December 30, 2024

Overall

Overall, the fighting on the ground in the last several days has slowed, with Russian forces making marginal gains in most sectors but it would appear that movement, and attacks, are hampered by cold, but not freezing, weather and the occasional rain showers. Nevertheless, Russian forces continue to move forward and several small towns along the front that were contested are now under Russian control. None, however, represents substantial changes in the tactical picture at this point.

There was no sector in which Ukrainian forces appear to have made any gains.

Of note, in the Kursk salient, Russian forces continue to make small gains; they are clearly trying to inch towards a pincer, cutting across the salient just inside the Russian border.

In regards to the Pokrovsk salient, Russian forces inched westward from positions just east of Pokrovsk, these were small but real gains.

South and south-west of Pokrovsk Russian forces have established control over Shevchenko, Pishchane and Novovasylivka, Novoolenivka and Ukrainka, and are pushing into Solone. 

What this really means is that the Russian forces continue to take ground south and south-west of Pokrovsk as they seek to both cut off the south-west corner of Ukrainian controlled terrain, and set themselves up for a push northward, behind (west of) Pokrovsk and into the center of eastern Ukraine where there are few if any defensive positions.

Russian forces still do not have control over the north-west section of Kurakhove (the site of the thermal power plant), but the town is nearly surrounded, and the roads have all been cut.

Just to the south Russian forces continue to advance and Ukrainian forces have withdrawn north of the Sukhi Yaly river. A small pocket of terrain remains under nominal Ukrainian control but there is little likelihood that it will do so for more than another week or two.

Around Velyka Novosilke (VN) Russian forces once again hold Novyi Komar, and have advanced on VN from the south and west, but have not yet pressed into the town proper. However, once again the ground lines of communication are under Russian control, making sustaining the fight very difficult.

Elsewhere, there were marginal Russian gains across the south.

As for air operations, President Zelenskyy commented that for the week of December 22 - 28 Russian forces launched 370 x Shahed drones, 280 x guided glide bombs, and 80 x cruise and ballistic missiles into Ukraine.

Kyiv’s military administration office also released the following stats for 2024:  200 total attacks on Kyiv, consisting of:

1,300 x Shahed drones

200+ x cruise missiles

24 x ballistic missiles

22 x Kinzhal ballistic missiles

7 x Zircon missiles

There were also a series of aid announcements:

The White House announced a $2.5 billion military aid package that includes:

• Surface to air missiles (not further ID’d)
• HIMARS rockets
• 155MM and 105MM Ammo
• JDAM
• Anti-tank missiles
• Crew served weapons ammo and small arms ammo
• Demolition munitions
• Communication gear
• A wide range of training, maintenance and spare parts

The US Treasury Secretary announced a $3.4 billon direct budget support package for Ukraine. This brings direct budget support to the Ukrainian government, from the US, since February 2022 to just over $30 billion.

The World Bank and Ukraine agreed on a $15 billion grant - this grant is backed by the US.

Ukraine and Russia carried out a prisoner exchange, with each side turning over 189 prisoners.

Finally, Ukraine received the first Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) shipment from the US on December 27th. Private electricity company DTEK received 100 million cubic meters of gas, the first shipment of a deal that runs through 2026 and which is set to be extended through 2046.

Thoughts

In the first few days of the war, and continuing certainly through the first full year, the Ukrainians won the InfoWar dimension of the war, hands down. President Zelenskyy was masterful in his orchestration of the message, and it was that strategic messaging that really helped forge the ad hoc alliances that have kept Ukraine funded and armed.

In 2023 Zelenskyy may have had some missed steps, and the counter-offensive did not go well, but on the whole, he continued to win the InfoWar. However, the public disagreement with Gen. Zaluzhnyi (replaced at the beginning if 2024), and the simple fact that the army has continued to lose ground, has all seemed to take the its toll on Zelenskyy.

He has faced any number of diplomatic struggles in the past year, including would-be NATO allies (at least 7 countries - potential allies - voicing opposition to Ukraine joining NATO), calls by Hungary’s Prime Minster Orban for a ceasefire and talks to begin immediately, followed by Zelenskyy’s comment that Orban’s relationship with Putin is “too warm,” Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico voicing anger at Ukraine’s failure to maintain the transit agreement for Russian natural gas to move to eastern Europe (Slovakia, Moldova, and Hungary), etc. 

The problems from afar don’t seem insurmountable, but he seems more prone to make harsh statements, to answer quickly and somewhat rashly, and in doing so alienating those he needs to support Ukraine. It raises an issue to me for which there is no easy answer: Zelenskyy appears to be approaching burn-out. He may not collapse, but is he as crisp as he was, does he have all his wits about him? Or is he mentally exhausted? And if he is, who is there to replace him?

v/r pete