September 19th, 2024  Next Summary September 23rd

Overall  

Ground Operations  - Russian, Ukrainian gains in or near Kursk Salient

- More Russian gains south-east of Pokrovsk

Power Grid - Status

Weather

Kharkiv

74 and sunny. Mostly sunny through the weekend and intro Monday, daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

73 and partly cloudy, gusting to 25. Sunny through the weekend, clouding up Sunday night. Daily lows in the low 50s, daily highs in the upper 70s. Winds easterly, 5-15kts.

Kyiv

75 and sunny. Sunny to partly cloudy into next week; daily lows in the upper 40s, daily highs in the mid 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Ground Operations

Kursk Salient

Both sides continue to trade off gains in and around the Kursk salient. 

Just west of the main salient, Ukrainian forces who pushed across the border in the vicinity of Novy Put (west of the Kursk Salient about 20 miles or so), have pushed north and west, they now control a piece of terrain that stretches from Medvezhye in the east almost as far west as Krasnnoktyabrskoye in the west - a distance of perhaps 6 miles, and have pushed in almost to Veseloye (about 3 or 4 miles. Gains were made over the last two days towards the north-east, even as terrain was taken back by the Russians in the north-west side of this small incursion.

These are very small towns and in some cases just place names, and the terrain is mostly manicured farmland between tree-lined dirt roads and small woods scattered across the terrain. The dominate feature in the area is the Seim River which serves to isolate this piece of terrain from the rest of the Russian oblast to the north.

Overall, Russian forces continue to move into the area and Ukrainian gains are smaller and fewer. In the area of the main salient the Russians continue to squeeze and regain ground even as the Ukrainians continue to probe. The western side of the main salient is now being pressed hard by Russian forces and overall Russian forces have recaptured terrain along nearly all of the perimeter of the salient. At this rate the incursion will be completely contained in less than a week.

North of Kharkiv

Fighting continues in both pockets and Ukrainian forces counter-attacked near Hlyboke and Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv) and Vovchansk (north-east of Kharkiv) but there were no confirmed gains or loss. 

North of the Donets River

Russian forces remain very active along the entire line of contact and there were confirmed  or claimed gains along much of the line. Confirmed gains south-east of Kupyansk and claimed gains (but not confirmed) west of Pishchane are reflected in the more conservative blogs and maps and suggest the Russians are pushing hard for the Oskil River. The same reporting shows Russian forces having crossed the Zherebets River at and near Makiivka (south-west of Svatove); the forces remain engaged along the rest of the line.

Bakhmut

Fighting continues north and north-east of Bakhmut but there were no confirmed gains.

West of Bakhmut, in the immediate area of Chasiv Yar, there were also no confirmed gains by Russian forces.

South of Bakhmut, in the terrain west of Kishchivka and Kurdyumivka, Russian forces had no confirmed gains yesterday, but clearly remain west of the Donets Canal and are slowly approaching Bila Hora and Stupochky.

Further south, west of Horlivka, Russian forces continue to grind out small gains as they push into eastern Toretsk. Imagery confirms that Russian forces have pushed at last as far as Tsentralna street, the major (roughly) north-south road in the east side of Toretsk. However, Ukrainian blogger reporting (from sites that are quite conservative in their assessments) are showing further Russian penetration into the town, with Russian troops less than 1,000 yards east of the center of the town.

Donetsk City

Fighting continues along virtually all the edge of the Pokrovsk salient but there were no confirmed gains reported yesterday. Reporting suggests that Russian forces are now in the process of clearing pockets of Ukrainian troops out of perhaps a dozen small towns that form the edge of the salient, beginning at Novooleksandrivka on the north edge, around to Hrodivka and Krasnyo Yar, and on down to the east edge of Selydove and on to Ukrainsk. 

The Ukrainian General Staff characterized the fighting west of Donetsk City as “fierce.”

Fighting continues further west of Donetsk City - west of Heorhivka, as Russian forces press on Maksymilyanivka (the next town to the west from Heorhivka) but there were no confirmed gains. Russian tacair are reported as flying multiple missions in support of operations in this area.

Further to the south-west, Russian forces pressed north and west in the Vodyane area; fighting continues around both Pivdennodonbaska No. 1 and No. 3 coal mines.

  Further west of of Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilke Russian forces had confirmed gains south-east of Hulyaipole, moving through the small town of Marfopil (a small town of only several hundred people) and pressing north-west along the main road (Velyka St. (“Great Street”)) that runs into Hulayaipole - 4 miles away to the north-west. Hulyaipole was a town of 12,000+ before the war, and had several small factories making agricultural equipment, paint, a shoe factory and some food processing facilities. Its importance to the war is that it is an intersection of several major roads that stretch out into southern Ukraine.

Southern Ukraine

Russian forces remain on the attack south of Orikhiv, conducting multiple probes in a broad arc north of Robotyne, to include extensive artillery fire and tacair activity, but there were no confirmed gains along the line of contact. 

Russian activity was also noted along the Dnepr River, but there were no reported changes in terrain held by either side.  

Air Operations 

Russian forces launched 3 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 52 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian air space during the night of the 17th, targeted at power grid and related infrastructure targets. The UAF claimed it defeated the 3 cruise missiles using electronic warfare, shot down 46 drones, and defeated 5 drones with electronic warfare, and the last drone returned to Russian air space.

