November 12th, 2025

Politics - Corruption probe

Combat Ops - Marginal Gains in Pokrovsk

- Significant gains in the south

Weather

Note, fog and clouds continue to obscure much of the front line, meaning that changes in the front lines may remain unconfirmed for several days at a time.

Kharkiv

47 and light rain. Mostly mostly cloudy for the next week. Daily lows in the upper 30s, daily highs in the upper 40s. Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

47 and cloudy. Cloudy tomorrow followed by three days of sunny weather. Daily lows in the 30s, daily highs in the low 50s.  Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

39 and cloudy. Cloudy for the next week, light rain in Saturday. Daily lows in the 30s, daily highs in the upper 40s. Winds southerly, 10-15kts.

Politics 

Ukraine’s justice and energy ministers submitted their resignations in the wake of a corruption probe after President Zelenskyy’s called for their resignations.

Justice Minister German Galushchenko and Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk have “submitted their resignations in accordance with the law.”

The two are said to be involved in a plot in which money was being laundered by Energoatom - Ukraine’s nuclear power agency - as part of a plan to control the purchase of electric power, and involved a series of kickbacks to various offices for contractors wanting to work with the agency. Five people have already been arrested, at least two more remain at large. The scheme is said to have involved demands of 10-15% payoffs for gaining contracts, and more than $100 million in payments.

The scheme was reportedly led by Timur Mindich, a businessman, co-owner of the Kvartal 95 studio, the studio founded by President Zelenskyy.

Eliminating corruption has been named a key issue in admittance to the EU.

Denmark’s MOD announced 1.4 billion kroner ($263 million) in military aid to Ukraine, set aside for the purchase of more weapons, particularly US weapons (ostensibly air defense weapons).

Ground Operations

Ground operations over essentially the whole front - with one exception, southern Ukraine - have slowed in the last week, which seems to be true for each autumn of this war, though it isn't completely clear why. Weather is certainly part of it, as is planning and preparations for winter offensives, but on both sides there seems to be a slowdown in operations, The exception is, as noted, Russian operations just north-east of Hulyaipole, up to the south-bank of the Vovcha River (due west of Donetsk City); in this area Russian forces continue to push westward and have taken several more small towns in the last several days.

It should also be noted that Russian advances in the last two months were exceptionally fast for the Russians since the seconds half of 2022, by which time they had switched to a sustained war of attrition. Since then, Russian forces have not only not shown to be proficient in rapid movements to take advantage of weak points in the Ukrainian line, they really appear to not care. They have a slow, methodical, low risk (as in low chance of losing) way of war and they are going to sustain that, and not engage in higher risk, higher gain tactics.

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

Fighting continues north of Sumy City and there are some indications of additional Russian forces being moved into the area, but there were no substantive changes in the front lines over the last 5 days.

Fighting continues north of Kharkiv, but there were no confirmed changes to the front lines.

Along the border, north of the Oskil River, there was renewed Russian activity near Bolohivka, but whether there was any change to the front line is not clear.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

A good deal of contradictory and confusing reporting from Kupyansk, with Russian claims of gains, Russian claims of taking control of much of Kupyansk east of the Oskil River, Ukrainian claims of pushing the Russians back in western Kupyansk, reports of both sides interdicting the logistics support of the other side, etc.

My guess is that all the reports are in part correct, that Ukrainian forces pushed the Russians backing some parts of the city, that Russian forces pushed forward, that there is a very aggressive drone-centric effort to interdict logistics - trying to strike any moving vehicle, and a very nasty, house-to-house fight going on in some sections of Kupyansk and in Myrne and Sobolivka immediately to the west. Again, it has settled into an expensive “knife-fight in a phone booth” and the side with t hemost men will be the favored side.

Further south to the Donets fighting continues, but with no substantive changes to the front lines.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

North of Bakhmut, imagery confirmed Ukrainian gains east-south-east of Siversk, pushing the Russian line back in the open fields between Siversk and Verkhnokamyanske.

Fighting continues west of Chasiv Yar and north-west of Toretsk, with continued probes by Russian forces, and small counter-attacks by Ukrainian forces in the area north-east, east and east-south-east of Kostiantinivka, but even where there is some imagery to show troop locations, these troops appear to be mainly recon elements and it is not clear that the front line has really moved. A Ukrainian unit of unknown size continues to hold a position in southern Chasiv Yar.

West of Toretsk, north-east of Pokrovsk, beyond the Pokrovsk pocket, there are claims and counter claims of gains on the ground, but they can't be confirmed.

In Pokrovsk and the Pokrovsk pocket there has been little change over the last 5 days, but Russian forces continue to slowly shift into the area; blogger maps - depending on which ones you chose, show another 1 or 2 Russian brigades in the area, but the Russian movements remain slow - plodding, and there were only marginal movements in eastern Pokrovsk and in Myrnohrad. There are a host of claims about gains by both sides but little to support it.

It needs to be remembered that the two cities (Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad) are made up of thousands of small houses, closely packed, and clusters of small apartment buildings - all of a type which have been used in the past 3 years in very stubborn defensive fights. In the past year in particular Russian movements have started to rely more heavily on Russian tactical aviation to provide strikes to reduce some of these buildings, and that was seen over the weekend with several buildings being struck by 500KG (1100 lb) FAB boys (a JDAM equivalent). But there is little reason to believe this will go quickly, and, as mentioned in the past, part of this Russian “way of war” is to move slowly, take few tactical risks, and try to inflict heavy casualties on the Ukrainians; this they are doing.

