The Russo-Ukraine War: 

A New Phase

June 1st, 2025

It is a good bet that we are about to enter a new phase of the Russian - Ukraine war, that the war is going to escalate in some way. If you took the day off from the news, you may have missed what happened in Russia yesterday: Ukrainian special operations personnel conducted a quite imaginative strike on 4 different Russian Air Force bomber bases, one of them in central Siberia, and released video of several TU-95 Bears being destroyed.

The Ukrainians claim 40 aircraft were destroyed, a mix of Bear and Backfire bombers, as well as 1 x A-50 Mainstay, an AWACS-like aircraft. So far (I am writing this around noon on Sunday) 2 x TU-95 Bears have been confirmed as destroyed, 5 x Bears and 2 x TU-22 Backfires damages, and 1 x AN-12 destroyed; expect those numbers to change as the afternoon progresses.

The question is: what will this mean?

From a simple, tactical perspective, not much. Over the entire course of the war (3 years and 3 months), the Russians have launched about 2,500 cruise missiles of various types, perhaps half of them launched by their bombers. In 2024 bombers launched 920 of nearly 1800 cruise missiles. Overall, Ukrainian Air Force personnel have noted a drop in cruise missile use over the last several months as the Shahed drones have increased in lethality, while remaining far less expensive than the cruise missiles. In addition, the UAF has been quite successful in engaging and defeating Russian cruise missiles, using both surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles, as well as electronic warfare, and on any given night fewer than half of the cruise missiles reach their targets and often lately none reach their targets.

Thus, the loss of the long-range bombers is unlikely to have a major impact on Russian targeting decisions on a daily basis. Further, the Russian bomber-launched cruise missiles have had virtually no impact on the battlefield, and have mainly (though not exclusively) been directed at infrastructure targets: the power grid and ports.

The question is what effect this will have in Moscow and Kyiv.

In Kyiv the obvious impact will be on morale, this is an obvious morale boost.  It’s worth noting, however, that there’ve been few instances in history where nations have sought peace after being bombed, at least not until a great deal of damage has been done.  Rather, they usually “dig in.” And, as just noted above, it’s hard to see how this will affect the fight on the ground in any way.

In Moscow the question will be contingent on the actual amount of damage. If the losses are as listed above: 3 aircraft destroyed, and 7 damaged, then there may be no response. Russia’s bomber force is not huge: 55 x TU95 Bears, 56 x TU-22 Backfires, 17 x TU-160 Blackjacks. 128 total bombers, but even so, a loss of 2 and damage to 7 would be irritating but no more, and so that might - might - not draw a response.

But, if the numbers climb into the region claimed by Ukraine: 40 total bombers struck, and in particular the fact that one bomber base was several thousand miles from Ukraine, this will be perceived as a strike against Russia itself. It will not take a great deal of imagination, and a touch of propaganda, to suggest that the next strike might destroy St. Basil’s in the Kremlin. Russian spokesmen will invoke Rodina, and there will be every effort to stoke patriotic fervor.

The question that begs to be answered is: What are Putin’s options?

Remembering that negotiators from both sides are scheduled to meet tomorrow in Istanbul, Putin can choose to ignore this. And Kyiv could privately make the point that there is more in store for Russia if they don’t agree to a ceasefire. 

On the other hand, Putin could perceive this as a direct threat to his rule and, from his perspective, a threat to Russia, and therefore choose to escalate.

Escalation, of course, won’t mean much in terms of the Russian Air Force. The bomber force has been of little impact in the war (not to be confused with tactical aviation which has been quite effective, especially when using the JDAM-ER like FAB 500 and FAB 1500 bombs).

But Putin still has the option to mobilize, go to a war footing, and commit the bulk of the army, to include conscripts, to the war in Ukraine. Will that ameliorate those in Russia who insist on smashing Ukraine? Probably not, but it might be an interim step.

Might he consider a nuclear response? Certainly he will consider it. What no one knows - except Vlad Putin, is what is his real threshold for use. If he is convinced - or convinces himself - that the next attack will be either another attempt to kill him - and more likely to succeed as Ukrainian tactics improve, or to perhaps destroy St Basil’s and the Kremlin, it is possible he will consider the use of a low yield nuclear weapon (or two or three) in order to force a “reset.”

If he does, what should be the US response? And what does that mean for Taiwan ? And South Korea?And Japan?

What is important is to note that this attack is of high enough visibility that the visibility alone demands some response, which will presumably either be to now seek a ceasefire, or to escalate. If Putin is going to seek a ceasefire in the wake of this attack it would be very interesting, and more or less a first in the history of “air strikes." It would also mean running the risk of being deposed by those around him. It is more likely he will escalate; the question is: How?