August 22nd, 2024 

Overall  

Ground Operations  - Ukraine continues small advances in Kursk

- Russia continues advances in Donbas, nearing Pokrovsk

Politics  - Hungary and Refugees?

Weather

Kharkiv

95 and partly cloudy. Mostly cloudy to sunny for the next week; daily lows in the upper 60s, daily highs in around 90. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

88 and cloudy. Mostly sunny the rest of the week, daily lows in the upper 60s, daily highs in the 90s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

83 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Mostly cloudy tomorrow, then partly cloudy to sunny for the following week, daily lows in the upper 50s to low 60s, daily highs after today in the upper 70s to low 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations

Kursk Salient

Ukrainian forces remain on the attack and continue to make small gains on both sides of the salient. Ukrainian forces have been confirmed to have Vishnevka (south-south-west of Korenevo). Ukrainian elements contain to probe westward from Vishneka towards the Seim River. Probes have also pushed north and northeast towards Aleksandrovka (about 4 miles north-east of Korenevo). Unconfirmed reporting suggests some 3,000 Russian troops are now south of the Seim River with no ready means to re-cross. At the same time imagery confirms Russian elements holding positions to the south-east of Alexsandrovka, near Zhuravli.

On the east side of the salient, Ukrainian forces are moving northward from Sudzha on Russian positions near Malay Loknya and also to the north-east near Martynovka; the town of Martynovka itself appears to be under the control of the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian incursion now appears to involve elements of 7 different Ukrainian brigades, but how many personnel are actually inside Russia is not clear.

North of Kharkiv

Fighting continued north of Kharkiv but there were no confirmed changes in either area. Fighting at the aggregate plant in Vovchansk appears to have evolved (or devolved) to a very harsh, short range gun fight inside another industrial facility.

North of the Donets River

Fighting continued along the length of the line of contact but there were no confirmed gains or losses.

Bakhmut

North and west and immediately south of Bakhmut fighting continues, but there were no confirmed gains or losses.

Further south, west of Horlivka, Russian forces continue to push forward and Niu York appears to be under Russian control, though Ukrainian forces continue to insist that Ukraine forces control a small section of the town. 

Meanwhile, Russian sources claim that Russian forces are advancing, pushing westward from east of Toretsk in several different areas (south-east near Zalizne, from the east near Nelipivka, and from the vicinity of Druzhba and Pivnichne. The Ukrainian General Staff also noted Russian forces active near Panteleymonivka, a small town about 3 miles south-west of Niu York, which would suggest Russian forces are pushing westward to close up the pocket to the south that has been created by Russian forces moving well to the west from the Avdiivka area.

Donetsk City

Russian forces west of Donetsk City continue to push westward to Pokrovsk and appear to reached - per a decidedly pro-Ukrainian mapping site - the town of Krasny Yar, 6 miles east-south-east of Pokrovsk. 

While unconfirmed, Russian forces also appear to have pushed past Hrodivka and may have reached Mykolaivka and continue to press west and north-west and north from the area of Hrodivka. On the South side of the salient the Russians are pressing on - and may have taken - Komushivka, and have probably taken Ptyche.

Russian forces also appear to be forcing their way through Krasnohorivka. and pushing north and west from there. I would expect the Russian to make an effort to close up the pocket that is developing between the thrust to Pokrovsk and the thrust from Krasnohorivka and Heorivka to the south.

Further south (south-west of Donetsk City), Russian forces continued to push westward and were confirmed to have made gains in the Kostyantynivka and Vodyane area and have now cut the 0532 roadway and have moved no-mans land far enough to the west that most of the road is now in the gray zone.

South Ukraine 

Mainly skirmishes continue across the south as forces have been stripped to support fighting elsewhere, but Russian forces are active about 5 miles north of Verbove (about 2-3 miles east of Mala Tokmachka) in the small village of Luhivske, which was confirmed in imagery. Presumably this report suggests that the Ukrainian line is thinner than supposed; the Russian presence in that town means that the T - 0803 and T - 0815 roadways, which run through that area in a north-west to south-east course, have been cut.

Rumors are circulating of a large Ukrainian raid being planned across the Dnepr River to seize Energodar and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, but there is no supporting evidence.

Air Operations

Russian forces continued drone and missile strikes into Ukrainian air space on the 21st, launching 2 x Iskander class ballistic missiles, 1 x Kk-59/69 cruise missile, 69 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down or electronically defeated the cruise missile and all but 2 of the drones, 50 shot down, 16 defeated by electronic warfare, and 1 flew into Belarus airspace.

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike on Russian air defense assets in Rostov Oblast on the night of the 20th and claim to have hit an S-300 site. This will take some imagery to clarify; modern SAM sties like S-300, S-400 and Patriot use separate vans and launchers that are usually separated by enough distance that even a cluster weapon won’t cover enough area to destroy more than 1 item at a time (1 launcher, a control van, a radar, etc.)  The preferred target at any site - the hardest to replace item - is the operations van, because you kill the operators. The next is the radar. Launchers are the most plentiful and the cheapest part.

Politics and Diplomacy

The Hungarian government has decided that the government will only fund refugees from those areas of Ukraine that are affected by war, which, as defend by the Hungarian government, includes abut half the country.

Accordingly, several thousand Ukrainian refugees in Hungary face eviction from government shelters.

Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Finance estimates that Ukraine will need between $35 and $38 billion in foreign assistance to run the country in 2025, an increase of $12-15 billion from earlier estimates.

The governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have asked the UN Security Council to take action against Ukraine for its support of rebels groups in their countries.

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Aug8 Aug 21 Aug22

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 78.02 77.26 76.36

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 75.03 73.12 72.12

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.08 2.15 2.12

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 86.98 91.51 91.97

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.38 5.57 5.44

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 72.14 72.73 72.65

ESPO  67.02      74.63  75.61 70.04 70.04

SOKOL 70.82 70.11 69.12

Thoughts

One rate past two weeks I have read a good many comments about information management and propaganda efforts etc., as both sides try to manage their populations in light of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the ongoing Russian successes west of Donetsk and west of Horlivka. At the same time there are reports of poor morale on both sides, of various groups complaining to the leadership, in both Ukraine and Russia parents of those serving have complained, young men are trying to avoid service, businesses are complying about losing their best workers, etc.

When the war started Ukraine began what was a masterful information warfare campaign, and President Zelenskyy was on point again and again, with just the right message, the right appearances, the right tone. At the same time, Putin seemed to be out of synch, making two false steps for every good one. I think it is fair to say that Ukraine immediately began to win the Information War. 

They continued to win it all through 2022, and the Russian campaign went from bad to worse, exacerbated by the horrors of Bucha, and the leveling of cities and towns such as Mariupol, Severodonetsk and scores of towns - all reduced to nothing more than smoking ruins. Ukraine kept that advantage until the autumn of 2023, when the summer offensive slowly tapered off to nothing and was accepted as having failed. 

But, if the first goal of an information warfare campaign is to maintain a national's will to fight (and secondarily to undermine the enemy’s will to fight), some time over the past 6-12 months Russia has pulled even with Ukraine and may now be pulling ahead.

The incursion into Russia, as wells the recent drone strikes into various parts oof western Russia, to include Moscow, appears to have been met with a mix of apathy and support to the people of Kursk by most Muscovites. 

It is possible that the tactical and operational success of the incursion into Kursk will devolve to a strategic mistake on the part of Ukraine, and will allow Putin to convince his people that indeed, this war is Ukraine’s fault, that Ukraine - and NATO - are the real aggressors, and have been since the Maindan Revolution of 2014, and that Russians will continue to support the war effort no matter the cost.

v/r pete