September 23rd, 2024 

Overall  

Diplomacy - Zelenskyy in New York, meet with Biden

Ground Operations  - Russian, Ukrainian few gains in Kursk salient

- Some Russian gains south-east of Pokrovsk

Air Operations - First BDA on Ammo dump

Weather

Kharkiv

77 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Sunny to partly cloudy through the week, daily lows in the low 50s, daily highs in the upper 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

80 and partly cloudy, gusting to 20. Partly cloudy to mostly sunny through the week, daily lows in the low 50s, daily highs in the upper 70s. Winds easterly, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

72 and cloudy, gusting over 20. Mostly sunny to partly cloudy through the week, daily lows in the upper 40s to low 50s, daily highs in the mid to upper 70s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Diplomacy

President Zelenskyy is in the US and will meet with President Biden to present his victory plan. Zelenskyy will also present his plan to Former President Trump and Vice President Harris. It is believed that a key element of his plan is the acquisition and use of long range strike assets to target Russian facilities well inside of Russia.

Zelelsnkyy was presented an award by the American Academy of Achievement and commented on the sate of the war:

"We don’t have much time. The next few months will be decisive. Ahead of us in this war – Russia’s war against Ukraine and all of you because this is Russia’s war against freedom itself, – we are short of time to define what the outcome will be. And we must define it. Not Russia, not their bloody allies. We need to be faster. We need not to lose the next few months in war, so that we don’t lose the next decades.” 

"Ukraine has a Plan for Victory. And I will present this Plan to America – to President Biden, to the Congress and to both Presidential candidates – Kamala Harris and Donald Trump – and all our global allies. And I believe this must be our shared achievement – victory for freedom, with no compromises at freedom’s expense. Right now, we all hold the power to shape the world our children and their children will live in.”

Zelenskyy will speak that at a meeting of the UN Security Council tomorrow in New York.

Ground Operations

Kursk Salient

Ukrainian forces continued to attack through the weekend but gained no new ground in the main salient. At the same time, Russian forces continue to flow into the area and the Russian forces have regained some terrain on virtually the entire perimeter of the salient. Ukrainian forces did appear to gain some new ground west of the main salient, near the town of Veseloe, even as they lost terrain near Veseloe.

North of Kharlkiv

Fighting continued north of Kharkiv City but there were no confirmed gains either due north around Hlyboke or to the north-east near Vovchansk.

North of the Donets River

Russian forces made key gains west of Pishchane (about 12 miles north-west of Svatove) pressing on the small town of Kolisnykivka, a town located on the banks of the Oskil River. Taking this town and reaching the Oskil would be a meaningful tactical success for the Russians and would set them up to attack Kruhlyakivka, the town immediately to the south of Kolisnykivka, which has a major bridge over the Oskil River, one that can take the weight of a T-72 tank. 

Elsewhere, Russian and Ukrainian forces once again traded ground, returning once again to the see-saw nature of fighting in this area. Ukrainian forces regained small portions of terrain west of the small town of Kyslivka (about half way between Svatove and Kupyansk), even as Russian forces made gains elsewhere in the vicinity of the town.

Bakhmut

Fighting continues north, west and south of Bakhmut, but there was little of note, with no confirmed gains to the north or west. Immediately south of Bakhmut there are unconfirmed reports that Russian forces pushing west from Klishchivka continue to make small gains in the direction of Bila Hora and Stuposhky.

West of Horlivka, Russian forces continue grinding forward into Toretsk, with marginal gains in the east side of the town, just south of the town, and also around the northern edge of Niu Yorlk. Of note, Russian advances have been confirmed about 2 miles south of Toretsk’s southern edge, with the Russian thrust now west of the western edge of Toretsk, setting the stage for a turn north and a drive into south-western Torestk, flanking the forces currently holding back the Russians approaching from the east.

Donetsk City

Russian forces continued their slow advances in the general directions of Pokrovsk and in the general direction south-east of that town over the last 4 days. As has been noted in the past, the Russians have been advancing in multiple towns at different rates, and have also made an effort to close up gaps in the line in order to prevent the easy development of a Ukrainian salient as the line presses forward. The movement is very slow (ponderous at times), but they are leaving fewer holes in the line that might be exploited. While there has been little progress due east of Pokrovsk, Russian forces just to the south-east, around Krasnyi Yar and Lysivka continue to push west and south-west and even the most conservative Ukrainian web sites now hold Russian forces there as only 3 miles from the E50 roadway that runs south out of Pokrovsk. Russian artillery in this area is now about 7 miles from the center of Pokrovsk - easy artillery range.

