June 3rd, 2025 1942 - Japanese forces attack Aleutians, start of

Operation Mi (the IJN attack on Midway Island

Politics - Russian Memorandum of Conditions

Combat Ops - Russian forces gain ground in Sumy Oblast

- Russian forces gain ground west of Toretsk 

Special Operations - Kerch Bridge Attacked

Weather

Kharkiv

86 and partly sunny, gusts near 20. Thunderstorms Wednesday morning, then several days of mostly sunny weather. Daily lows around 60, daily highs upper 70s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Melitopol

815and sunny. Partly cloudy on Wednesday with afternoon thunderstorms, rest of the week mostly sunny. Daily lows around 60, daily highs in the 80s. Winds variable, 5-10kts.

Kyiv

64 and cloudy, gusting to 30. Rain tonight, clearing by morning, Wednesday and Thursday sunny, then more thunderstorms. Daily lows in the upper 50s, daily highs near 80. Winds variable, 10-15kts.

Politics and Diplomacy

As noted yesterday, Ukraine had already provided Russia with its memorandum of minimum conditions for negotiations, while Russia waited until yesterday to present their memorandum. The below is being passed around and is reportedly the Russian memorandum, though there continues to be some confusion and it has not yet received any sort of official imprimatur.

MinDef Umerov, who headed the Ukrainian delegation, said that the Ukrainian government would study the document and get and respond within a week. The Ukrainian team has proposed the next round of talks take place between June 20th and June 30th.

The key points of the Russian Memorandum are:

• Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporozhzhia internationally recognized as Russian 
• Ukraine doesn’t join NATO or any military bloc 
• Ukraine holds Elections 
• Ukraine withdraws troops from new Russian regions 
• Ukraine bans “Nazi” propaganda

Draft as of June 1, 2025

Proposals of the Russian Federation (Memorandum)

on the Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis

Section I

Key Parameters for a Definitive Settlement

1. International legal recognition of the incorporation into the Russian Federation of Crimea, the LPR, the DPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions; full withdrawal from these territories of Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) units and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations;
2. Neutrality of Ukraine, implying its refusal to join military alliances and coalitions, as well as a ban on any military activity by third-party states on Ukrainian territory and the deployment of foreign armed formations, military bases and military infrastructure there;
3. Termination of all existing international treaties and agreements inconsistent with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this Section, and refusal to conclude any such agreements in the future;
4. Confirmation of Ukraine's status as a state without nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, with a direct ban on their receipt, transit and deployment on Ukrainian territory;
5. Establishment of maximum limits for the size of the AFU and other Ukrainian military formations, the quantity of armaments and military equipment, and their permissible specifications; dissolution of Ukrainian nationalist formations within the AFU and National Guard;
6. Guarantees of the full rights, freedoms and interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking population; granting the Russian language official status;
7. Legislative prohibition of the glorification and propaganda of Nazism and neo-Nazism, dissolution of nationalist organizations and parties;
8. Lifting of all current economic sanctions, bans and restrictive measures between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and refusal to impose new ones;
9. Resolution of issues related to family reunification and displaced persons;
10. Waiver of mutual claims for damages incurred during hostilities;
11. Removal of restrictions imposed on the Orthodox Church of Ukraine;
12. Gradual restoration of diplomatic and economic relations (including gas transit), transport and other connections, including with third-party states.

Section II

Ceasefire Conditions

Option 1.

Commencement of complete withdrawal of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations from the territory of the Russian Federation, including the DPR, LPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, and their pullback from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties, in accordance with Provisions to be approved.

Option 2. "Package Proposal":

1. Prohibition on redeployment of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations, except for movements aimed at withdrawal from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties;
2. Cessation of mobilization and commencement of demobilization;
3. Cessation of foreign supplies of military products and foreign military assistance to Ukraine, including the provision of satellite communication services and intelligence data;
4. Elimination of military presence of third countries on Ukrainian territory, cessation of participation of foreign specialists in military operations on Ukraine's side;
5. Guarantees of Ukraine's renunciation of sabotage and subversive activities against the Russian Federation and its citizens;
6. Establishment of a bilateral Center for Monitoring and Control of the Ceasefire Regime;
7. Mutual amnesty for "political prisoners" and release of detained civilians;
8. Lifting of martial law in Ukraine;
9. Announcement of the date for elections of the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;
10. Signing of an Agreement on the implementation of provisions contained in Section I.

