low teens. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations 

Kursk Salient

Reports earlier this week hinted at anther Ukrainian attack in the Kursk salient; this has now materialized, with what appears to be parts of 2 x mechanized infantry battalions (with a reported 30 - 50 total armored vehicles). This is light compared to a US mechanized infantry battalion which would each have 40+ armored vehicles per battalion as well as more than a dozen other vehicles in support).

The Ukrainian battalions appear to have pressed south-east out of Sudzha, using local bad weather to defeat Russian reconnaissance drones, run past Kolmakov and into Fanaseyevka, and perhaps as far as Ulanok (the next town on the road) - the  towns all located on the Oboyan roadway that runs roughly south-east to east out of Subzha, covering a distance of 4 - 5 miles. The attack appears to be mainly along that one roadway, threading their way between elements of 4 brigade sized units (an airborne brigade, a naval infantry brigade, a naval infantry regiment and a mechanized rifle regiment).

This is a gutsy - risky maneuver which places them with exposed lines of communication back to Ukrainian controlled terrain; it remains to be seen whether the Ukrainians will try to force more units down that same road or will this task force turn and strike Russian forces in the rear, particularly those attacking Kurilovka? Or, given the frozen terrain and improved off-road mobility, they could turn to the southwest and run back into Ukrainian territory having simply caused havoc behind Russian lines.

Unconfirmed Russian reporting noted the attacking force consisted of elements of 2 battalions, 50 vehicles and fewer than 500 troops. Claims are that Russian forces have already destroyed 20+ vehicles and stopped further movement, but none of this has been confirmed.

Meanwhile, Russian forces just east of Kurilovka continue to press into that town.

North of Kharkiv

Russian forces continued small unit assaults and bloggers claimed Russian gains south of Hlyboke (due north of Kharkiv), but this has not been confirmed.

North of the Donets River

Fighting continues north and east of Kupyansk, and Russian forces appear to have moved into the small village of Fyholivka, about 2 miles north of Dvorichna. Fyholivka is a small village of two parallel north-south streets, about 2,000 feet long, only one street of which (the western one) has any houses on it. The eastern street is the main road in the area and runs north through several more towns and control of these towns would provide de facto control of the terrain east of the road, all the way to the Russian border (about 8 miles)

  Russian forces also continue to expand their holdings in the area of Zapadne, north of Kupyansk.

There were claims of small Russian gains east of Borova, but these have not been confirmed, nor were there any further gains west of Terny, despite heavy fighting in that area.

Bakhmut

North and north-east of Bakhmut, fighting was reported in the general Siversk area, particularly to the east and south-east, but there were no confirmed changes to the front lines.

In Chasiv Yar, and just south of Chasiv Yar, Russian forces appear to have made small gains into western edge of town center, as well as into neighboring village of Shevchenko. South of the town Russian forces also appear to have made gains into Stupochky. Ukrainian reports suggest additional Russian forces are massing for a large attack into Shevchenko and Stupochky.

Further south, fighting continues around the northern edge of Toretsk and into the north edge of Krymske and Dachne, but there were no confirmed changes to the front lines.

Donetsk City

Fighting continued along most of the perimeter of the Pokrovsk salient. Russian forces had modest gains east of Vozdvyzhenka, as well as west and south-west of Pokrovsk. To the south-east (west of Kurakhove) Russian forces made small gains in Andriivka, as well as further west near Bahatyr. 

Russian forces continue to try to squeeze and grind down the pocket south-west of Kurakhove. In the area south-west of Kurakhove, Russian forces continue to grind out gains. Imagery confirms that Russian forces now control Dachne. What is not clear is whether Russian forces overran the Ukrainian forces, or were the Ukrainian forces able to withdraw westward across open fields without being chewed up.

Russian forces remained active north and west of Velyka Novosilke, but there were no claims of any changes in the front line in that area.

 Southern Ukraine

Tacair strikes and artillery “sniping” were reported at a number of sites across southern Ukraine, but the were no reports of troops in contact across the south or along the Dnepr River.

Air Operations

During the night of 6 - 7 February Russian forces launched 112 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 81 drones and that 31 other drones did not reach their targets (defeated by EW).

Other reporting suggested damage in Sumy, Kyiv and Khmelnytskyi and Sumy oblasts; a fire was reported in Kyiv proper as a result of drone strikes.

Russian forces launched 2 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 104 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace on the night of February 5th. The UAF claimed it shot down 57 drones and that 42 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). The only reports Ukrainian officials issued were damages to residential properties.

