June 2nd, 2025

Politics - Meeting In Istanbul - Ukrainian Memorandum

Combat Ops - Operations Spider’s Web

Weather

Kharkiv

79 and sunny. Cloudy, thunderstorms Tuesday and Wednesday, then several days of mostly sunny wether. Daily lows around 60, daily highs upper 70s. Winds westerly, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

81 and sunny. Rain and thunderstorms on Wednesday, rest of the week mostly sunny. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

78 and cloudy, gusting to 20. Rain tonight, rain and thunderstorms tomorrow, then partly cloudy until Thursday night, then more thunderstorms. Daily lows in the 50s, daily highs in the upper 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Politics and Diplomacy

In Istanbul, the talks concluded by 0900 EDT, lasting just about an hour. The only developments appear to be the Ukraine delegation handing the Russian a list of the names of missing children and the Russian handing the Ukrainians a memorandum listing minimum agreements and the plan for negations. Ukraine had already provide their memorandum to Russia; the Ukrainian memorandum is provide in full below.

The Turkish ForMin spokesman noted that the talks: “didn’t end negatively.”

The Ukrainian Memorandum:

Key principles of the agreement and the negotiation process

→ A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary prerequisite for peace negotiations.

→ Confidence-building measures – resolution of humanitarian issues: unconditional return of all deported and illegally displaced Ukrainian children. Exchange of all prisoners on an "all for all" basis. Release by Russia of all civilian hostages.

→ Non-recurrence of aggression : The goal of the negotiations is to restore a permanent basis for lasting peace and security and to ensure that aggression does not recur.

→ Security guarantees and involvement of the international community:Ukraine must receive reliable security guarantees. The parties will invite the international community to participate in the negotiations and provide guarantees to ensure the implementation of the agreements.

→ Sovereignty: Ukraine does not undertake obligations to be neutral. The state can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Kyiv’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance. No restrictions can be placed on the size, deployment, or other parameters of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, as well as on the deployment of troops of foreign friendly states on the territory of Ukraine.

→ Territorial issues: territorial gains made by the Russian Federation since February 2014 are not recognized by the international community. The contact line is the starting point for negotiations. Territorial issues are discussed only after a complete and unconditional ceasefire.

→ Sanctions: Some restrictions may be lifted on Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for reimposing sanctions if necessary. Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used to rebuild Ukraine or remain frozen until reparations are paid.

→ Agreement implementation: a clear, balanced and achievable "roadmap" for implementing and enforcing agreements.

The next step is to agree on a ceasefire and the agenda for the leaders' meeting.

→ after the meeting in Istanbul, the parties will continue negotiations, which will focus on a complete and unconditional ceasefire: its conditions and monitoring;

→ confidence-building measures;

→ preparing and agreeing on the agenda for future leaders' talks on key issues;

→ negotiations will be held with the participation of the USA and Europe.

Cease-fire

→ a complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea for at least 30 days (with the possibility of extension every 30 days) as a necessary prerequisite for peace negotiations;

→ monitoring of the ceasefire, led by the US and supported by third countries.

Confidence-building measures

→ after the successful exchange of prisoners of war as a result of the negotiations in Istanbul, the parties continue the process of exchanging all prisoners of war (the principle of "all for all").

→ an agreement on the unconditional return by the Russian Federation of all deported and displaced Ukrainian children, as well as the release of all civilian prisoners. These measures should apply to all categories of persons listed, starting from February 2014.

Leaders' meeting

The leaders of Ukraine and Russia will meet to agree on key aspects of a final peace settlement.

Key issues of the peace agreement that must be agreed upon by the leaders:

→ permanent and complete cessation of hostilities: conditions, monitoring, sanctions for violations;

→ guarantees of security and non-repetition of aggression;

→ territorial issues;

→ economy, compensation, restoration of Ukraine;

→ sanctions for violating the peace agreement;

→ procedure for concluding a final peace agreement.

Combat Operations

Due to the extent of air operations over the last several days I will focus on those actions.

Ground Operations 

The war continued on the ground over the weekend, across the entire front line, with fighting described as fierce. Russian forces made some gains north of Sumy City as they continue to try to carve out a buffer zone, and it appears that Russian forces now control the town of Kostyantynivka (due north of Sumy City) and terrain immediately south of the town, as well as the town of Oleksiivka (about 4 miles south-east of Kostyantynivka).

