Vilayet of Syria

10 December 2024

In 1864 the Ottomans, under their Provincial Reform Law, reorganized their empire into a hierarchy of regions, at the top of which were the vilayets (Turkish for “province”). One was the Vilayet of Syria, also known as the Vilayet of Damascus. Other vilayets included Ham, Aleppo, Beirut, etc.

All this was during the sunset of the Ottoman Empire. But, despite the reputation of the Ottoman Empire in its final 150 years, and particularly its last 50, for roughly 400 years the Ottomans ruled present day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the Sinai and the eastern shore of the Red Sea as far south as Jeddah and Mecca, and they ruled it fairly well.

As for the Vilayets, within each vilayet there were a series of subdivisions, each divided into Sanjaks, and those into kazas, which were essentially sharia court jurisdictions. Because travel was difficult, regions and clans remained distinct; the sultan and his deputies ruled, but for the most part, as they had for centuries, they left local matters to local courts and to the clans.

All that serves as a distant background to what’s now happening. As you are all aware, things have happened very quickly over the past week or so and suddenly the Assad regime is out of power, Assad and family now in Moscow. The Russians are also leaving, and the various factions are forming some sort of transitional government.

Iran is also out, for all intents and purposes, and a coalition, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is in charge. HTS, as you’ll recall, is led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani, former leader of the al Nusra front, the former Syrian branch of Al Qaeda.

So far they’re saying the right words, they won’t be persecuting various sects, etc., nor will they meddle in the affairs of other countries or reach across various borders.

Of course HTS is still listed as a terrorist group by the US and EU…

What is likely to happen next? The short answer is: Who knows? 

In fact, there are so many variables at play that every day could see changes that throw everything before it out onto the trash heap. But, just to throw some ideas out, I’ll make a few guesses and see what comes of it.

In no particular order (because there is no particular order):

Iran is going to have to rethink its entire long game, not just its presence in Syria and Lebanon. The Iranian tool - Hezbollah - has been badly mauled already by the Israelis, who will use the next few weeks of chaos to clean up a few more loose ends in Syria, such as Iranian and Syrian support to Hezbollah, and the Syrian air defense network. And the long-running Iranian support to the Assad regime now places Iran at odds with the coalition that controls the country.

Russia is evacuating Tartus. The loss of the port leaves Russia with no port in the Mediterranean. Russia has a presence in Tobruk, Libya, but currently has no presence for the caring of warships. They will try to expand into Libya but this will be expensive. And the problem of Russian warships entering and leaving the Black Sea (Turkey has to approve) means any effort to set up at another port will require support from Russia’s Northern Fleet in Murmansk.

Five or six years ago Russia began working with Iran and Syria to form an alliance that would have, if they had ever actually done it, applied great pressure to the Middle East: squeezing Iraq, and then the Arab countries to the south. This never came together and Russian aspirations (and Iranian) have been set back years and years.

Inside Syria, things are likely to get interesting. The coalition is a diverse bunch: Islamic extremists, Kurdish Marxists, Turkey backed rebels, remnants of ISIS - they may all be getting along right now but that doesn't mean they will be in two weeks. 

And, this is Turkey’s neighborhood. Whereas much of the Syrian and Iraqi population view themselves from a family or clan or sect perspective, Turkey has a strong nationalistic streak that gives that country a great advantage over its neighbors. Turkey has a population of 85 million, far more than the combined populations of Syria and Iraq (70 million), and while Iran has a population of 92 million, the population is substantially less cohesive, as was demonstrated by the riots and internal unrest earlier this year.

Also note that the combined GDPs of these three countries is about $700 billion; the GDP of Turkey (a NATO ally) is almost double that, at $1.3 trillion. 

Turkey also benefits from a fairly stable (a relative term) government and a fairly competent if not necessarily likable leader, Recep Erdogan, who has a great vision for himself. It wouldn’t be much of a reach for Erdogan to see this collapse of Syria as an opportunity to recreate a new Ottoman Empire. Turkey already controls a strip of northern Syria, and has long wanted an opportunity to more fully address its Kurdish minority.

I think that for the next several weeks there’ll be some small amounts of violence but a coalition government will come together. However, given the presence of Kurdish groups, Turkish groups, Syrian minorities, Islamic extremists and Marxists radicals, and everything in between, it would be remarkable if any coalition held together for long.

There’ll be a temptation by some governments to use overt and covert actions to sway the coalition in one direction or another. Some may even view it as to their benefit to bring down the coalition. Certainly, for Erdogan and any dream of creating some sort of Turkish empire, if such a dream secretly exists, that would be one way to advance the plan. Whether Erdogan tries this or not, the thought will cross his mind.

What should the US do?

The US presence in Syria, begun in 2014, was designed to counter ISIS and Islamic extremists, and has expanded into support for the Kurdish backed Syrian  Democratic Forces. That organization - itself a coalition of several groups - is now part of the ruling transitional government. Presumably, the US presence in Syria, said to be currently about 1,000, is no longer needed, with the Assad regime now gone, and the Kurds now part of the ruling government. The US is now, as with the Israelis, in the process of destroying certain weapons of the Assad regime (aren’t we all glad that Israel destroyed the Syrian nuclear weapon program in 2007?)

But, in as much as no one really saw any of this happening, a good indicator we have every little chance of figuring out what happens next, when we have finished breaking Assad’s toys, perhaps it is time to step back and just let things develop, certainly until the next administration can take a hard look at the problem.