November 5th, 2025

Politics - 10,000 North Korean soldiers, 5,000 workers

- Progress in sanctions 

Combat Ops - Ukrainian position in Pokrovsk weakening

- Pokrovsk pocket may be closed 

Weather

Kharkiv

43 and light drizzle. Partly to mostly cloudy through the weekend. Daily lows in the upper 30s, daily highs in the mid 40s. Winds light and variable, 5kts.

Melitopol

46 and cloudy. Partly cloudy for the next 4 days except Sunday, which will be sunny. Daily lows in the low 40s, daily highs in the upper 50s.  Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

48 and cloudy. Partly to mostly cloudy for the next week, except Saturday, which will be sunny. Morning fog possible. Daily lows around 40, daily highs near 50. Winds variable, 5kts.

Politics 

Republic of Korea intelligence estimates that there are now 10,000 North Korean troops on the Russian - Ukrainian border, in the Kursk oblast, and another 5,000 North Korean construction workers as well.

Kazakhstan’s Kazmunaygaz (the state owned oil and natural gas company) will continue to work with Russia’s Lukoil, despite Western sanctions.

Japanese trading company Marubeni will follow Japanese government guidance in its relationship with Sakhalin-1 and Rosneft; Japanese guidance, following US sanctions on Rosneft, will allow Marubeni until 21 November to step away from Rosneft.

Guzel Enerji of Turkey is increasing the price of diesel fuel that is in part supplied by Russian sources, in accordance with Western sanctions.

Germany will provide 3 billion Euros ($3.5 billion) in financial aid to Ukraine in 2026.

President Putin will not attend the G-20 summit in South Africa in November.

Ground Operations

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLASTS

North of Sumy city there were no changes to the front lines. Imagery of the Lukashivka area, along the border about 30 miles north-west of Kharkiv, 40 miles south-east of Sumy city, Russian forces have pushed across the border (just south of where the Vorskla River crosses the border) and apparently are establishing another would-be buffer.

There were no confirmed changes north of Kharkiv city, nor were there any changes in the front line along the border, north of the Oskil River.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues in central Kupyansk and to the west of the city. There is no imagery to confirm a change in the lines, but reporting suggests that Russian forces counter-attacked the narrow Ukrainian salient down the P79 roadway and Ukrainian forces appear to have withdrawn.

At the same time, President Zelenskyy commented on the situation in Kupaynsk, and noted that Ukrainian units are attacking and that only 60 Russian troops remain inside Kupyansk, which seems fanciful.

Further south, There was little other movement, except Ukrainian forces appear to have retaken some ground that may have been briefly held by Russian forces just south-east of Lyman, although my suspicion is that that was a Russian recon element that probed into the edge of Lyman, were spotted, and then withdrew.

BAKHMUT - TORETSK - POKROVSK

Fighting continues around Siversk but there were no confirmed changes to the front lines.

North-west of Torestk imagery confirmed Ukrainian forces made gains at two sites east of Kostiantinivka, one just south-west of Oleksandro Shutlyne and one just west of Predtechyne, the south and north sides, respectively, of the Russian salient that has reached Kostiantinivka. The two small counter-attacks are about 2.5 miles apart and it isn’t clear what size forces the Ukrainians have committed or what forces they are facing.

POKROVSK - Imagery confirms Russian gains across northern Pokrovsk, and other reports suggest the gains extend being the imaged areas; one analyst (pro Russian but usually fairly accurate) suggests that Russian force control more than 80% of the city and that Ukrainian forces control only 4 small pockets on the edge of the city, and that those are now being squeezed. Russian tacair is reportedly conducting multiple strikes with FAB (JDAM equivalent) ordnance.

Ukrainian forces do continue to hold those sections of the town and Ukrainian SOF continue efforts to open up and sustain logistics links with forces inside Pokrovsk and in Myrnohrad. Ukrainian forces also continue to push into northern and western Rodynske and continue efforts to clear up the remains of the August salient. Ostensibly Ukrainian gains in Rodynske would cause Russian forces to shift some assets to stop those Ukrainian gains, but the Russian army has shown that it shift forces only slowly and only as a last resort.

At the same time, unconfirmed reports suggest Russian forces made gains in and just north of Rivne (immediately north-east of Pokrovsk), and if accurate this would constitute a closing of the mouth of the Pokrovsk pocket and a literal encirclement of the Ukrainian brigades that remain in and around Myrnohrad. Estimates vary as to how many Ukrainian forces remain inside the Pokrovsk pocket but there are several estimates that place the force size as 3 brigades (one site says 4), and a total of 10,000 to 11,000 troops.

Fighting continues but there were no changes in the front lines south-west of Pokrovsk, to the Vovcha River.

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

South of the Vovcha River there were no confirmed changes to the front line, nor were there any confirmed charges westward past Orikhiv, to the Dnepr River, though Russian forces claim gains in Stepnohirsk.

Fighting also contains along the Dnepr River and around the Antonovsky bridge but there were no changes in terrain held.