Other reporting noted that 19 apartment buildings were damaged by falling Shaheds.

Ukrainian forces struck a warehouse south-west of Mariupol that was being used to store ammunition. The warehouse, located in Hklyboke, about 8 miles down the coast from Mariupol, was damaged and fire damage was reported, but the fire was apparently put out.

Russian sources claim that “2/3rds all  Abrams tanks” have been destroyed.

The US transferred 31 x M1 tanks to Ukraine early in 2024, which would suggest that 20 x M1s have been destroyed. As of this summer I believe that 6 x M1s were confirmed to have been destroyed.

Power Grid

The European Union (EU) is preparing to provide 2.5 gigawatts of power to Ukraine this winter, to offset further damage to the power grid. This represents about 15% of the needed electricity for the country. 

EU President Von der Leyen commented that:

”Overall, Ukraine needs 17 GW of power capacity for this winter... 80% of Ukrainian thermal plants have been destroyed, and a third of hydropower capacity. So, this is where we will concentrate our repair efforts with the aim of restoring 2.5 GW of capacity this winter. This is approximately 15% of Ukraine's needs."

"As we speak, for example, there’s a full thermal power plant that is being dismantled in Lithuania, and shipped piece by piece to Ukraine with our support, and rebuilt then in Ukraine. This shows the great lengths of the European Union and the member states' willingness to support Ukraine.”

Von der Leyen also commented that the EU will provide 160 million Euro ($173 million) in other aid to help Ukraine work through the winter.

"I can announce that we will make an additional amount of close to €160 million available for this winter. This includes €60 million in humanitarian aid for shelters and heaters, for example, and it includes around €100 million for repair works and renewables. And these €100 million come from the proceeds of the immobilised Russian assets in the European Union.”

Ukraine has already received 10,000 generators and transformers through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

Meanwhile, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) is predicting power blackouts in Ukraine will last from 4 to 18 hours daily. Daniel Bell, head of HRMMU, commented that:

"This winter will be very hard. People will likely face regular power blackouts throughout the country. Any new attacks, which will lead to more durable outages, may have catastrophic consequences.”

As of 2 months ago, 73% of Ukraine’s thermal power plants were out of order. 

Aid

Germany announced the transfer of more military gear to Ukraine, to include:

22 x Leopard 1 A5 tanks

61,000 rounds x 155 mm ammo

22 x Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected Vehicles (MRAP

3 x GEPARD self-propelled anti-aircraft guns

6 x All terrain tracked vehicles 

2 x TRML-4D air surveillance radars;

16 x Ground Surveillance Radars

100+ drones of various types

100+ vehicles of various types 

1 million rounds small arms ammo

50 million Euro ($54 million) for medical care related material

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Aug8 Sep9 Sep18 Sep19

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 78.02 71.74 73.44 74.26

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 75.03 68.37 71.05 71.43

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.08 2.20 2.30 2.24

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.38 5.67 5.76 5.76

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 86.98 90.75 92.23 92.64

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 41.49 41.40

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 72.14 78.83 68.47 68.44

ESPO  67.02      65 77 77

SOKOL 70.82 66.23 66.32 67.16

Ukrainian farmers will plant between 4.5 and 5 million hectares (11 - 12.3 million acres) of winter wheat this year, according to the First Deputy Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food. Per the Minister, winter wheat plantings normally begin in mid September and are completed by late October.

Thoughts

The debate continues on granting Ukrainian forces the authority to use US and NATO weapons for deep strikes into Russian as do the threats from Russia in the event the Ukrainians are given permission to conduct deep strikes.

At the root is the question of whether Russia would use battlefield nuclear weapons.

Several thoughts as this argument continues:

To begin, wording is important: Russia isn’t going to approve the use of nuclear weapons; one man is, President Putin. He may seek the advice of others, but he has 100% of the vote. So, this comes down to his perceptions of what is happening. Arguments about the legal actions of a belligerent are as meaningful as arguing legalities with a rattle snake - he really doesn’t care. And, in the case of Putin, he has already been declared a war criminal by the west; it’s not going to get worse.

We have no idea what his real red line is, he alone knows it - if he does in fact know it. Having never actually used nuclear weapons, he (and everyone watching) may have no real idea what that red line is. Presumably it is something akin to what has been said: a true threat to Russia. But it is still Putin who will make that evaluation.

It’s worth remembering that he has options. Low yield nuclear weapons (less than 1 kiloton (“1 KT”)) are said to be in the Russian arsenal. Such low yield weapons could be used to, for example, drop the bridges across the Dnepr and logistically isolating eastern Ukraine; pontoon bridges could be set up quickly but the impact would be significant , and there would be relatively little radiation effects.

Use of a nuclear weapon above the atmosphere to create an EMP and knock out a large number of satellites (Russian satellites as well), and a good deal of US and NATO ground equipment. Detonating the weapon well to the west and south, so that Ukraine was affected but not Russia, would mean detonating the weapon over the Mediterranean (it’s a matter of simple geometry) damaging systems across a good deal of NATO’s southern flank.

And there are some other steps he might take - such as the cutting of key undersea cables - that would have dramatic impacts on the US and the west, and leaving the West to make the assessment as to whether a red line has been passed.

v/r pete