August 12th, 2024 

Overall  

Ground Operations - Sumy Border - Ukraine continues to advance

- Marginal Russian gains continue

Nuclear Power Plant - Fire but no real concerns

Weather

Kharkiv

74 and sunny winds gusting over 25. Partly cloudy to sunny all week; daily lows in the mid 50s, daily highs mid to upper 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

79 and sunny, gusting near 30. Mostly sunny through next week; daily lows near 60, daily highs in the mid 80s. Winds variable, 5-15kts.

Kyiv

69 and partly cloudy, gusting over 30. Partly to mostly cloudy for the next week, daily lows in the upper 50s, daily highs in the low to mid 70s. Winds variable, 5-15kts.

Ground Operations  

Sumy to Kursk Region

Ukrainian forces retain the initiative in this incursion. The picture on how many forces committed isn’t clear, with both the Russians and the Ukrainians deliberately being vague as to which forces they have committed and which forces the other side has committed, but it appears that there are elements of at least 6 x Ukrainian brigades that are now inside Russia. Russian forces involved include several large border guard units, at least one regular army brigade, and a good deal of Russian aviation. Ukrainian sources claim that 10 - 11 Russian battalions have been pulled from various adjacent forces and are now in the Kursk area.

While there are reports of “redeploying” Russian units, fighting along the active line of contact inside Ukraine continues much as before and in fact Russian forces picked up some terrain over the weekend.

In the Kremlin there is clearly a good deal of angst, I would suspect a fair portion of which is directed to how the Ukrainian forces pulled off this attack without being detected. That, of course, leads to the next question: are they getting ready to do the same elsewhere and what should the Russian operational response be? Should more forces be called up to fully arm up the border? How do they improve ISR (intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) along the entire Ukrainian - Russian border? What else is Ukraine doing that the Russians are “missing?”

I would think this would also raise the question in Putin's mind as to whether it is now necessary to conduct a full mobilization. While there has been regular speculation since February 2022 that Putin can’t afford to do so politically and Russia can’t afford to do so economically, it should not be lost on anyone that Russia’s economy in terms of percentage of debt, budget deficits, and growth rates is doing better than that of Ukraine’s, the EU’s or the US.

Roughly (maps and estimates vary), Ukrainian forces have pushed eastward as far as the Psel river, which runs through the east side of the town of Sudzha; they have pushed as far north as Malaya, and as far north-west as Snagost (the lines of course are not straight). Beyond this, Ukrainian elements, essentially armored cavalry units (moving in Bradleys, a few Strykers and similar vehicles) are raiding along roads running to the north, north-west and north-east, and whenever possible, avoiding contact with Russian forces and simply tearing up the country-side. Per Gen. Syrskyi, more than 1,000 square kilometers (385 sq. Miles) of Kursk oblast is under Ukrainian army control. Looking at the map, I would say perhaps, all told, 150 sq. mi is clearly under Ukrainian control, and another area of comparable size is, if not under Ukrainian control, also not under Russian control, but I grant the General his moment.

Russian force response has been to bring in artillery, and to conduct a good deal of air strikes. The small towns and villages in the occupied areas have been mostly evacuated (numbers not clear). On the Ukrainian side some 19,800 have been evacuated.

Of note, overall command responsibility has been given to FSB (The Federal Security Service), not the Ministry of Defense, so coordination with regular military forces is likely to be a problem, at least initially.

Fighting is taking place in the eastern half of Sudzha and yesterday it appeared that Russian forces - elements of a regiment (perhaps a battalion - give or take 500 men) had been trapped in eastern Sudzha, but they appear to have fought their way out.

North Of Kharkiv

Fighting continues but there were no reported changes in the lines.

Donets River

Russian force made confirmed gains southwest of Kupyansk, in the general area between Tabaivka and Novoselivske

Bakhmut

Operations continue north, west and south of Bakhmut, with the only notable changes being Russian gains west of Horlivka.