Further to the south-east, moving around the edge of the salient, Russian forces are pressing on the east side of Selydove, and at the same time moving south, south-west and west out of Ukrainsk, allowing them to move into positions to circle Selydove. At the same time, forces moving south out of Ukrainsk are slowly closing the “jaws” on the pocket south of the salient, with the northern “jaw” less than 4 miles from Russian forces operating out of Krasnohorivka and Hostre on the south edge of the pocket.

Further south Russian forces continue to probe westward and of greatest significance is the further movement west from Vodyane as well as northward from the area just east of Prechystivka, setting up a possible encirclement of Vuhledar. These two forces are now at most 4 miles apart and Ukrainian ground lines of communication into Vuhledar is reduced to two well maintained dirt roads.

Southern Ukraine and the Dnepr River

Russian forces continued combat operations across southern Ukraine and along the Dnepr River throughout the weekend but there were no significant developments and no evidence of any terrain changing hands. Activity mainly consisted of small probes (squad level or small) and drones and artillery fire

Air Operations 

Russian forces conducted strikes into Ukrainian air space on the 21st, launching 2 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 80 x Shahed drones. The UAF claimed it shot down 70 drones and electronic warfare defeated 6 other drones. Damage to the power grid or apartment buildings or civilian infrastructure were reported in Khmelnytskyi, Poltava and Sumy.

Ukrainian forces launched an unspecified number of missiles against targets in Crimea on the 21st and Russian forces claimed to intercept a number of Ukrainian missiles.

Reports are now being generated assessing the total damage to the Toropets ammo facility after the strike on September 18th, which apparently consisted of more than 100 dozens, though that isn’t crystal clear. The Estonian Army G2 claims the strike destroyed 30,000 tons of ammunition.

Commercial imagery shows a slightly confusing picture.The strike started a fire which was followed by several large explosions. The imagery shows a facility with roughly 110 sites (bunkers and open revetments). Of those, some 58 look as if they have burned or suffered some damage. The imagery is not crystal clear and some bunkers look like they were just burned clear of vegetation. Some of the resentments are burned clean, no bunkers look as if they went off high order. Other imagery (which I could not find) reportedly showed a train that had been at the facility and was caught on fire wand was destroyed.

THE Estonian Army G2 reported that 30,000 tons of ammunition was destroyed. That may be a bit of a reach as one would expect that at least some of that ammo would have gone off high order and blown apart more bunkers or revetments and nothing of that sort is readily visible.

But there is some extensive damage and that this was a fairly successful strike.

The largest reference to a seismic event was a report of a 2.8 the Richter scale - which would equate to 1,000 lbs of TNT, and may equate to the one video shot form a mile or two away that shows a single explosion. (For scale, a 30,000 ton detonation (all of it going off at once) would yield a 6.1 on the Richter scale.)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian drones struck the Russian Tikhortesk ammo dump on the 20th and destroyed 2,000 tons of ammunition.

Again, a successful strike, but how they know they destroyed 2,000 towns ammo at this point is not clear.

Russian forces on the 20th launched 4 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 5 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 16 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down the 5 cruise missiles and 16 drones. There were no damage reports.

Russian forces on the 19th launched 1 x Kh-59 cruise missile and 70 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down the cruise missile and 61 drones, and that the remaining 9 drones were defeated by electronic warfare means. 

Later reports noted that a cruise missile struck a retirement home in Odessa.

On September 18th Russian forces launched 3 x S-300 ballistic missiles, 1 Kh-59 cruise missile, and 42 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down the cruise missile and all 42 drones.

Both sides have reported on several occasions during the last several days that the other side is flying drones near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

Politics

The Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Russia will not participate in the Ukrainian Peace Summit later this year, sating that the summit isn’t concerned with negotiations but rather about presenting an ultimatum to Russia.

EU President Von Der Leyen announced that the EU will provide 2 new loan mechanisms to Ukraine, one worth 35 billion Euros ($39 billion) and one worth 45 billion Euros ($50 billion) to aid in rebuilding and in purchasing of weapons.

Aid 

The Netherlands announced it will send 3 x Patriot missile launchers to Ukraine. 