There were no changes in the lines to the south-west of Pokrovsk, north of the Vovcha River.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Fighting south of the Vovcha River, south to the general area north-east of Hulyaipole, continues, and is noted by the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) to be “fierce.” This afternoon the UGS reported that Ukrainian forces had withdrawn from Novouspenivske, Novye, Okhotnyche, Uspenivka, Novomykolaivka, and that fighting continues in Yablukove, Rivnopillya, and Solodke, all three of which are said to be currently under have artillery barrages.

What this means is that the Russian forces have taken a series of small towns along the Yanchur River (a small river in the south-east), and pushed further westward and are now pushing into the next three towns (north to south: Solodke, Rivnopillya and Yablukove). Yablukove is 5 miles north-east of Hulyaipole, and the three towns are north of the Ukrainian defensive lines built to protect southern Ukraine from attacks from the south and east.

There are two small rivers and manicured farmland between Yablukove and Hulyaipole, but otherwise no meaningful defensive positions between these towns and the north side of Hulyaipole. Further, there are reportedly no Ukrainian reserves available to reinforce the lines in this area. The UGS will need to shift forces if they hope to slow up the Russian advance.

These operations have been greatly facilitated by Russian drone and artillery strikes continuing to degrade the Ukrainian GLOCs into the area. 

Bloggers report Russian FPV drones in central Prymorske, more than 6 miles north of the front lines, but this has not be confirmed.

Fighting was again reported near the Antonovsky bridge, up river from Kherson. The exact nature of the fighting is not reported.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of November 11th-November 12th Russian forces launched at least 1 x ballistic missile (type unknown) and 121 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down, or otherwise defeated with EW,  90 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odessa,  Sumy  oblasts.

Casualties reports have not been released for the day.

RuAF tacair struck 3 towns.

Over the previous 4 days (the nights of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th) Russian forces launched a total 787 x Shahed drones, 9 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles, 25 Iskander ballistic missiles and 18 cruise missiles of various type - the largest strike (458 Shahed and 32 ballistic missiles) occurring on the night of 7-8 November (Friday night). 

Overall, during the past 4 days Ukrainian forces were able to shoot down or defeat 542 Shahed drones, and 9 cruise missiles, but 235 drones, 34 ballistic missiles and 9 cruise missiles reached their targets, hitting power grid targets across much of the country, leaving multiple cities with temporary blackouts, which in many cases also means no heat or water, as the cold weather begins to settle in to Ukraine.  Also hit were several rail targets.

In addition, on average Russian tacair struck 7 towns per day with glide bombs, usually towns and cities within 30 miles of the front lines.

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct strikes on oil sector targets in Russia as well as several power grid targets, hitting a substation in Belgorod that left 20,000 citizens without power for a night, and a refinery in Orsk (almost 900 miles east-south-east of Moscow).

Bloggers report that the latest version of Ukrainian battlefield electronic jamming has significantly reduced the effectiveness of the Russian Lancet strike drones and that the Russians are relying ever more heavily onto fiber optic drones.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct8 Nov7 Nov12

Brent      94.71    70.44 66.90 67.03 66.18 63.86 63.17

WTI     92.10    68.65 64.29 63.26 62.48 59.94 58.98

NG       3.97         3.35 3.06 3.12 3.44 4.33 4.54

Wheat     8.52          5.49 5.18 5.22 5.06 5.32 5.34

Ruble     85          78.47 79.74 84.03 81.28 80.95 81.09

Hryvnia 28.6 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.48 41.89 42.07

Urals 91.66 64.07 63.17 60.12 61.15 56.56 55.69

ESPO 94.52 71.58 68.63 68.32 66.74 65.18 62.87

Sokol 99.31 64.38 62.57 62.97 61.91 60.71 62.06

Thoughts

Commentary on Pokrovsk, and to a certain extent most of the front line south of Pokrovsk, has developed a tone of acceptance: the Russians will take this terrain eventually. These comments are followed by comments on how many casualties are being inflicted on the Russians, which must be taken with a good deal of salt, as well as no comments on Ukrainian casualties. There are also repeated comments on Russian forces taking advantage of fog and poor weather.

It reminds me of the comment from ore than one general that “It also rains on the enemy.” More to the point, it seems to me that there is a hint of fatalism growing on the Ukrainian side.

Add to that the now openly discussed manpower shortage in the Ukrainian army and you have two disturbing trends.

It is worth adding that, while there is a great deal of talk about support to Ukraine, containing the Russians, etc., etc., etc. The price of Russian oil says a great deal more than all the talk. Consider that from January 2020 through February 2021, Ural oil was substantially lower in price than today, bottoming in April 2020 at $14.81 cents. Since the war began the lowest price for Urals oil has been a dip to 48.67 in March of 2023. Similar dips in other Russian oil prices have also taken place. But folks around the world - especially China - continue to buy Russian crude and refine it, and Europe continues to buy those products, knowing full well that some significant percentage of that they are buying started out as Russian crude. 

More generally, the lessons here are old but worth repeating: sanctions imposed “a nickel at a time” give the targeted country time to adjust. The result is that the sanctions, in the end, will make them more resilient. Like Nietzsche’s warning, if it doesn't kill them…

The other lesson, as demonstrated by the seemingly impossible process of weaning Europe off of Russian natural gas, is that, in the end, countries will look after their own interests, no matter what they say in public. This includes not only buying cheap energy to keep costs down in their economies, it means paying as little as possible for their own national security as long as there is someone else who will, in the end, foot the bill.

v/r pete