Air and Maritime Operations

During the night of November 4th-November 5th Russian forces launched at least 80 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down, or otherwise defeated with EW, 61 drones.

Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, Zaporizhzhia damaging power grid and port infrastructure.

Casualties reports (incomplete as of midday) included at least 6 wounded civilians.

RuAF tacair struck 8 towns.

A Russian Navy Grisha class corvette, located in Sukhama Bay, Sevastopol, Crimea, was reported to be on fire yesterday. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has 2 Grisha’s in Sevastopol and 2 in Krasnodar Krai, the newest of which was launched in 1989.

During the night of November 3rd-November 4th Russian forces launched at least 1 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 6 x S-300 ballistic missiles and 130 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or otherwise defeated with EW, 92 drones.

Damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odessa and Sumy oblasts, damaging power grid and port infrastructure.

Casualties reports (incomplete as of midday) included at least 1 dead civilian and 11 wounded civilians.

RuAF tacair struck 10 towns.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   July8 Aug8 Sep9 Oct8 Nov4 Nov5

Brent      94.71    70.44 66.90 67.03 66.18 64.09 64.35

WTI     92.10    68.65 64.29 63.26 62.48 60.18 60.44

NG       3.97         3.35 3.06 3.12 3.44 4.21 4.34

Wheat     8.52          5.49 5.18 5.22 5.06 5.45 5.50

Ruble     85          78.47 79.74 84.03 81.28 81.11 81.32

Hryvnia 28.6 41.80 41.39 41.23 41.48 42.08 42.08

Urals 91.66 64.07 63.17 60.12 61.15 58.63 58.60

ESPO 94.52 71.58 68.63 68.32 66.74 66.69 66.24

Sokol 99.31 64.38 62.57 62.97 61.91 61.22 61.30

Thoughts

It appears that the Russian attack - Ukrainian defense of Pokrovsk is coming to a climax, Russians forces appear to have most of the city, and to be on the verge of full encirclement of the Ukrainian units int he pocket.

Russian success has been substantially supported by the Russian effort to gain some degree of air control over the battlefield, achieved through a combination of drone strikes (the tethered drones being a key component of that effort), the use of the Russian FAB glide bombs (similar to JDAM), and a layering of tactics: the use of missiles and drones to both attack Ukraine’s power grid and at the same time to force the UAF to commit a large percentage of their air defense assets into defense of these civilian and infrastructure targets, allowing the Russians to be more aggressive in their use of air assets over the battlefield. This was also tied to aggressive Russian recon (which reportedly relies heavily on Spetsnaz elements) and infiltration tactics that push small teams (2, 3 or 4 soldiers at a time) forward, in larger numbers - 100 or more personnel per day into Pokrovsk over the past several weeks. These teams have also apparently favored attacking Ukrainian drone teams (there is a tactical intelligence story here that would be interesting to develop), denying Ukrainians the optimum use of their drones, with Russian units moving faster than the Ukrainian drone teams "set up and beginning operating” time lines. Said differently, though the Russians may not sue the jargon, the Russian army has, at least in the last 3 - 5 months, and at least in the Pokrovsk area, and perhaps to the south, worked its way inside the Ukrainian OODA Loop.

Pokrovsk has not fallen, but at this point it seems that the Ukrainian army would need to commit forces it really can’t afford to move - forces located elsewhere on the front line - to stop the Russians gaining control of Pokrovsk, and even then, would probably fail to stop the loss. Said differently, Pokrovsk could fall within a few days to a few weeks. If Rivne has also been taken by the Russian, the Ukrainian army could lose 10,000 soldiers in short order.

That said, whether the Russians can shift this tactical setup to other points on the line remains to be seen.

Nevertheless, Pokrovsk stopped being a logistics and personnel movement hub 4 months ago as it came under sustained Russian drone and tacair attack. This is painful, but the Ukrainian operational adjustment has already taken place. Nor is the Russian army organized logistically nor does it have the command and control setup or doctrine for rapid movement; there will be no “Guderian-like" breakthrough.  

But what needs to be discussed is the manpower shortage, and in particular the lack of enough trained infantryman in the Ukrainian army, as well as a very small strategic reserve. There have been comments about “porous lines” but that is a polite way of saying the line is under-manned. This is the real issue, and the 3 years (late 2022 - late 2025) Russian effort to inflict high casualty rates on the Ukrainian army is, arguably, beginning to yield the desired Russian results.

All in all, the real impact here is one of morale, this is a boost to the Russians and a blow to the Ukrainians; what we don’t know, and can’t know, is how big a blow it will be to Ukrainian army morale and public morale. That is the real worry, and will become evident over time - as Napoleon noted: "the Moral [his morale] is to the physical as three to one.” Said differently, the Russians are winning; they retain the initiative and they will continue to grind. At some point - known but to God - the Ukrainian army is likely to break. Before that happens, Ukraine needs to develop another approach.

v/r pete