Ukrainian forces launched an unspecified number of drones against Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base in Krasnodar Krai, causing a fire at the base; the airbase is located about 2 miles from the sea on the east coast of the Sea of Azov.

Politics 

A delegation from the Ukrainian Embassy, to include Ambassador Oksana Markarova, the Ukrainian Defense Attache, General Kremenetskyi, and the general’s deputy, Denys Senik, met with Special Envoy Kellog yesterday. Per the Ambassador, the discussion was substantive and “thorough.”

Special Envoy Kellogg, in an interview with the New York Post, commented that President Trump is ready to substantially increase sanctions against Russia, that sanctions are currently "only about a three" on a ten-point scale of "how painful the economic pressure can be.”

"You could really increase the sanctions – especially the latest sanctions [targeting oil production and exports]. It's opened the aperture way high to do something. And if there's anybody who understands leverage, it's President Donald J. Trump, and you can see that with what he's recently done [in other foreign problem-solving].”

"Solving the Russia-Ukraine war is really all hands on deck for the entire administration, so a whole-of-government approach. We got the national security team talking about it – the president, vice president, national security adviser, secretaries of State [and] Treasury, National Security Council, working all together.” 

Kellogg labeled the previous administration’s commitment to provide aid 

"as long as it takes, as much as it takes” as "That is not a strategy, it's a bumper sticker.”

"I think we have some opportunities, and fortunately, I'm working for the master deals. He wrote 'The Art of the Deal'. I wouldn’t put anything past him.”

"For Russia, this is kind of in their DNA in military operations – basically, you're in an attrition fight. If you look at history, you'd never want to get into an attrition fight with the Russians, because that’s how they fight. They're used to it. I mean, this is a country that was willing to lose – and did – 700,000 in the Battle of Stalingrad in six months, and they didn’t blink an eye.” 

"You have to put economic pressure, you have to put diplomatic pressure, some type of military pressures and levers that you’re going to use underneath those to make sure [this goes] where we want it to go.”

A poll (Russian state run) conducted last week showed 67% of Russians support the war, and 65% believe the war is going well.

A Russian opposition news service conducted analysis of Russian "dog tags" and their assessment is that the Russian army recruited some 30,000 penal colony troops between February and August 2023.

As you may recall, Russian casualties have included a large number of penal colony troops. It is these troops that execute the so called “meat assaults,” attacking in larger numbers than the 3-5 man rifle teams - regular army - that sneak forward, either moving to contact or conducting reconnaissance. It has been estimated that 20% (possibly higher) of Russian casualties (95,000 KIA total, 350,000 WIA) are penal colony troops.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Mar 7   Jun10-22 Jun8-23 Jun7 Sep9 Dec9 Jan8 Feb6 Feb7

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 71.74 72.63 76.69 74.43 74.89

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 68.37 68.85 73.94 70.70 71.17

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.20 3.17 3.66 3.37 3.37

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.67 5.59 5.37 5.86 5.86

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 90.75 100.84 105.18 96.75 96.88

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 40.89 41.55 42.33 41.45 41.46

Urals 56.56    67.61 78.83 66.19 71.76 68.53 68.32

ESPO 65 77 78.19 75.93 ???

Sokol 66.23 65.32 72.79 70.83 70.92

Russian exports of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) to the EU in 2024 totaled 15.5 million tons, the highest level since 2019. Prices for LNG rose steadily through the year, from just under $9 per MBTU to just over $14 per MBTU, so Russian sales of LNG to the EU would have been on the order of $8 - 9 Billion. Total Russian LNG exports hit 33 million tons, the most ever exported.

Thoughts

Kellogg made the point - very heavy stick. As I mentioned yesterday: run it all the way out to a third party embargo: the US won’t trade with anyone who trades with Russia. That would essentially leave Russia with Cuba, North Korea and perhaps Kazakhstan trading partners. As we have already seen, Chinese oil traders are wary of trading with Russia due to banking concerns. 

Increases in US oil and gas production (and hence LNG) would also dip into Russia’s LNG sales.

And Prime Minster Modi of India will meet with President Trump on the 12th (next Wednesday). It is reasonable to expect Trump will work to have Modi shift some of his defense buys to US or Western defense contractors, away from Russian systems, and perhaps more oil deals - away from Russian oil. 

As Kellogg points out, Trump believes in deal-making. The issue now is to get Putin (and to a lesser extent Zelenskyy) to realize that now is the time to make a deal, so that by the time Trump and Putin meet, they are 9/10th of the way to the deal.

As for the Ukrainian attack south-east of Sudzha, we’ll see if anything comes of it. But, if the initial reports are accurate as to the size and scope, this will be stopped and rolled up quickly.

v/r pete