June 10th, 2025

Politics - Poll: 43% of Ukrainians can accept de facto Russian occupation

- 68% oppose de jure ownership

Combat Ops - More Russian gains north-west of Donetsk City

- Russian forces reach Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

- Air strikes continue  

Weather

Kharkiv

74 and sunny, gusting over 20. Partly cloudy today, followed by 6 days of rain. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

80 and sunny, gusting over 25. Partly cloudy to sunny all week. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the 70s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Kyiv

63 and partly cloudy, gusting to 30. Mostly cloudy tomorrow, followed by 4 days of rain. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the 60s. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics and Diplomacy

A survey of the Ukrainian population conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), 15 May to 3 June 2025, found that 43% are willing to accept de facto Russian occupation of some Ukrainian territory (though 48% oppose this), and 68% opposed de jure Russian ownership of any territory.

Further, 78% of Ukrainians reject the transfer of territory currently under Ukrainian control to Russia in order to achieve a ceasefire.

A doctor who was examining Ukrainian soldiers who had been held captive by Russia and recently released has posted a picture of scars burned into the soldiers body (the right side of his torso) spelling out in Cyrillic “Glory to Russia.” Per the Ukrainian government, 90% of Ukrainians held as POWs suffered some sort of abuse while prisoners.

Ground Operations 

SUMY AND KHARKIV OPERATIONS

Fighting continues on the border near Tetkino (north-west of Sumy City), with Ukrainian elements operating in Russian territory, and some fighting near Novyi Put, further east, but there were no changes inside Russian territory.

Russian forces north and north-east of Sumy City, inside Ukraine, continued operations but there were no changes to the front lines in these areas, nor were there any changes due north of Kharkiv city.

There is a good deal of contradictory reporting on Russian and Ukrainian operations along the Oskil river and north of the Donets River, with multiple claims of gains by both sides. It would seem that the Russians have made some small gains north of Kupyansk, as they push west and north-west from positions along the Oskil river, but mainly pushing into unoccupied terrain, but on the whole it appears that the bulk of the activity is recon probes followed by drones and artillery fire, and no substantive changes in the front lines except in the area roughly west of Terny.

West of Terny (or north of Lyman) Ukrainian forces pushed north-east of Karpivka - even as Russian forces appear to have (not yet confirmed) pushed west from Karpivka and Ridokub, another example of the yin and yang nature of these attacks.

Of note, the terrain north of Karpivka is higher than either Karpivka or Ridokub (by perhaps 100 feet or so), so a small tactical advantage for the Ukrainians.

THE CENTER - BAKHMUT TO POKROVSK

North and north-east of Bakhmut fighting continues in the general area east of Siversk but there were no changes to the front lines.

South-west of Chasiv Yar Russian forces had confirmed gains pushing into Stupochky, and fighting was reported just west of Stupochky in Predtechyne, north of Bila Hoar, and west of Kurdiumivka. 

Further south, Russian forces continued to grind out gains on the north side of Toretsk. West of Toretsk, imagery showed Russian troops operating just south of Oleksandro Kalynove, 3 miles north of Zorya and Romanivka, along the H20 roadway, just east of Yablunivka. While it is not clear that Russian forces held the position or this was some sort of recon or probe or raid, this represents the de facto closing of most of the pocket between the H20 roadway and the T0504 roadway, and in a fairly short period of time, just a few weeks. The first Russian forces reached the south-west outskirts of Yablunivka on May 19th, and this pocket really didn’t begin to form until then; 3 weeks later the pocket is essentially gone. 

By all accounts this area of operations is the “most intense” on the entire line of contact, and Ukrainian sources report that additional Russian forces are being moved into this area. Whether additional Ukrainian forces are being moved has not been reported.

At the same time, small gains were also reported west of the T0504 roadway, with Russian forces gaining round around Poltavka and Popiv Yar.

In the Pokrovsk area there were unconfirmed gains reported in several small towns just east of Pokrovsk, and fighting was reported in 20 different towns in the area.

Further south, imagery has confirmed that Russian forces have, in fact, entered Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on a several mile long front (north to south), south of the town of Muravka (along the Solana River). A Russian MOD Spokesman in the Kremlin labeled it as “creation of a buffer zone.”

SOUTHERN UKRAINE

Russian forces south of the Pokrovsk salient remain on the attack along the entire line of contact. Just north of the Vovcha River, imagery confirms that Russian forces have occupied Oleksiivka (about 45 miles west of Donetsk city), and are already pushing through the town and attacking Zelenyi Kut, the small town just west of Oleksiivka.

South of the Vovcha River Russian forces have pushed through Bahatyr (just opposite Olesiivka) and pushed further west and have pushed another 5 or 6 miles further west on the south side of the river. At the same time, Russian forces to the south have pushed along the Mokri Yali river and have overrun Fedorivka, reached Komar, and are now pushing through Komar. Further to the south-west Russian forces have now pushed in Zelene Pole.

And at the western end of the line, Russian forces between Stepove and  and Mali Shcherbaky has pressed north across the T0812 roadway and may be as much as 2 miles north of that road, which would put them about a mile south of Pavlivka.

