July 5th, 2024

Just a brief recap of developments over the last 2 days:

President Putin made a statement on the war that suggests he is more confident of victory, President Zelenskyy commented on the need for more weapons, not manpower, and on the ground the war continued as before.

President Putin, speaking at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kazakhstan, said that Russia will not accept a ceasefire without Ukraine first meeting certain conditions, to include declining NATO membership, and ceding the 4 Russian claimed oblasts to Russia.

As Russian forces continue to grind forward in most areas, Putin’s position continues to harden and there is now no relationship between the Ukrainian position and the Russian position.

President Zelenskyy told Bloomberg on the 3rd that Ukrainian manpower issues have improved in the last several months and that a future offensive will be dependent on equipment and ammunition, not manpower. This comment has been echoed by at least one Ukrainian field commander.

Reporting suggests that the Ukrainian army intends to stand up 10 new brigades, as well as bringing existing brigades up to full manning and full TOE. 

While the details are closely held by the Ukrainian army, it does not appear that the 10 brigades have been fully formed yet. Once equipped, getting all 10 brigades trained in full, brigade-sized operations will take several months at a minimum for even basic operations, suggesting no offensive is possible until the coming winter.

In the meantime, Russia will try to keep as much pressure as possible on the Ukrainian army, forcing the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) to commit troops to the existing fight and stalling the offensive.

Nevertheless, if - if - the UGS can, in fact, re-equip the bulk of their army and at the same time stand up 10 new brigades, they should have the preponderance of forces anywhere they commit their troops.

On the ground, there were small gains made by Ukrainian forces north of Kharkiv, and at the same time Russian forces have taken control of the aggregate plant in Vovchansk which has been the site of some very hard fighting. 

Both west of Bakhmut and west of Avdiivka Russian forces continue to push westward and it now appears that all of Chasiv Yar east of the Donets canal is controlled by Russian forces and Russian forces now sit on the canal, particularly the two pressings in the Chasiv Yar area; this has been confirmed by Ukrainian forces. Further south, Russian forces control the terrain immediately north of the Karlivka reservoir and continue to make slow progress westward across a broad front west of Avdiivka.

Russian forces conducted missile strikes on the 3rd and 4th with at least 1 drone and several cruise missiles getting through the air defenses and striking targets in the Chernihiv, Odessa and Dnipro areas. The strike in Chernihiv hit elements of the power grid and knocked out power to 6,000 homes.

Ukrainian forces conducted a USV strike on the port of Novorossiysk on the night of the 3rd but Russian Navy elements in the harbor were alert and destroyed the USVs and suffered no apparent damage.

There is seemingly no chance at this point that either side will yield any on their “war termination” criteria, and it is difficult, without some “black swan” event, to imagine the war ending in the next 12 months. 

A Ukrainian attack this coming winter is contingent on several things: if they can identify the right seam in the Russian positions; if they can in fact assemble the trained forces so that they have a substantial force advantage over the Russians; and if they can sustain the initiative, then the offensive could crack the Russian line and split Russian holdings in two and begin a systematic roll-up of the Russian positions. But the Russian defenses - mine field, FPV drones, and artillery - will make this difficult and for an attacking force to penetrate quickly and keep moving will require well trained and well led troops with sustained logistics, even in the face of the Russian artillery and drone forces.

None of this is going to be a sure thing.

On top of all this is the increasing drift of Russia into the arms of Beijing and the rise, as one Russian think tank put it, of a new Eurasian Security Structure. Stir that into the mix, as well as the benefits to Beijing of sustaining the war in Ukraine, and there is every likelihood that Ukraine will be no closer to peace in 12 months than it is right now.

v/r pete