Section III

Sequence of Steps and Timeline for Implementation

1. Work commences on drafting the Treaty text;
2. A 2-3 day ceasefire is declared for collection of bodies of the fallen in the "gray zone";
3. Six thousand bodies of AFU servicemen are unilaterally transferred to the AFU;
4. A Ceasefire Memorandum is signed with specific dates for fulfillment of all provisions, determining the date for signing the future Treaty on Final Settlement (hereinafter, the Treaty);
5. A 30-day ceasefire regime takes effect from the moment the AFU withdrawal begins. Complete withdrawal of AFU units from the territory of the Russian Federation and full implementation of the
   "package agreement" must be completed within these 30 days;
6. Elections are conducted and government bodies are formed on the territory of Ukraine;
7. The Treaty is signed;
8. The signed Treaty is endorsed by a legally binding UN Security Council resolution;
9. The Treaty is ratified, enforced, and implemented.

Ground Operations 

The most important fighting continues in the border region of Sumy Oblast, and in the pocket between Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk; President Zelenskyy commented that 125,000 Russian troops are now massed along the border in this area; there is no confirmation of this comment.

SUMY AND KHARKIV OBLAST

Fighting continues in an arc north of Sumy city, an arc a bit more than 30 miles in length and from perhaps 4 to 10 miles wide. Recent imagery shows activity in the vicinity of Andriivka, due north of Sumy City, and reporting suggests Russian forces have also recently occupied Oleksiivka, Novomykhailivka, and Kindrativka, and moved into the area west of Yablunivka and Kostyantynivka.

Fighting also continued north-west of Sumy city in the vicinity of Tetkino but there were no changes in the lines in this area.

Anecdotal reporting suggests that Russian forces near Tetkino are having some difficulties getting enough supplies as a result of the two small rail road bridges (one in Bryansk Oblast, one in Kursk Oblast), that were dropped by Ukrainian Special Services personnel over the weekend.

There was no change in the front line with the forces located on the border with Belgorod Oblast, or with the units due north of Kharkiv city.

NORTH OF THE DONETS RIVER

Fighting continues along the length of the line of contact, but with the only confirmed changes west of Terny, where Russian forces gained ground in Karpivka, in a thrust west from Nove. Karpivka is a small town of about 400, sitting on either side of a reservoir formed by the Nitrius River, and sits about 8 miles from the Oskil River. Russian forces probably also made gains pushing north-west from Ridokub.

BAKHMUT AND THE RUSSIAN CENTER

There were no confirmed changes in the front lines north and north-east of Bakhmut, though there is a good deal of activity east of Siversk, in the area of Verkhnokamianka, and some unconfirmed reports suggest the Russians are concentrating forces in this area.

West of Bakhmut - south of Chasiv Yar, Russian forces were engaged with Ukrainian forces about 1 miles north of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar about 4 miles). As Russian forces were confirmed yesterday to have pushed north into the Dyliivka area (south of Bila Hora), and are pushing west from the Kurdiumivka area, it appears that the Russians are trying to close up the pocket between Toretsk, Chasiv Yar and the Donets Canal.

Around Toretsk, fighting continues north of that town but with no confirmed changes in that immediate area, though fighting was reported on the edge of Pleshchiivka, west-north-west of Toretsk. In the pocket between Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk, west of Toretsk, Russian forces made small gains, moving one or two tree lines at several points in the pocket, pushing north from Romanivka, and west (near the roadway) into the western edge of Yablunivka.

Fighting continues around Pokrovsk, as well, with the Ukrainian General Staff reporting engagements in or near 13 different towns in this general area.

South of the Pokrovsk area, along the Vovcha River, there were no confirmed changes.

Further south, along the Novopil - Vesele line, Russian forces picked up ground west of Novopil, pushing to the southern edge of Ternyrivka, as well as pushing into the terrain to the south and south-west of that town.

There were no reported changes to the line across southern Ukraine.

Air Operations

During the night of  June 2nd-June 3rd Russian forces launched 112 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 60 drones, and 15 were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odessa and Zaporizhzhia Oblast but reports are not complete.

RuAF tacair struck 15 Ukrainian towns last night.