Air Operations

During the night of  June 9th-June 10th Russian forces launched 2 x Iskander class ballistic missiles, 5 x Iskander cruise missiles, and 315 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 213 drones, and 64 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW), and also claimed that both ballistic missiles and all 5 cruise missiles were shot down. The two Ballistic missiles are believed to have been North Korean manufactured KN-23s (which are basically the same missiles as the Iskander).

Damage has been reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odessa, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

RuAF tacair struck 20 towns.

During the night of  June 8th-June 9th Russian forces launched least 4 x Kinzhal ballast missiles, 10 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, 2 x Kh-31P cruise missiles, 1 x Kh-35 cruise missile, 3 x Kh-22 cruise missiles, and 479 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace, a total of 499 inbound missiles of all types. The UAF claimed it shot down 277 drones, and 188 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW), and initially claimed that it had shot down all the other missiles except 1 Kh-35. 

Later reporting - from local governments, not the UAF - suggests that some or all of the 4 Kinzhals were not intercepted and some reporting suggests that at least 2 more Kinzhals were fired, with 4 launched into the general Kyiv area and 2 into Rivne. Strike damage was reported in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltaava, Rivne, Sumy, Volyn, Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

RuAF tacair struck 6 towns.

Ukrainian Air Force drones struck Savasleyka Airbase, outside Nizhny Novgorod (200 miles east of Moscow), the home field of the 54th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, a MiG-31 regiment. The Ukrainian General Staff claims a MiG-31 and Su-30 or 34 kill, but that has not yet been confirmed.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Feb7 Mar4 Apr8 May8 Jun9 Jun10

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      74.89 70.00 64.80 61.93 66.80 67.28

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      71.17 66.97 61.37 59.00 64.89 65.50

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15    3.37 4.44 3.69 3.64 3.69 3.62

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17     5.86 5.37 5.38 5.34 5.49 5.37

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    96.88 89.50 86.24 82.45 79.27 78.63

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 41.46 41.40 41.18 41.55 41.55 41.57

Urals 56.56    68.32 65.49 52.76 54.13 60.84 62.06

ESPO N/A 71.50 70 48.90 63.97 64.94

Sokol 70.92 67.20 61.42 57.39 61.51 62.37

Thoughts

The below is based on nothing more than years of reading propaganda and press releases from every sort of government, especially communist propaganda (but not only communist propaganda) and is a viscerally weighted comment, but you may find it interesting. None of this is to say that Putin is right or that I support his actions, etc. This is, rather, what I have spent most of the last 45 years trying to do, understand the other side, try to see the world through his eyes.

I have been reading about Vladimir Putin regularly for 25 years, and on a near daily basis for more than 4 years; I started paying close attention to the developments in Ukraine in 2012; There is much I don’t know and I’m not going to try to make some grand predictions, but there is a sense to him: he thinks he is going to win the war.

Several pieces go into that but at the center is his confidence in himself: he is not going to yield and the folks around him are not going to either. Is he happy with the way the war is going? To a certain extent, yes. It is important at this point to understand that there is a cultural strain that runs through most countries, and it affects how they fight. Russians view warfare through a ground war lens. It does not mean they can’t use air warfare or naval warfare or any other dimension. But their primary “lens” is the army. (So is Ukraine’s, though less so.) So, does it affect his view of the war that the cruiser Moskva was sunk? No. He may not like it, but it changes essentially nothing.

The attack on the bombers? Much the same. And, he will know the true extent of the damage - probably 8 airframes lost, another 8 or 10 damaged; fewer than the initial reports. Does he like his bomber force? Certainly. And the attack is sure to have angered I’m. But my sense is that it did not, and will not, affect his “calculus.”

And the fact that just days later his troops were said to have reached Dnipropetrovsk will validate his world view: the army counts, the army is winning the war.

Did they start off with the wrong net assessment? Yes. Did they have the wrong strategy? Yes. They began the war by committing a tremendous strategic error, but then they changed their strategy, and have fought back. That is all the proof he needs that he is right. And, they have a strategy that may be high cost, but is low risk. And they are winning. 

And I would add, the Russian assessment is that the Ukrainians are losing as many troops - or more as the Russians. And they have far fewer troops to lose. 

What does that mean for Trump? 

Simply put, both the carrot and the stick need to be bigger. Getting the Kremlin's attention will mean there has to be much greater risk and cost of continuing and a much greater reward for stopping; any deal making has to be grand in scope to get Putin’s attention.

I would add one more thought: one of the curious pieces of this war is how adamant both sides appear that they are winning. That is, of course, necessary in any war, to keep public morale up. But it does appear they both believe it. It is impossible from the outside, reading just what is online, to know the ground truth, and it is also true that in most wars who is winning and who is losing can be difficult to determine even when you have all the information. But in a war of attrition, the manpower pool is probably the best objective indicator - measuring “will” being impossible. And none of us knows what the real number is, the number of available bodies for service. But it is reasonable to guess that Russia has substantially more…

v/r pete