August 6th, 2026

Politics

Former DefMin Fedorov is still hopeful he will return as defense minister when the Verkhovna Rada returns from summer recess on August 18th. 

"I currently have no moral right to engage in anything else, because while people are fighting for tomorrow and my name is being mentioned, people believe this can be done, and today there is no clear 'no', I believe we always have a chance.”

"This may be a temporary situation, but it cannot go on for long … so it is very important that this process has a certain deadline.”

"Let's wait until we pass those dates, [August 18th] and then I will talk more about my path and what we will do. I have options B, C, D, and so on.”

"It is important to work towards our victory, to implement the plan we discussed, because we do not have hundreds of teams with hundreds of people who understand the war and are ready to serve their country 24/7. So we will find a format in which we will serve our country regardless.”

Airport personnel in Leipzig sighted a drone between to AN-124 cargo aircraft, an aircraft owned by the Ukrainian Antonov airline, and after the drone hit one of the ground crew, it fell to the ground. It was later determined to have explosives on it. At least one of the two AN-124s were carrying explosives from France to be delivered to Ukraine. 

The Polish “Law and Justice” party has drafted a law that would order the deportation of Ukrainain men of conscription age who do not have a job. Poland’s Department of Labor estimates that there are at least 11,000 such individuals.

Ground Operations

Overall there were small changes on the ground with both sides posting some gains. 

North of the Donets River, south-east of Borova, Ukrainain forces were confirmed in imagery to have gained some ground south of the town of Novovodyane and may have made if it across the Zherebets river just south of the town.

Ukrainian forces also have pushed into the small village of Zirka, on Sunday and Monday, about 2 miles south of the Vovcha River, south-south-west of Fillia, continuing Ukrainain gains in this area.

Russian forces continue infiltrations in several towns north-east and east of Slvoyansk and continue to make slow gains east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, and mandatory evacuation of children from 424 families have been ordered in villages east of Kramatorsk.

Further south, imagery confirms Russian recon probes and infiltrations continue into the western and north-western ends of Kostiantinivka and appear to have reached the eastern edge of Druzhivka. It now appears that 100% of Kostiantinivka has been, at one time or another in the past 8 or 9 months, probed by Russian infiltration elements.

Russian forces also continued a series of infiltrations in villages along an arc from south-west about 6 miles to about 12 miles north-west of Hulyaipole.

And on Tuesday a Russian Recon probe was confirmed to have entered the south-east edge of Orikhiv, and were moving along the first row of houses. This is, I believe, the first time Russian troops have penetrated Orikhiv.

Air Operations

Both Ukrainain and Russian forces continued their strikes on logistics infrastructure. Of note, During the night of August 4th-August 5th Russian forces struck with a relatively small package, primarily focused on Kyiv (24 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 4 x Zircon missiles and 115 strike drones), but Ukrainain forces were able to only shoot down 98 drones. The 28 missiles and 17 strike drones “got through.” The Ukrainian reporting notes that they are now out of Patriot missiles and were unable to engage any of the missiles.

Civilian casualties included 16 killed and 29 wounded in the Kyiv area.

Ukrainain Deputy PM Shmyhal commented that, as of 03 August, Russian strikes has cumulatively resulted in damage to 80% of Ukraine’s power generation capacity and there is now a 6 gigawatt shortfall.

Ukrainian forces also continued strikes on the Wildberries warehouses and on Russian oil infrastructure. Yesterday drones again struck the oil refineries in Ufa, and photographs showed fire and smoke, though the full extent of the damage is not yet known.

In a related development, Ukrainain Military Intelligence reports that a North Korean unit is deploying to western Russia with 120 ballistic missiles (unknown designation), 6 launchers and 90 troops (which seems very low). Ukrainian Intelligence claims that unit will deploy to the Voronezh area (about 250 miles south-south-east of Moscow, with the 112th Missile Bde (Russian army).

In addition, Ukrainain Intelligence reports that North Korea recently transferred 40 x Kn-23 (Hwasong-11A, 500 miles, 3,000 lb warhead) and 24 x Kn-24 (Hwasong-11b, 250 miles, 1,000lb warhead)  ballistic missiles to Russia.

112th Guards Novorossiyskaya Missile Brigade is garrisoned at Shuya, about 100 miles north-east of Moscow. The unit was equipped with the Iskander ballistic missiles, with a 300 mile range and a 1500lb warhead.

Accuracy of the North Korean missiles was very poor when first used (200meter for the both the 11a and 11b at full range), but reportedly Russian assistance has substantially improved accuracy. 

As for the numbers, this is a good many missiles for a single brigade. Normal Russian organization is 2 x launchers per battery, 2 batteries per battalion, 3 battalions per brigade, so 12 launchers per brigade. Each launcher has 2 missiles and 2 reloads, so 48 total missiles for a fully loaded brigade.

Thoughts

Fedorov is still holding out hope to return, and a recent poll shows that Ukrainians trust him more than President Zelenskyy. A poll last week of 2,000 Ukrainians showed the following levels of trust (fully trust / partial trust / partial do not trust / do not trust):

Amb. (Former CINC) Zaluzhnyi 27.8% / 37.1% / 11.6% / 18.1%

Fedorov  26.8% /37.8% / 8.5% / 16.3%

‘Magyar’ Brovdi (UAV forces) 25.4% / 25.8% / 7.4% / 17.7%

Gen Drapatyi (new CINC) 24%

Budanov (President’s COS) 23.8%

Pres. Zelenskyy 18% / 24.5% / 17% / 37%

Polls should always be taken with a grain of salt: how the people polled are picked, how the questions are asked, etc. Still, it must give Zelenskyy pause that he is not trusted as much as his Chef of Staff, never mind Gen. Zaluzhnyi, who has been regularly named as his real political rival since before he was fired in early 2024. 

What is more interesting, I think is that Fedorov is still holding onto the idea that he will return, though it would seem to me that for him to return would be to de facto undercut Zelenskyy’s authority, which would certainly not help the county. 

Meanwhile, Ukraine has no Patriot missiles and Russia is getting more ballistic missiles - courtesy of North Korea - to continue to strike the Ukrainain the power grid.

v/r pete