West of Horlivka Russian forces appear to be fairly quickly (by the standards of this war) moving through Niu York, and are closing up the pocket to the north-east of that city, as well as gaining ground in and around Druzhba. 

Donetsk City

North-west of Donetsk, Russian forces continue to gain ground, most importantly, keeping pressure on the line toward Pokrovsk. Multiple reports suggest gains in that direction, to include taking the town of Zhelanne, 11 miles south-east of Pokrovsk, but none were confirmed by imagery.

Further gains were also claimed in the terrain immediately east of the O-0532 roadway, between Vuhledar and Marinka, but these gains were also not confirmed.

Velyka Novosilke, Orikhiv and the Dnepr River

Fighting and skirmishes were reported all cross the south, but there were no confirmed gains or losses.

Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)

A large fire has been reported at the ZNPP, as of the 11th. Ukrainian officials claim that Russians set the fire, igniting used tires at the base of one of the cooling towers. There are no radiation leaks and there is no real damage to the facility.

Russian appointed head of the Zaporizhia Oblast, Yevgeny Balitsky, claims the fire was started as a result of Ukrainian artillery fire.

Imagery appears very dire but, in fact, both sides insist there is no real damage to the reactors or support faculties themselves.

Air Operations

Russian forces launched 4 x Iskander class ballistic missiles and 57  x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace on the night of the 10th. The UAF claimed it shot down 53 drones, and that none of the ballistic missiles hit Kyiv, though it wasn’t clear exactly what that meant…

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Aug8 Aug9 Aug12

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 78.02 79.43 80.38

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 75.03 76.56 77.72

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.08 2.13 2.24

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 86.98 88.56 90.81

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.38 5.38 5.43

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 72.14 72.14 74.95

SOKOL   67.02      74.63  75.61 70.82 71.75 71.75

Thoughts

The Ukrainian incursion continues and so do the various Russian attacks inside Ukraine. How this all plays out remains to be seen, though Ukraine will be hard pressed to sustain this operation it gets too deep into Russia. If the Ukrainian army is going to sustain the attack, they will need to deny the airspace over their forces and that will mean moving already scarce SAMs forward, reducing the SAM coverage in some places inside Ukraine.

As for the Russians, the Russians just keep fighting.

As I first mentioned in late spring 2022 (even a blind squirrel finds an acorn) the Russian army appeared then (and clearly had by the end of 2022) changed their operational art to something seen after - oddly enough - the battle of Kursk in 1943.

As BH Liddell Hart observed, the Russian style - broad alternating strokes at different points was the natural method for an army with limited mobility but a general superiority of force. Actions are conservative, slow, deliberate. It was not then, and is not now, capable of rapidly exploiting a gap, or a mistake by the enemy. But it was also not really likely to lose. Instead, it committed itself to a long, slow, ponderous grind. And with that grind they eventually destroyed the German army.

What occurred to me was that the Russians retuned to this way of war in 2022 (beginning the transition in the spring, not fully realizing it until early 2023), but it doesn’t reflect what we commonly look for in war: the focused attack, the slashing offensive, the tightly integrated ground and air campaigns. The Russians aren’t interested.

Instead, they have developed a very basic plan, one that they believe will win - eventually. The army in the field must execute the plan. Don't change the plan, don’t keep adjusting, just execute the plan. And it is an army plan. If the RuAF helps, great. If not, the army will still execute the plan. The Russian Navy? If they help, great. If not, the army will still execute the plan.

So, Ukraine attacks into Russia; that is, from the perspective of the Russian army units in Ukraine, someone else’s problem.

As to what’s next, that depends on whether the Russian leadership (Putin, et al) assess that the entire Ukrainian border now must be actively defended. If so, it could lead to Russian mobilization, which would be economically difficult for Russia but that could be militarily very difficult for Ukraine.

And while there might be some hope that the Ukrainian army might repeat what Wagner Group began in June of 2023, marching up the road to Moscow, remember that the Wagner Group was receiving a good deal of support from locals who didn’t think it was really a coup… That will not be the case here.

v/r pete