Economic Reporting

Feb 22   Mar 7   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jun7 Jul9 Aug8 Sep9 Sep19 Sep23

Brent      94.71      119.50 120.90    75.58      80.06 85.19 78.02 71.74 74.26 73.87

WTI     92.10      123.80 119.50  71.29      75.81 81.73 75.03 68.37 71.43 70.36

NG       3.97       4.45     8.41      2.15      2.82 2.38 2.08 2.20 2.24 2.58

Wheat     8.52       12.94    10.71    6.17       6.40 5.71 5.38 5.67 5.76 5.69

Ruble     85         145.70  58.48     82.59      88.77 88.18 86.98 90.75 92.64 92.83

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 fixed at 36.4 41.40 41.46

Urals 56.56    67.61 67.61 72.14 78.83 68.44 69.85

ESPO  67.02      65 77 77

SOKOL 70.82 66.23 67.16 67.64

Thoughts

A recent assessment form Mediazone - which clearly has some of the best methodology, provide a lower and upper boundary on Russians killed in the war as 69,000 to 120,000.

This tracks with a much rougher estimate I have made of 85 - 95,000 KIAs.

Throughout this war, except in a few odd exceptions (both high and low) each KIA also means 3.5 to 4 wounded (and roughly the same number for both sides); I’ll use 3.5 so that would mean Russian casualties run from 69,000 KIA and 241,000 WIA, low side, to 120,000 KIA and 420,000 WIA.

But it’s important we have some sort of figure on Ukrainian casualties.

We have several recent, interesting data points:

A recent poll across Ukraine related that 22% reported that a family member had been killed in action and 77% reported that someone they knew had been killed. 

At the same time a member of the Verkhovna Rada passed that Ukraine had suffered 19,000 KIAs in the first 12 months of the war and another 19,000 in there second 12 months. If that is the sustained average over 24 months, then overall Ukraine has had 47,500 KIAs. 

What can that tell us?

First, I would take the 47,500 as the lower boundary, with the precaution that it seems to me as if the Ukrainian government is doing what every other government does: being very careful in its definition of “killed in action.” Without going further into it here, suffice it to say that every country plays with those definitions, and those numbers.

But, as for that polling data, if we look at average extended family size, for which there is not a great deal of accurate data, but a lot of assumptions, we get some interesting numbers. Anthropologists have noted wide disparities between different cultures - sub-Saharan Africa has the largest average extended family - more than 60, India is about 45, the US is not quite 30, Italy (representing Europe) 17 - 18.

Ukraine has had a shrinking population for the last 30 years (52 million in 1991, 43 million in early 2022, an estimated 34.5 million as of early this year) and one of the lowest fertility rates in the world (just above 1.0 (replacement is 2.1)) I’ll begin by using the US figure and then the Italian figure:

Assume an average extended family size of 35 and you have 1 million distinct “families” in Ukraine. If 22% of families lost someone in the war, that would equate to 220,000 KIAs. Doubling that number to 70, would still leave Ukraine with 110,000 KIAs.

At 30 members per family that number is 253,000 KIAs.

At 18 per family (Italy) that would yield 412,000 KIAs.

As for the second number, the key here is how many people do you “know.” There’s a number, known as the Dunbar number, which is the number of relationships (not all close) that a person can maintain, on average. That number has, through observation and experimentation around the world, been estimated at 148, rounded to 150, though it should be noted that there are some samplings which have yield a range from as low as 100 to as high as 250.

Using the Dunbar number - 150 - would yield 230,000 different “friends and relationships” groups. The poll yielded that 77% of people had a friend who had been killed. This yields a figure of 160,000 KIA. If we use the upper limit of the Dunbar number (250), we end up with 106,000 KIA.

Said differently, assuming that the two numbers (22% and 77%) are roughly accurate, using an outer boundary for deriving a hard data point from that polling yields a KIA figure in excess of 105,000 Ukrainians. And this number may well be substantially larger.

Ukraine then produces these figures for KIA and WIA: Lower bound 49,000 / 171,000, middle figure 105,000 / 367,000 and upper figure perhaps 160,000 / 560,000.

And of course, Ukraine has a population 23% that of Russia.

Remember too, that some 22,000 of Russia’s of KIAs and 50,000 WIAs were penal colony soldiers. Take them from the totals and Russia casualties may be less than Ukraine’s.

v/r pete