During the night of  June 1st-June 2nd Russian forces launched 3 x Iskander ballistic missiles, 1x Kh-101 cruise missile, and 84 x Shahed drones into Ukrainian airspace. The UAF claimed it shot down 15 drones, and 37 were “lost” (brought down by EW). Damage was reported in Kharkiv, Kherson, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia Oblast but reports are not complete.

RuAF tacair struck 14 Ukrainian towns last night.

UAF reporting notes that Russian “smart glide bombs” (UDMK: УМПК; Унифицированный модуль планирования и коррекции, Unified gliding and correction module, informal referred to as JDAMski, and roughly equivalent to the US JDAM-ER (extended range)) continues to be modified and a new extended range weapon (UDMK-PD); previous range estimates were 60 - 80 KM (37 - 49 miles), but the extended range weapon is now estimated to have an effective range of 95 km (59 miles)

Special Operations

Operation Spider’s Web Damage Assessment

The below is from open-source assessment of commercial imagery and will take several days to settle to final numbers (weather, availability of satellites (orbits and other tasking, etc.)) all playing a roll in the final evaluation.

Open-source analysts on X assessed from available imagery published on June 2:

- Belaya Air Base, Irkutsk Oblast: 4 x Tu-95 bombers and 3 x Tu-22M3 bombers destroyed or damaged

- Ivanovo Air Base, Ivanovo Oblast: 1 x A-50 airborne early warning aircraft

- Olenya Air Base, Murmansk Oblast: 4 x Tu-95 bombers and 1 x An-22 transport 

Also, a correction from yesterday: the correct numbers on cruise missile launches and effectiveness by Russian bombers: Since the war began Russian bombers have launched 2,437 cruise missiles (mostly targeted at the power grid and port infrastructure) and the UAF has shot down 1,916 (79% loss rate, a 21% success rate). Yesterday I commented that less than half got through; in fact, less than 1 in 4 got through.

Explosions were reported in Kerch during the night; This morning the Secruty Services of Ukraine claimed that an 1100 KG charge (2428lbs) was placed underwater near a support for the Kerch bridge and detonated. Russian authorities are now examine the bridge, and the bridge is temporarily closed.

Economic Reporting

Feb22   Jun10-22Jun8-23 Jan8 Feb7 Mar4 Apr8 May8 Jun2 Jun3

Brent      94.71      120.90    75.58      76.69 74.89 70.00 64.80 61.93 65.33 65.28

WTI     92.10    119.50  71.29      73.94 71.17 66.97 61.37 59.00 63.43 63.31

NG       3.97        8.41      2.15      3.66 3.37 4.44 3.69 3.64 3.68 3.69

Wheat     8.52       10.71    6.17      5.37 5.86 5.37 5.38 5.34 5.45 5.40

Ruble     85        58.48    82.59    105.18 96.88 89.50 86.24 82.45 78.93 78.86

Hryvnia Pre Oct 2023 - 36.4 42.33 41.46 41.40 41.18 41.55 41.68 41.54

Urals 56.56    71.76 68.32 65.49 52.76 54.13 57.16 57.16

ESPO 78.19 N/A 71.50 70 48.90 63.15 63.23

Sokol 72.79 70.92 67.20 61.42 57.39 59.15 59.92

OPEC+ decide over the weekend to increase total production by 411,000 barrels per day in July, the 3rd increase in a row. However, as the market expected a larger increase, oil prices rose on the news of increased production.

Thoughts 

There is a school of thought, with a lot of bright people in it, that says that Putin will consider his losses so far, and particularly what happened over the weekend and the loss of the bombers, and, in light of hints of substantially greater sanctions, will turn to President Trump and accept the deal offered earlier.

This is certainly a possibility. 

As it now stands, nothing has changed in day-to-day operations and Russian forces on the ground - as has been noted before, carry on, oblivious to any other developments around them: political, economic, naval, or aerial.

If Putin is to take this event as an “inflection point,” as some have called it, then I would think he would need to sell it to Russians as an epiphany. Failing that, if he continues, he is likely to try to make it “worth it.” In effect, it would seem that - if he continues - he has accepted the “sunk cost” perspective, at which point, no cost is too high.

But that would seem to be a choice only Putin can make.

v/r pete