Russian forces also gained ground both north of Toretsk - taking control of the small village (perhaps 20 houses) of Dyliivka (about 2 miles due north of Toretsk, sitting astride the rail line from Horlivka to Kostyantynivka).

South and west of Toretsk Russian forces also made gains as they continue to slowly push north-west from Toretsk, and also continue to push lowly northward along the H-20 and T0504 roadways. There are conflicting claims as to whether the Russians made any gains in these area. Imagery confirms that they have taken the small town of Zorya - just west of Romanivka, and probably have control of parts of Popiv Yar, just west of the T0504 roadway. How far they have pushed up the H-20 isn’t clear but there was some fighting reported in the Yablunivka area. 

Elsewhere across the southern and eastern front fighting continued but there were no significant developments.

Air Operations

During the night of  June 1st-June 2nd Russian forces launched 3 x Iskander ballistic missiles and 84 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 15 drones, and 37 were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Kharkiv, Kherson, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia Oblast but reports are not complete.

RuAF tacair struck 14 Ukrainian towns last night.

During the night of  May 31st-June 1st Russian forces launched 3 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 4 x Kh-101 cruise missiles, and 472 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot 3 cruise missiles, shot down 213 drones, and 172 drones were lost (defeated by EW). Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odessa, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr oblasts. This is the largest drone strike of the war.

Of note, none of the ballistic missiles were successfully engaged and the UAF states that they are running low on PATRIOT missiles.

During the night of  May 30th-31st Russian forces launched 3 x Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, 2 x S-300 ballistic missiles, 2 x Jet-powered drones, and 107 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down the 3 cruise missiles and 42 drones, and 30 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Cherkasy, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts.

During the night of  May 29th-30th Russian forces launched 2 Iskander ballistic missiles and 92 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down  26 drones, and 30 drones were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Odessa, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

RuAF assets conducted air strikes on 16 towns across the front.

Russian air defense forces claimed to have shot down 162 Ukrainian drones last night but did not report how many were believed launched into Russian air space nor were there any reports of damage.

During the night of June 1st - June 2nd - and airfield in Borisoglebsk (300 miles south-south-east of Moscow) was attacked by “a large number of drones."

Operation Spider’s Web

The Ukrainian Special Services struck 4 Russian bomber bases Sunday: Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. Ukrainian Special Services claimed the strikes damaged or destroyed 41 aircraft, a mix of TU-95 Bear and TU-22M Backfire aircraft as well as 1 A-50 Mainstay Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. Ukrainian Special Services reported that 117 drones were used in the operation (named "Operation Spider’s Web”), loaded into sealed crates and driven to the designated launch areas near the Russian AF bases by unwitting drivers, who were instructed to simply park the vehicles and wait. The crates were then remotely opened and the drones launched.

The results of the strike have not been confirmed.

The Ukrainian operatives reportedly had all left Russia by the time the attack took place on Sunday. 

Russia had, as of Sunday morning, 55 x TU-95 Bears, 56 x TU-22M Backfires, and just 5 x A-50 Mainstay. Russia also has 17 x TU-160 Blackjack bombers, for a total bomber force of 128 aircraft. Obviously the loss of 40 aircraft (more than 30% of your force) would be a serious blow to the Russian AF.

For nuclear accounting purposes, 52 x Bears and 15 x Blackjacks are listed as Russia’s nuclear strategic bomber force.

Imagery of Belaya Airfield showed 4 x TU-22 Backfires and 3 x TU-95 Bears “probably destroyed” and 1 x TU-95 damaged. Other analysis brings the total as I write this to: 8 x TU-95s, 4 x TU-22Ms and one An-12 have been destroyed or damaged; expect those numbers to change as the day progresses.

It is important to note the the loss of these aircraft, while a blow to Russian long range strike capabilities will have little impact on the war as a whole, and virtually none on the war on the ground. Over the entire course of the war (3 years and 3 months), the Russians have launched about 2,500 cruise missiles of various types, perhaps half of them launched by their bombers. In 2024 bombers launched 920 of nearly 1800 cruise missiles. Overall, Ukrainian Air Force personnel have noted a drop in cruise missile use over the last several months as the Shahed drones have increased in lethality, while remaining far less expensive than the cruise missiles. In addition, the UAF has been quite successful in engaging and defeating Russian cruise missiles, using both surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles, as well as electronic warfare, and on any given night fewer than half of the cruise missiles reach their targets and often lately none reach their targets.

Thus, the loss of the long-range bombers is unlikely to have a major impact on Russian targeting decisions on a daily basis. Further, the Russian bomber-launched cruise missiles have had virtually no impact on the battlefield, and have mainly (though not exclusively) been directed at infrastructure targets: the power grid and ports.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jan8 Feb7 Mar4 Apr8 May8 May30 Jun2

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      76.69 74.89 70.00 64.80 61.93 63.89 65.33

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      73.94 71.17 66.97 61.37 59.00 60.67 63.43

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15      3.66 3.37 4.44 3.69 3.64 3.53 3.68

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17      5.37 5.86 5.37 5.38 5.34 5.33 5.45

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    105.18 96.88 89.50 86.24 82.45 79.13 78.93

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 42.33 41.46 41.40 41.18 41.55 41.57 41.68

Urals 56.56    71.76 68.32 65.49 52.76 54.13 57.95 57.16

ESPO 78.19 N/A 71.50 70 48.90 63.15 63.15

Sokol 72.79 70.92 67.20 61.42 57.39 58.66 59.15

Thoughts 

The strikes on the airfields - the destruction of Russian strategic weapon systems - represents the start of a new phase of the war, directly impacting Russia’s great power status and representing a clear loss of face for not simply Putin, his regime, and the Russian military, but for Russia itself. 

It would seem that Putin has only a few options here and they are obvious: 

- Putin can attempt to ignore it and carry on, business as usual. That will be difficult to do, but will, at least in part, depend upon the actual BDA from the strike: a handful of aircraft lost and another handful damaged is one issue, the loss of 40 bombers out of a force of 128 is quite another. If Ukraine uses the fact of the strike to try to pressure Putin, Putin will probably find that he must respond.

- Putin could use this as an epiphany and sue for peace. It is unlikely, and would probably get 1 : 1000 odds in Vegas, but it is a possibility.

- Putin can deliver an ultimatum - publicly or privately - and wait a certain period of time and then respond - my guess is that this is the most likely course.

- He could say nothing but simply respond - this is unlikely - the Russian people will expect an explanation and Putin has to give one to spin a tale as to why he is not to blame.

Assuming he delivers an explanation and ultimatum, what is Putin then likely to do? He really has only a limited range of military options:

- Do more, without really changing anything, this is what he wants, but simply insisting that everybody “work harder” won’t mean much if he can’t actually expend more ammunition.

- Mobilization, put Russia on a war footing and use the entire army to fight the war - which might be necessary but would result in a very slow response, would further hurt the economy, and leave a large slice of the population frustrated.

- More missile strikes, specifically, ballistic missile strikes - but it isn’t clear that the Russians have more than the perhaps 500 tactical (conventionally armed) ballistic missiles so this would be unpleasant but would not materially affect Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war, unless the Russians were to focus on some specific targets, such as the bridges over the Dnepr. Whether they have enough missiles, given accuracy + reliability + warhead size, to destroy all or most of the bridges would be a key issue.

- Tactical nuclear weapons, which certainly could, for example, destroy all the bridges and leave eastern Ukraine separate from western Ukraine.

All in all, Putin’s choice will depend on the actual BDA to a lesser extent, and to a greater extent what others are saying: what did the Ukrainians say in private today in Istanbul, and what did the White House (the President, SecState, the various Ambassadors) say via phone or face to face. There’s also a question as to whether President Xi would add his voice to the mix, perhaps cautioning Putin to not use nuclear weapons as it would raise that issue in Xi’s calculus vis-a-vis Taiwan and the US response.

Of course, if the Ukrainians told the Russian negotiators that they can expect more of the same unless there is a ceasefire, I would think there is a distinct chance that Putin will very seriously consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

As I was told by an old Navy F-4 guy many years ago, when you drop bombs on people you piss them off.

I think we can expect President Putin to be pissed off. Just how much is the question now.

v/r pete